









This report is part of the Canadian Index of Wellbeing project organized and funded by the  
Atkinson Charitable Foundation 
 
Andrew Sharpe and Jean-François Arsenault 
CSLS Research Report 2009-4 
June 2009 
 
CENTRE FOR THE 
STUDY OF LIVING 
STANDARDS         
LIVING STANDARDS DOMAIN OF THE CANADIAN 
INDEX OF WELLBEING 
 
 
111 Sparks Street, Suite 500 
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5B5 
613-233-8891, Fax 613-233-8250 
csls@csls.ca   i 
Living Standards Domain of the Canadian Index 
of Wellbeing 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Summary Tables ..................................................................................................... iii 
List of Charts  ...................................................................................................................... iv 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. vii 
Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... viii 
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
II. Average and Median Income and Wealth  ..................................................................... 4 
A. Income Per Capita - National Accounts-Based Estimates .......................................... 5 
1) Gross Domestic Product Per Capita........................................................................... 6 
2) Personal Income Per Capita ....................................................................................... 8 
3) Personal Disposable Income Per Capita .................................................................. 11 
4) Wages and Productivity Measures  ........................................................................... 12 
B. Income Per Family Unit – Based on Household Surveys ......................................... 17 
1) Trends in the Number of Family Units .................................................................... 18 
2) Average Income Per Family Unit ............................................................................ 20 
3) Average Income by Family Type ............................................................................ 23 
4) Government Transfers and Taxes ............................................................................ 24 
5) Median Income of Family Units .............................................................................. 24 
6) Median Income by Family Type  .............................................................................. 27 
7) Trends in the Subjective Economic Situation of Families  ....................................... 28 
C. Wealth Per Capita ..................................................................................................... 30 
1) Wealth – National Accounts Estimates ................................................................... 31 
2) Wealth – Based on Household Surveys ................................................................... 32 
III. Income and Wealth Distribution ............................................................................... 34 
A. Income Distribution .................................................................................................. 35 
1) Income Trends by Quintile ...................................................................................... 35 
2) Gini Coefficient ....................................................................................................... 39 
3) Low Income Measures ............................................................................................. 42 
B. Wealth Distribution ................................................................................................... 51 
IV. Income Volatility  ....................................................................................................... 56 
A. Earnings instability ................................................................................................... 57 
B. Personal bankruptcies  ................................................................................................ 58 
V. Economic Security  ...................................................................................................... 59 
A. Labour Market Security ............................................................................................ 60 
1) Employment Rate and Participation Rate ................................................................ 60 
2) Unemployment rate  .................................................................................................. 61 
3) Incidence and Duration of Unemployment  .............................................................. 62 
4) Supplementary Measures of Unemployment  ........................................................... 63 
5) Long-Term Unemployment ..................................................................................... 64   ii 
6) Job Quality ............................................................................................................... 65 
7) Job Stability ............................................................................................................. 67 
8) Job Anxiety .............................................................................................................. 67 
9) Temporary Jobs  ........................................................................................................ 69 
10) Persons Working 50 Hours or Over  ....................................................................... 71 
11) Incidence of Low Wages ....................................................................................... 72 
B. Housing Security ....................................................................................................... 74 
1) RBC Housing Affordability Index  ........................................................................... 74 
2) Housing Affordability, Adequacy and Suitability – CMHC ................................... 75 
C. Food security ............................................................................................................. 76 
D. Income Security ........................................................................................................ 79 
1) Personal Security Index ........................................................................................... 79 
2) Debt Levels and Savings Rate ................................................................................. 81 
E. Social Safety Net ....................................................................................................... 84 
1) Minimum Wages  ...................................................................................................... 84 
2) Social Assistance Benefits ....................................................................................... 85 
3) Minimum Wage Relative to Welfare Benefits and the Poverty Line ...................... 87 
4) Employment Insurance ............................................................................................ 88 
5) Child Benefits .......................................................................................................... 89 
6) CSLS Economic Security Index .............................................................................. 90 
7) Vulnerable Social Groups ........................................................................................ 97 
VI. Overall Trends in the Living Standards Domain ...................................................... 98 
A. Overall Trends .......................................................................................................... 98 
B. Sustainability of Living Standards .......................................................................... 100 
VII. Living Standards Measurement Issues  ................................................................... 101 
A. Technical and Definitional Issues ........................................................................... 102 
B. Conceptual Issues .................................................................................................... 102 
VIII.  Headline Indicators for the Living Standard Component of the CIW .......... 103 
X. Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 108 
References ....................................................................................................................... 109 
     iii 
List of Summary Tables 
 
Summary Table 1: National Accounts-Based Measures of Real Aggregate Income in 
Canada, Average Annual Change (per cent), 1981-2008 ................................................... 6 
Summary Table 2a: Measure of Wage in Canada Compared to Productivity, Average 
Annual Change (Per Cent) ................................................................................................ 14 
Summary Table 3: Trends in the Number of Family Units, by Family Type, 1981 and 
2007  ................................................................................................................................... 20 
Summary Table 4: Household-Based Measures of Real Aggregate Income in Canada, 
Average Annual Change (per cent)  ................................................................................... 21 
Summary Table 5: Implicit Income Tax and Government Transfers Rate (per cent) ...... 22 
Summary Table 6: Trends in Average After-tax Income Per Family Unit, by Family 
Type, 1981 and 2007, in $2007 ........................................................................................ 24 
Summary Table 7: Median Income per Household in Canada, Average Annual Change 
(per cent) ........................................................................................................................... 26 
Summary Table 8: Trends in Median After-Tax Income per Family Unit, by Family 
Type, 1981 and 2007, in $2007 ........................................................................................ 28 
Summary Table 9: Real Net Worth of Persons and Unincorporated Business, Annual 
Change (per cent) .............................................................................................................. 32 
Summary Table 10: Ratio of Top to Bottom Quintile in Canada, Adjusted for Family Size
  ........................................................................................................................................... 39 
Summary Table 11: Gini Coefficient in Canada for All Family Units, Absolute Value and 
Total Absolute and Percentage Change Over the Period .................................................. 40 
Summary Table 12: Trends in the Percentage of Persons Under the After-Tax LICO, by 
Age Group and Sex, 1981 and 2007, in per Cent, Unless Otherwise Indicated ............... 45 
Summary Table 13: Composite Index of the Canadian Index of Wellbeing, Headline 
Indicators for the Living Standards Domain  ................................................................... 105 
Summary Table 14: Composite Index of the Canadian Index of Wellbeing, Headline 
Indicators for the Living Standards Domain  ................................................................... 106 
 
   iv 
List of Charts 
 
Chart 1a: National Accounts-Based measures of Real Aggregate Income in Canada, Average Annual 
Growth, 1981-2008, per cent 
Chart 1b: A Comparison of Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Real Gross Domestic Income and 
Real Gross National Product on a per Capita Basis, 2002 chained dollars, 1981-2008 
Chart 1c: Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Personal Expenditure Price Index (PEPI), Index (1981 = 
100), 1981-2008 
Chart 2a: Gross Domestic Product, Personal Income and Personal Disposable Income on a per Capita 
Basis ($2002), 1981-2008 
Chart 2b: Implicit Tax Rate, 1981-2008, per cent 
Chart 3: Real Hourly Compensation and Productivity Indexes, (1981=100), 1981-2008 
Chart 4: Growth in Population, Number of Households, Unattached Individuals and Economic 
Families, Index (1981 = 100), 1981-2007 
Chart 5: Average Market, Total and After-Tax Income per Family Unit, $2007, 1981-2007 
Chart 6: Measures of Real Income on a per Capita and per Household Basis, Total Growth, per cent, 
1981-2007 
Chart 7: Median and Average Market Income per Family Unit, $2007, 1981-2007 
Chart 8: Median Market, Total and After-Tax Income per Family Unit, $2007, 1981-2007 
Chart 9: Balance of Opinions About the Future of the Canadian Economy and the Economic Situation 
of One's Family, 1991-2009, in per cent 
Chart 10: Average Net Worth of Persons and Unincorporated Business, per Capita and Family Unit 
(thousands of $2007), 1981-2008 
Chart 11: Adjusted Market, Total and After-Tax Income by Quintile, Economic Families, 2007, 
$2007 
Chart 12: Adjusted Market, Total and After-Tax Income, Economic Families, Change by Quintile for 
the Total 1981-2007 Period, per cent 
Chart 13: Quintile Shares of Adjusted Market, Total and After-Tax Income, Economic Families, 
Change Between 1981 and 2007, percentage points 
Chart 14: Top to Bottom Quintile Ratio for Market, Total and After-Tax Income, Economic Families, 
1981-2007 
Chart 15: Gini Coefficient for Market, Total and After-Tax Income, All Family Units, 1981-2007 
Chart 16a: Percentage of Persons Under the After-Tax Low Income Cut-Offs (LICOs) ($2007), 1981-
2007 
Chart 16b: Estimates of the Average Low Income Gap per Household (2007$), 1981-2007 
Chart 16c: Percentage of Persons Under the After-Tax Low Income Measure (LIM), 1997-2006    v 
Chart 17: Market Basket Measure (MBM), After-Tax LICO and After-Tax LIM, 2000, in per cent 
Chart 18: Share of Population, Low Income (2000) and Persistent Low Income (1996-2000) 
Depending on Socio-Economic Characteristics 
Chart 19: Incidence of Low-Income (2000) and Persistent Low Income (1996-2000), in per cent 
Chart 20a: Comparison of Quintile Median Net Worth in 1999 and 2005 ($2005), All Family Units 
Chart 20b: Quintile Real Median Net Worth, All Family Units, Growth Between 1999 and 2005, Per 
Cent 
Chart 21: Comparison of Quintile Average Net Worth in 1999 and 2005 ($2005), All Family Units 
Chart 22a: Share of Total Net Worth Growth for All Quintiles, 1999-2005 
Chart 22b: Wealth Distribution: Ratio of Top Half to Bottom Half of Wealth, 1981-2005  
Chart 23: Consumer Bankruptcies per 10,000 Persons, 1976-2008 
Chart 24: Participation Rate and Employment Rate, 1981-2008, In Per Cent 
Chart 25: Official and Supplementary Measures Of Unemployment Rate, 1981-2008 
Chart 26: Index of Unemployment Duration and Unemployment Incidence (1981=100), 1981-2008 
Chart 27: Medium (26-51 Weeks) and Long Term (52 Weeks and Over) Unemployment as A 
Proportion of Unemployment, 1981-2008, In Per Cent 
Chart 28: CIBC Employment Quality Index (1994=100), 1988-2008 
Chart 29: Job Losers as a Proportion of Employment, 1981-2008, In Per Cent 
Chart 30a: Is There Anyone In Your Household Worried About Losing Their Job Or Being Laid Off? 
1990-2009, In Per Cent 
Chart 30b: Fear of Job Loss As Reported By the Personal Security Indicator 2003, 1998-2002, In Per 
Cent 
Chart 31a: Temporary Workers as a Percentage of all Workers, 1997-2008 
Chart 31b: Percentage of Employees in Temporary Jobs, 1989, 1994, 1998 And 2004, In Per Cent 
Chart 31c: Percentage of Employees Working 50 Hours or Over per Week, Ages 15 and Over, 1981-
2008 
Chart 32: Employees Aged 17-64 and 25-64 Paid Less Than $10 per Hour ($2001), 1981-2004, Per 
Cent 
Chart 33: RBC Housing Affordability Index and 5-Year Mortgage Interest Rates (Per Cent), 1985-
2008 
Chart 34: Percentage of Households Whose Dwelling Are Adequate, Suitable and Affordable, Per 
Census Year 
Chart 35: Prevalence of Food Insecurity by Income Adequacy Grouping, Per Cent, 2004 
Chart 36a: Subjective Perception of Income Adequacy as Reported by the Personal Security Indicator, 
1998-2002, In Per Cent   vi 
Chart 36b: Confidence in Income Support Programs as Reported by the Personal Security Indicator, 
1998-2002, In Per Cent 
Chart 37a: Net Worth per Household ($2001, CPI Adjusted) and Personal Savings Rate (per cent), 
1981-2008 
Chart 37b: Ratio of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth to Personal Disposable Income on a per 
Household Basis, (CPI Adjusted), 1981-2008 
Chart 37c: Composition of Assets and Debt in Canada, As a Percentage of Total Assets, 2005 
Chart 38: Trends in Nominal Minimum Wage as a Proportion of Average Wage, And Real Hourly 
Minimum Wage (CPI Adjusted), 1983-2008 
Chart 39: Trend in Welfare Income in Canada (Population Weighted), 1986-2007, In $2007 
Chart 40: Trend in Welfare Income as a Proportion of the Poverty Line in Canada (Population 
Weighted), 1986-2007 
Chart 41: Trend in the Number of Hours Needed to Reach the Poverty Line, 1986-2007 
Chart 42: Sergeant EI Disincentives Index, 1970-2008 (1970=100) 
Chart 43: Trends in the EI Financial Assistance in Canada, 1981-2008 
Chart 44: Trends in Proportion of Private Expenditure on Healthcare in Personal Disposable Income 
in Canada, 1981-2008 
Chart 45: Trends in the Divorce Rate in Canada, 1981-2008 
Chart 46: Trends in the Poverty Rate and Poverty Gap Ratio for Lone Female Families in Canada, 
1981-2008  
Chart 47: Trends in the Poverty Rate and Poverty Gap Ratio for Elderly Families in Canada, 1981-
2008  
Chart 48a: Overall Index of Economic Security for Canada, 1981-2008 
Chart 48b: Average Annual Growth Rates for the Components of Economic Security, 1981-2008  
Chart 49: Trends in GDP Per Capita and Composite Indices of Headline Living Standards Indicators 
for Canada, 1988-2008 
 
     vii 




  This report, which constitutes the living standards domain of the new Canadian Index of 
Wellbeing (CIW), provides a comprehensive overview of trends in a number of indicators of living 
standards over the 1981-2008 period in Canada. Part one examines trends in average and median 
income and wealth indicators in Canada. Part two looks at the distribution of the income and wealth 
of Canadians over time, including trends in poverty. Part three discusses trends in income fluctuations 
or volatility. Part four analyzes trends in the economic security of Canadians, including labour market 
security, food security, housing security, and the security provided by the social safety net. The report 
also presents a synthesis of overall trends in living standards, discusses living standard measurement 
issues, and puts forward a set of headline indicators to capture the essentials of what has been 
happening to the living standards of Canadians. Finally, the report comments on the sustainability of 
current levels of living standards. 
 
Looking at the nine headline indicators for which time series are available, one can 
immediately see that living standards of Canadians have not unambiguously improved between 1981 
and 2008. Indeed, Canadians experienced a widening of income and wealth inequalities. There have 
been large poverty reductions. There have been large increases in wealth inequality. The 
unemployment rate is down to a record low for the 1981-2008 period, and yet the incidence of long-
term unemployment was higher in 2008 than in 1981. Economic security measured by the CSLS 
index has also fallen, spurred by a significant decrease in economic security caused by the financial 
risk associated with illness. Since 1981, many dimensions of living standards in Canada have not 
improved, and that in spite of a 52.6 per cent surge in gross domestic product per capita.  
 
The bottom line is that Canada has become a much richer country, but the top quintile has 
received the lion’s share of rising income and wealth. Looking forward, the challenges for Canada’s 
policymakers are significant, but need to be tackled if Canada is to become a fairer and richer country. 
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Living Standards Domain of the Canadian Index of 
Wellbeing 
Executive Summary 
   
  Have the living standards of Canadians improved or deteriorated in recent years? An answer 
to this seemingly straightforward question is actually very difficult. This is because of the large 
number of possible indicators that could be chosen to track trends in living standards. This report, 
which represents the living standards domain of the new Canadian Index of Wellbeing, provides a 
comprehensive overview of trends in a number of indicators of living standards over the 1981-2008 
period in Canada.  
 
Living Standards: What is Covered and Why? 
 
A given level of national income may be associated with the cost of increased inequality or 
greater economic insecurity. It may be fuelled by poor quality job creation or fail to achieve basic 
economic outcomes, such as reducing poverty or providing basic housing to individuals and family. 
The objective of the living standards domain is to track not only the capacity of the Canadian 
economy to grow, but more importantly its capacity to transform economic growth into stable income 
streams for all Canadians.  
 
To select which indicators must be reviewed if we are to obtain a complete picture of living 
standards in Canada, we rely on a conceptual framework. The conceptual framework we use identifies 
the following aspects as key for living standards: living standards at present times, as captured by 
income levels and distribution, and the sustainability of current income levels, as captured by 
measures of wealth and the extent of economic security experienced by individuals (Executive 
Summary Table 1). This framework guides us in the selection of relevant indicators to be reviewed. 
Of course, to operationalize this framework in the context of the CIW, we adapt the choice of 
indicators by taking into account that some indicators may be more or less covered by other domains.   
 
Executive Summary Table 1: Dimensions of Economic Wellbeing 
Concept  Present  Future 
“Typical Citizen” 
Or “Representative Agent” 
Average Flow of Current 
Income / Consumption 
Aggregate Accumulation of 
Productive Stocks 
Heterogeneity of 
Experiences of all Citizens 
Distribution of Income - 
Inequality and Poverty 
Insecurity of Future 
Incomes 
 
  The report is divided into four major parts. Part one examines trends in average and median 
income and wealth indicators in Canada. Part two looks at the distribution of the income and wealth 
of Canadians over time, including trends in poverty. Part three discusses trends in income fluctuations 
or volatility. Part four analyzes trends in the economic security of Canadians, including labour market 
security, food security, housing security, and the security provided by the social safety net. 
   ix 
  Based on a detailed examination of the data presented in this report, five main conclusions or 
messages have emerged related to the evolution of living standards in Canada over the last quarter 
century. These conclusions are highlighted below.  
 
Canadians are on average better off in terms of income and wealth 
 
  The first message from the data is that Canadians have on average higher income in 2007 and 
2008 than in 1981. But the magnitude of the real income gains is very sensitive to both the choice of 
unit of analysis (persons versus households) and the choice of income measure (total or pre-tax versus 
after-tax income).  
 
The number of households grew almost 60 per cent faster than the number of persons over the 
1981-2007 period (51.5 per cent versus 32.7 per cent) so real income trends on a household basis 
show much less progress than on an individual basis. As the average tax rate also increased over the 
period, after-tax income measures show less growth than pre-tax measures. 
 
National account income measures show that between 1981 and 2007 real personal income 
per capita rose 34.8 per cent, and real personal disposable income per capita 25.9 per cent (and 36.5 
per cent and 28.8 per cent respectively for the 1981-2008 period). In contrast, income estimates from 
household surveys (SCF/SLID), which are currently only available to 2007, show that total real 
income per household increased 17.2 per cent and after-tax real income per household rose 15.5 per 
cent. Greater growth in the number of households than persons account for these differences. Part of 
the increase in real income of course reflected an increase in hours worked, with the average weekly 
hours worked per person of working age up 3.2 per cent over the 1981-2008 period. 
 
  The average wealth of Canadians also increased substantially over the 1981-2008 period. 
National accounts balance sheet estimates show that average real net worth was up 73.3 per cent on a 
per capita basis and 51.7 per cent on a household basis. 
 
Income and Wealth Inequality Has Increased 
 
  The second message is that income growth has been unevenly shared among Canadians, with 
the rich garnering a disproportionately large portion of the gains. For economic families, the after-tax 
income of the top quintile, or fifth, of households, adjusted for family size, rose 39 per cent between 
1981 and 2007, while the increases for the other quintiles were in the 20-25 per cent range. An even 
more unequal pattern was observed for total and market income. This led to a significant rise in the 
income share of the top quintile, offset by declines in the income shares of the other four quintiles. 
These developments resulted in the Gini coefficient, a measure of overall income inequality, 
increasing significantly, with most of the increase in the 1990s. The Gini coefficient for market 
income increased by 16.8 per cent between 1981 and 2007. The increase in inequality was greatest for 
market income and least for after-tax income, implying that increases in both government transfers 
and taxes offset somewhat the rise in market income inequalities, at least in the 1980s.  
 
The rising inequality also meant that median income measures performed much worse than 
average income measures. Indeed, over the 1981-2007 period, median market income per household   x 
actually declined 4.8 per cent, while median total income rose 2.9 per cent and after-tax income rose 
4.2 per cent.  
 
  The picture of living standard trends provided by median income is inconsistent with the 
widespread impression Canadians have of a steady progression in living standards based on average 
income per capita measures. Median after-tax income of all family units only surpassed 1981 levels in 
2006. Not only does it imply a decrease in living standards for the median Canadian household 
between 1981 and 2005, but it also means that government redistribution, through transfers and taxes, 
did not totally offset the reduction in median market income per family unit until 2006. 
 
  Wealth distribution also became much more unequal between 1984, 1999 and 2005. This 
trend was particularly obvious between 1999 and 2005, the two years for which data on the 
distribution of wealth include pensions. Indeed, median real net worth per household increased only 
23.2 per cent between 1999 and 2005 compared to 29.6 per cent for average net worth. Median real 
net worth for the bottom quintile fell 9.1 per cent, compared to a 28.5 per cent rise for the uppermost 
quintile. 
 
Some Progress has Been Made in Reducing Poverty 
 
  The third message is that the rising income inequality has meant that while the increased real 
average income has translated into some improvement in the poverty rate, these improvements would 
likely have been greater if income gains had been more evenly shared. Nonetheless, poverty has fallen 
to a record low, with the after-tax Low Income Cut-off (LICO) rate for all persons 2.4 percentage 
points lower in 2007 than in 1981 (9.2 per cent versus 11.6 per cent). Poverty in 2007 reached its 
lowest level since Statistics Canada began tracking it in 1976, and was down 1.3 percentage points 
from its previous low of 10.5 per cent in 2006. The poverty gap, that is the amount of money by 
which the average poor family unit falls short of the poverty line, was the same in 2007 and in 1981 – 
$6,700 (2007 dollars). 
 
Overall Improvement in Labour Market Conditions 
 
The fourth message is that there has been improvement in overall labour market conditions, a 
key determinant of living standards, over the 1981-2008 period. Within the period, there were two 
sub-periods of very poor labour market conditions, namely the early 1980s and first half of the 1990s. 
The unemployment rate in 2008 was 6.1 per cent, down from 7.6 per cent in 1981. Despite the lower 
unemployment rate, the proportion of long-term unemployed, that is those who had been unemployed 
52 weeks or more, was greater in 2008 than in 1981 – 6.7 per cent versus 5.7 per cent. 
 
The most important development has been the increased employment rate, that is, the ratio of 
the employed to the working age population. This rate reached 63.6 per cent in 2008, up from 60.1 
per cent in 1981 due to the rise in the aggregate participation rate (67.8 per cent versus 65.0 per cent), 
which itself was driven completely by the increased labour force participation of women. Another 
positive development has been the decline in the incidence of job loss from 8.0 per cent in 1981 to 5.4 
per cent in 2008. 
     xi 
Frayed Social Safety Net Provides Less Support for the Disadvantaged 
 
  Certain key social programs for working age people now provide less income support to the 
disadvantaged than they did in the past. Welfare benefits, expressed in constant dollars, were 
significantly lower for all four types of welfare recipients in 2007 than in 1986. Employment 
insurance in 2008 was less generous, in terms of required qualification period and duration of 
benefits, than in 1981. These developments have likely contributed to the increase in income 
inequality. 
 
On the other hand, the introduction of the child tax credit and the National Child Benefits 
Supplement in the mid-1990s, the only major new social program established since the 1970s, has 
provided additional income to poor working families and lowered the poverty rate for this group 
somewhat. Equally, the national minimum wage in 2008 represented 42 per cent of the average 




  Keeping in mind the objective of the living standards domain, the conceptual framework 
which buttresses it and the key messages that have emerged, the CIW National Working Group 
selected eleven indicators for the living standards domain of the Canadian Index of Wellbeing: 
 
  After-tax median income  
  Income distribution (ratio of top to bottom quintile) 
  Incidence of low income (LICO) 
  CSLS Economic Security Index 
  Long-term unemployment 
  Employment rate 
  CIBC Employment Quality Index 
  Housing affordability 
  Wealth distribution  
  Persistence of low income 
  Food security 
 
Unfortunately, annual time series data are available for only nine of the eleven indicators. 
There were no consistent time series estimates for the persistence of low income (estimate for 2000 
only) and the prevalence of food insecurity (estimate only for a few selected years). Moreover, data 
on wealth distribution were available only for 1984, 1999 and 2005.  
 
Only six of the eight headline indicators with time series data have estimates for the entire 
1981-2008 period. Estimates for the CIBC employment quality index are only available from 1988 
and for the RBC housing affordability index since 1985. Because of these data limitations, and 
because of data limitations in other domains, headline indicators for the living standards domain are 
reported only starting in 1988. As a result, the key trends discussed in this section differ slightly from 
those observed for the 1981-2008 period highlighted throughout the report.  
   xii 
Of the eight headline indicators, four experienced increases and four deteriorations between 
1988 and 2008 (Executive Summary Table 2). The largest improvement was in the incidence of long 
term unemployment which witnessed a 22.5 per cent decrease (1.9 percentage points). The second 
largest improvement was in the incidence of low income for economic families (down 27.5 per cent 
per cent or 2.2 percentage points). There are also notable increases in after-tax real median family 
income, up 14.4 per cent, and the employment rate which is up 3.2 per cent (1.9 percentage points). 
 
Executive Summary Table 2: Index of Living Standards Indicators for Canada 










































1988  4.16  54,000  8.0  0.654  8.7  61.7  112.6  41.3 
1989  4.23  54,800  7.5  0.667  8.1  62.2  113.5  44.3 
1990  4.38  52,700  9.1  0.654  7.1  61.7  111.7  49.0 
1991  4.48  50,700  9.9  0.621  8.9  59.7  108.6  42.6 
1992  4.59  51,100  9.9  0.603  13.2  58.3  104.0  40.0 
1993  4.44  49,500  11.0  0.592  16.2  57.9  101.8  38.9 
1994  4.46  50,400  10.8  0.592  17.4  58.4  100.6  42.5 
1995  4.53  49,900  10.9  0.599  16.3  58.7  101.6  39.2 
1996  4.74  49,800  11.7  0.586  16.4  58.4  100.1  36.7 
1997  4.86  50,100  11.6  0.575  15.6  58.9  100.1  35.1 
1998  4.99  52,000  10.1  0.581  13.3  59.7  100.4  34.5 
1999  4.86  53,700  9.5  0.584  11.2  60.6  104.4  35.6 
2000  5.11  54,600  9.0  0.593  10.7  61.3  105.3  36.6 
2001  4.99  56,800  7.9  0.571  9.0  61.1  105.7  34.3 
2002  5.09  56,700  8.6  0.537  9.2  61.7  102.9  35.1 
2003  4.98  56,700  8.5  0.534  9.6  62.4  100.2  35.5 
2004  5.15  57,400  8.0  0.549  9.1  62.7  99.2  36.7 
2005  4.97  58,400  7.4  0.544  9.2  62.7  99.3  37.3 
2006  4.88  59,600  7.0  0.558  8.3  63.0  98.5  41.0 
2007  4.86  61,800  5.8  0.563  7.1  63.5  97.7  44.9 
2008  4.86  61,800  5.8  0.558  6.7  63.6  99.9  45.2 
Change, 1988-2008 
Absolute 
change  0.7  7,800  -2.2  -0.096  -1.9  1.9  -12.7  3.9 
Per cent 
change  16.6  14.4  -27.5  -14.7  -22.5  3.2  -11.3  9.5 
Note: Data were interpolated linearly for missing data points. If data points were missing for 2008, they were assumed to 
be the same as in 2007 
 
The headline indicator that suffered the largest deterioration over the 1988-2008 period was 
the ratio of the after-tax incomes of the top to bottom quintile (up 16.6 per cent), followed by   xiii 
economic security (down 14.7 per cent) and employment quality (down 11.3 per cent). The RBC 
Housing Affordability Index saw the smallest change among the indicators that experienced 
downward movement; the index was up 9.5 per cent, indicating a fall in housing affordability. 
 
Over the 1988-2008 period real GDP per capita rose 33 per cent (Figure 1). In contrast, the 
composite indicator of living standards, giving equal weight to each of eight variables, increased only 
4.5 per cent.  
 
 The current recession will reduce income, raise unemployment, and increase labour market 
insecurity. Yet, the recession may also temporarily reduce house prices, which will translate into 
more affordable housing. Nonetheless, it is likely that the recession will translate into a falling 
composite index for the living standards domain. Indeed, in the wake of both the early 1990s and the 
2001 slowdowns, the composite index of the living standards domain fell (Figure 1).   
 




This report provides a comprehensive examination of a large number of indicators of living 
standards in Canada over the last quarter century and identifies a number of these indicators as 
headline indicators for the new Canadian Index of Wellbeing. The bottom line is that Canada has 











1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
GDP per capita
Average overall index of living standards
Tables 7A and 63 
Figure 1: Trends in GDP per Capita and Composite Index of Living Standards for Canada, 1988-2008
1988=100  xiv 
Looking at the eight headline indicators for which time series are available, one can 
immediately see that living standards of Canadians have not unambiguously improved between 1981 
and 2008. Indeed, Canadians experienced a widening of income inequalities. The incidence of 
poverty has decreased. The unemployment rate in 2008 was near the record low for the 1981-2008 
period, and yet the incidence of long-term unemployment is slightly higher now than in 1981. 
Economic security measured by the CSLS index has also fallen, spurred by a significant decrease in 
economic security caused by the financial risk associated with illness. Since 1981, many dimensions 
of living standards in Canada have not improved, and that in spite of a 52.6 per cent surge in Gross 
Domestic Product per capita. These conclusions remain largely accurate for the 1988-2008 period, in 
spite of a 33 per cent increase in GDP over that short time period. Looking forward, the challenges for 
Canada’s policymakers are significant, but need to be tackled if Canada is to become a fairer and 
richer country.  1 
Living Standards Domain of the Canadian Index of 
Wellbeing
1 
I. Introduction  
 
  Have the living standards of Canadians improved or deteriorated over the last quarter century? 
Answering this seemingly straightforward question is actually very difficult. This is because of the 
large number of possible indicators that could be chosen to track trends in living standards. This 
report, which represents the living standards domain of the new Canadian Index of Wellbeing, 
provides a comprehensive overview of trends in a number of indicators of living standards over the 
1981-2007 period in Canada, and up to 2008 when data are available.
2  
 
To decide on which indicators must be reviewed if we are to obtain a complete picture of 
living standards in Canada, we rely on the framework outlined in Osberg and Sharpe (2002), which 
was originally laid out in Osberg (1985). This conceptual framework identifies the following aspects 
as key for living standards: living standards at present times, as captured by income levels and 
distribution, and the sustainability of current income levels, as captured by measures of wealth and 
the extent of economic security experienced by individuals (Figure 1). This framework guides us in 
the selection of relevant indicators to be reviewed. Of course, to operationalize this framework in the 
context of the CIW, the choice of headline indicators must take into account that some aspects of 
living standards (e.g. time use) may be more or less covered by other domains, as well as must reflect 
the views of other CIW experts.   
 
Figure 1: Dimensions of Economic Wellbeing 
Concept  Present  Future 
“Typical Citizen” 
Or “Representative Agent” 
Average Flow of Current 
Income / Consumption 
Aggregate Accumulation of 
Productive Stocks 
Heterogeneity of 
Experiences of all Citizens 
Distribution of Income - 
Inequality and Poverty 
Insecurity of Future 
Incomes 
 
  The report focuses on trends in living standards at the national level in Canada, although 
certain key regional developments are noted. Data on trends at the national as well as the provincial 
                                                 
1 This report was written by Andrew Sharpe and Jean-François Arsenault with assistance from Patrick Alexander, Graham 
Beattie, Benjamin Evans, Peter Harrison, Sharon Qiao, Christopher Ross, Faustine Roussell, and Jeremy Smith. We would 
like to thank Alex Michalos, Tim Sargent, Janie Saumure, Alex Seychuk and Benjamin Tal for assistance in data 
compilation. Earlier versions of this report were presented at of the CIW Working Group meetings held on June 28-29, 
2005, June 27-28, 2006, November 8-9, 2006, June 5-6, 2007, and November 25-26, 2008 and the CSLS session on 
wellbeing indicators at the annual meeting of the Canadian Economics Association May 26-28, 2006. We would like to 
thank participants in these events for comments. We would in particular like to thank Andrew Jackson from the Canadian 
Labour Congress, Kim Lauzon of Statistics Canada, Paul Bernard from the Université de Montréal, Ron Colman from 
GPI Atlantic and four external referees for detailed comments.  All tables referenced in this study are found in an Excel 
file published with the study on the Canadian Index of Wellbeing website (www.ciw.ca) and the Centre for the Study of 
Living Standards website (http://www.csls.ca/reports/csls2009-4-tables.pdf). 
2 For a discussion of the importance of the current economic crisis on living standards, see the forthcoming report by 
Arsenault and Sharpe (2009).   2 
and territorial levels for almost all indicators discussed are provided in the extensive set of tables that 
accompany this document.
3 Space limitations, however, preclude discussion of these provincial 
trends. Indeed, a report similar in length to this document (more than 100 pages) could be produced 
for each province. Equally, time and space considerations have meant that comparisons of trends in 
living standards in Canada with those of other countries have also not been included in this report. 
Future work may focus on international comparisons.   
 
  This report largely focuses on aggregate trends in living standards over time, and is not a 
cross-section examination of the current state and trends in this state of living standards for various 
socio-economic, age, gender, ethnic, and linguistic groups in society at a particular point in time. 
While some indicators are presented on a disaggregated basis for the most recent year or over time, a 
full examination of trends in living standards for all societal groups in Canada, either at a point in 
time or over time, is beyond the scope of this report.  
 
  Conclusions about trends in living standards can be very sensitive to the time period chosen. A 
comparison of current living standards with those in the 1930s will not surprisingly show a much 
greater improvement than a comparison with the 1980s. This report takes a medium-term perspective 
on trends in living standards in Canada, tracking living standards over the last quarter century. The 
initial year for most time series analyzed in the report is 1981, a business cycle peak and the first year 
for which many of the data series are available. Almost all time series extend to 2008 or 2007, 
providing as up-to-date a picture as available data allow on current living standards in Canada. The 
report has been revised in June 2009 to incorporate revised national accounts estimates for 2008. 
Within the 1981-2008 period the years 1989 and 2000 are often used to create sub-periods. Like 1981, 
these two years were business cycle peaks so the 1981-1989 and 1989-2000 periods are cyclically 
neutral in a peak-to-peak sense, minimizing the impact of the business cycle on trends. The 2000-
2007 period is also a cyclically neutral period. The 2000-2008 period is also relatively cyclically 
neutral, as real output continued to rise in 2008, albeit slowly. Given the recession that began in late 
2008, if the analysis were to extend to 2009 or 2010 the trends in living standards would be much 
worse, reflecting the effects of the business cycle on many the indicators surveyed in this report.  
   
Most of the data presented in this report represent objective indicators of trends in living 
standards, but in a number of cases they have been supplemented with subjective indicators of the 
perceptions Canadians have about more objective living standards indicators. There is a lively debate 
in the living standards literature on the relative weight that should be given to objective and subjective 
indicators of trends in living standards. Some argue that the focus should be on objective indicators 
which capture true trends in underlying reality. Others make the case that perceptions are reality at the 
level of individuals and that therefore these perceptions determine wellbeing and should be of 
interest. For example, even though the actual chances of losing one’s job may be falling, if workers 
think that the chances of losing their jobs are rising, due to extensive media coverage of high-profile 
layoffs, they may suffer increased job anxiety. Some argue that since this perception of reality, 
although inaccurate, may make workers worse off, it has relevance for any study of trends in living 
standards. Others feel that while this perception (or more accurately misperception) may be of interest 
                                                 
3 Data at the census metropolitan areas (CMAs) are also available for many of the indicators discussed in this report, but 
they are not included in the tables because of space limitations.   3 
to psychologists, it should not be a prominent part of an analysis of trends in living standards, which 
should be measured by objective indicators.
4  
 
  This report adopts a number of conventions. Growth rates are expressed in terms of compound 
(geometric) growth with the first year of the period as the base year. For example, the period 1981-
2008 uses 1981 as the base for growth rate calculations, not 1980. Growth rates are based on real or 
constant price estimates unless nominal estimates are explicitly mentioned.  
   
The data used in this report largely come either directly or indirectly from Statistics Canada, 
with a small number of exceptions.
5 The key sources of data from Statistics Canada used in the report 
are: the system of national accounts, which provides estimates of GDP, personal income, personal 
disposable income, and net worth; the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), which 
supplies household income and low income estimates; the Survey of Financial Security (SFS), which 
provides estimates of wealth; and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) which provides unemployment and 
employment estimates. 
 
  This report is a description and examination of trends in living standards indicators in Canada 
based on an analysis of the data. It does not survey the extensive literature on these trends, much of it 
published by Statistics Canada through flagship publications such as the Canadian Economic 
Observer, Perspectives on Labour and Income and Canadian Social Trends as well as through 
numerous research papers. Other sources of general analysis of recent trends in living standards in 
Canada include the volume Falling Behind: The State of Working Canada, 2000 by Andrew Jackson 
and published by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, and the 2001 volume Canada in the 
                                                 
4 This note provides a simple typology of states associated with objective and subjective indicators of the same 
phenomenon, such as the state of living standards. Individuals can be classified into four quadrants. Persons in the 
northwest quadrant perceive an increase in their living standards and objective indicators point in this direction. 
Perceptions align with objective reality, a state of bliss. In the southeast quadrant, persons perceive a fall in living 
standards. This perception is confirmed by objective data, a situation of misery. In the other two quadrants, perceptions do 
not match objective reality. In the northeast quadrant, persons believe that their living standards are increasing, but this 
perception is not supported by empirical data, a situation that can be characterized as one of false consciousness or denial. 
In the southwest quadrant, persons feel living standards are deteriorating, but in reality they are rising. An example of the 
disconnect between subjective and objective indicators concerns social mobility. In the United States, public opinion polls 
show that most Americans believe that the extent of social mobility is high. Yet studies have shown that the extent of 
social mobility is in fact low. The political implications of this situation are ambiguous. Does the fact that Americans 
appear content with the status quo on social mobility mean that this issue is not important? Or rather does the low degree 
of social mobility in and of itself make social mobility an important issue irrespective of public opinion? 
      Objective Indicators 
     
      Good  Bad 
Subjective 
Indicators  
Good  Bliss  False consciousness 
Bad  Neurosis  Misery 
 
5 Welfare rates are from the National Welfare Council, minimum wage rates from Labour Canada, the the Employment 
Insurance disincentive index from Finance Canada, housing affordability index from the Royal Bank of Canada, and 
employment quality index from the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC).   4 
1990s: The Longest Decade, edited by Keith Banting, Andrew Sharpe and France St-Hilaire and 




  As noted earlier, the organization of this report has been motivated by the work on the Index 
of Economic Well-being that the Centre for the Study of Living Standards has undertaken since 1998 
(Osberg and Sharpe, 2002, 2009a and 2009b). This index is organized around four components or 
dimensions of economic wellbeing: consumption flows, stocks of wealth, income inequality, and 
economic security. Data on these four dimensions are examined closely in this study.  
 
The report is divided into four major parts. Part one examines trends in average and median 
income and wealth indicators in Canada. Part two looks at the distribution of the income and wealth 
of Canadians over time, including trends in low income. Part three discusses trends in income 
fluctuations or income volatility. Part four analyzes trends in the economic security of Canadians, 
including labour market security, food security, housing security, and the security provided by the 
social safety net. 
 
  The body of the report has been written for a general audience interested in trends in living 
standards and the authors have tried to keep jargon and non-essential technical information to a 
minimum. The report also includes a detailed set of footnotes that will be of interest to specialists.  
II. Average and Median Income and Wealth  
 
By a global standard, Canada is considered a country with a high level of living standards, and 
its citizens are generally regarded as economically well off. Even though it is recognized that there is 
more to living standards and economic wellbeing than money, the standard metric for such judgments 
is levels of income and wealth defined in monetary terms. Consequently, the point of departure for 
any analysis of living standards is an examination of data on income and wealth.
7  
 
This section of the report looks at trends in the average and median income and wealth of 
Canadians from 1981 to 2007 and to 2008 when data are available. The section is divided into three 
parts. The first part is an examination of trends in national accounts-based measures of per capita 
income, including gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, personal income (PI) per capita, and 
personal disposable income (PDI) per capita as well as a brief discussion of trends in wages and 
productivity. The second part looks at household-based income measures including trends in the 
number of households, and trends in average and median income measures (market, total, and after-
tax income). It also includes a discussion of the perceptions of Canadians on their financial situation. 
The third part presents both national accounts and household survey estimates of wealth. 
 
                                                 
6 In the United States, The State of Working America published by the Economic Policy Institute is one of the main 
sources of analysis of recent trends in living standards. 
7 The term social wage is also often used in the context of living standards. The social wage is generally meant to refer to 
public expenditure on health, education, housing and social welfare. In other words, it represents the portion of 
government services which benefit individuals and could be considered as a part of their compensation. In this report, we 
do not focus on the concept of social wage because its most important components, health and education, are covered by 
other domains of the Canadian Index of Wellbeing.    5 
 For a country as a whole, income is synonymous with gross domestic product (GDP). 
However, personal income per capita tends to be closer to the public’s definition of income and bears 
a closer resemblance to the reality of daily life.
8 Unfortunately, national accounts data do not gather 
socio-economic characteristics, and as such do not allow for socio-economic disaggregation.  
 
In this regard, household surveys, such as the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics 
(SLID), which replaced the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) in 1998, are much more detailed. 
Not only do they provide estimates of average income per family unit, but they also provide median 
estimates and data can be disaggregated by socio-economic characteristics. These estimates are 
available for the 1980-2007 period. For SLID, the time between the end of the reference period and 
the release of estimates, also called release lag, is currently around 16 months, compared to only two 
months for estimates based on the national accounts.  
 
In terms of wealth information, Statistics Canada has published, as part of the national 
accounts balance sheets, estimates of net worth for the 1961-2008 period. By using net worth of 
individuals and unincorporated businesses as a proxy for personal wealth, we will observe the 
evolution of aggregate per capita wealth. No disaggregation by individual or household characteristics 
is possible for this series. Wealth estimates are also available from Statistic Canada’s Survey of 
Financial Security (SFS), which was conducted in 1999 and 2005. As the SFS is a household survey, 
individual or micro data are available so the distribution of wealth and median wealth estimates can 
be calculated. However, because the SFS is conducted so infrequently, no annual time series can be 
derived.  
A. Income Per Capita - National Accounts-Based Estimates  
 
  In building a set of indicators of living standards for Canada, the notion of income comes 
naturally. Estimates from the system of national accounts, released by Statistics Canada, are published 
with a lag of only two months. Data are available on a consistent basis covering the period of 1981-
2008, are comprehensive and draw on many data sources, which enhances their reliability. 
Unfortunately, income measures from the national accounts cannot be disaggregated by socio-
economic characteristics of the population. 
 
Of course, the most well known national accounts-based measure is Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita. This measure is followed closely by the media, politicians and economists. 
However, if we want to analyze the living standards of individuals, we tend to downplay GDP per 
capita, because it includes retained corporate profits and depreciation, which are not received by 
individuals, and does not include transfer payments, which are received by individuals. Personal 
income and personal disposable income, which do include transfer payments and exclude corporate 
                                                 
8 Estimates of personal income and personal disposable income are part of the system of national accounts produced by 
Statistics Canada. Estimates of GDP are available starting in 1926 on a national basis and from 1961 on a provincial basis. 
Personal income and personal disposable income data for Canada and the provinces are available for 1926-2008. 
However, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the main price index used to deflate nominal personal income and nominal 
personal disposable income to obtain real estimates, only goes back to 1979 for the provinces. Moreover, the most recent 
consistent time series for provincial GDP is for the 1981-2008 period. Given these data limitation, and more importantly 
because we are focusing our analysis on developments during the last quarter century, we will use data covering the 1981-
2008 period.   6 
profits and depreciation, match more closely the definition of living standards on an individual basis. 
We now examine trends for these three indicators over the 1981-2008 period.  
 
1) Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 
 
GDP represents the total value of the goods and services produced in a country or region for a 




Between 1981 and 2008, real GDP per capita in Canada has increased at an annual compound 
rate of 1.58 per cent, a 52.6 per cent total increase for the period, from $26,074 to $39,790 chained 
2002 dollars (Summary Table 1 and Chart 1a). Real GDP per capita has grown every year since 1981, 
with the exception of 1982, the 1989-1992 period, and 2008. Growth was rapid in the 1980s, with real 
GDP per person increasing 20.7 per cent between the trough of 1982 and the peak of 1989. After 
retreating 4.9 per cent in the 1989-1992 period, real GDP per capita resumed its upward trend until 
the downturn in 2008. Between 1992 and 2007, real GDP per capita grew steadily, increasing 39.4 per 
cent over the period. In 2008, real GDP per capita declined 0.7 per cent, the first annual decline since 
1992. 
 
Summary Table 1: National Accounts-Based Measures of Real Aggregate Income in Canada, Average 
Annual Change (per cent), 1981-2008 
  
Real GDP per 
capita 
Real Personal 




81-89  1.86  1.55  1.11 
89-00  1.57  0.63  0.27 
00-08  1.30  1.49  1.71 
81-08  1.58  1.16  0.94 
Total Growth 
81-08  52.6  36.5  28.8 
Sources: Tables 7A, 8B and 9B 
 
GDP is not the only measure of aggregate economic performance.
10 Gross national product 
(GNP) and gross domestic income (GDI) are two other measures of the aggregate performance of 
Canada. GNP is a broader measure than GDP as it also includes the balance of international flows of 
interest and dividend payments. Over the past three decades, net investment income from non-
                                                 
9 Expenditure-based GDP is the measure of total final sales of current production and includes personal  and government 
expenditures, business investment as well as exports and imports. Income-based GDP is the measure of total income 
earned in current production and includes wages, corporation and government business profits, interest and investment 
income, unincorporated business net income, taxes less subsidies and capital consumption allowances. Value-added GDP 
is the measure of total net value added in current production and includes the value added for each industry.  
10 In a forthcoming paper, Sharpe and Ross (2009) explain the differences between various measures of income and output 
and compare these measures for the economies of Canada and the United States.  Measures analyzed include GDP, GDI, 
GNP, GNI, NDP, NDI, NNP and NNI.   7 
residents has been negative in Canada, which explains why GNP has been lower than GDP over the 





The difference between GDP and GDI in real terms (as the measures must be equal in current 
dollars) stems from changes in Canada’s international terms of trade, the ratio of export to import 
prices. Over the 1981-2002 period, terms of trade were relatively stable in Canada. Between 2002 and 
2008, however, with the rapid increase in commodity prices, particularly oil, the price of Canada’s 
exports grew much more rapidly than the price of imports and GDI significantly outperformed GDP 
(Chart 1b). In other words, aggregate income in Canada (GDI) increased faster than aggregate 
production, because the prices of goods and services exported from Canada increased faster than the 
prices of goods and services imported to Canada. In any case, all three measures show similar gains in 
terms of aggregate income, with GDP suggesting a slightly lower increase than the other two 
measures. Given these strong similarities, using GDP as a starting point for our analysis appears 
reasonable.  
 
Real GDP per capita growth varied by province over the 1981-2008 period. The four Atlantic 
provinces enjoyed above average GDP per capita growth while all three provinces with above average 
income, Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta, experienced below average growth. Alberta grew 
only slightly slower than the national average, however, and its nominal GDP growth was faster than 
average. These trends resulted in a significant decline in disparities in GDP per capita levels between 
the provinces.
11  
                                                 
11 As shown in Table 7D, current dollar GDP per capita as a proportion of the national average rose in Newfoundland and 
























1981-2008 1981-1989 1989-2000 2000-2008
GDP per capita PI per capita PDI per capita
Source: Table 7a, Table 8b and Table 9b
Chart 1a: National Accounts-Based Measures of Real Aggregate Income in Canada




Canada’s GDP per capita performance might seem impressive, but how did it affect the living 
standards of the average Canadian? Do Canadians really feel 53 per cent richer today than they did in 
1981? Gross Domestic Product per person is generally not considered the most appropriate indicator 
of living standards at the level of the individual because, as noted earlier, it includes corporate profits 
and depreciation and excludes government transfers payments to persons. For this reason, personal 
income is considered a better income measure for tracking trends in living standards. And this 
measure exhibited less than one-half the growth of GDP per capita.   
2) Personal Income Per Capita 
 
Personal income includes employment earnings, interest payments, dividend payments and 
government transfers to persons. Estimates of nominal personal income per capita are part of the 
system of national accounts produced by Statistics Canada and are available at both the national and 
the provincial level since 1926.
12 To deflate nominal personal income and obtain real or constant-
dollar estimates, one can use either the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or the Personal Expenditure Price 
                                                                                                                                                                     
cent, in Nova Scotia from 64.1 per cent to 75.6 per cent, and in New Brunswick from 61.8 per cent to 75.1 per cent. 
Equally, in two of the three provinces with above average GDP per capita in 1981, GDP per capita as a proportion of the 
national level fell over the 1981-2008 period, from 102.4 per cent of the national average to 94.5 per cent in Ontario, and 
most importantly, from 109.3 per cent to 94.5 per cent in British Columbia.  
12 Note that personal income is not only the sum of all income received by persons residing in Canada, but also includes 
the investment income that associations of individuals defined as non-profit institutions serving households, such as 
churches, labour unions, charitable organizations, credit unions, trusted pension plans, life insurance companies, fraternal 
societies and mutual non-life insurance companies, accumulate on their own behalf or on behalf of persons. In this regard, 








1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Real GDI Real GDP Real GNP
Source : Table 6b, Table 6d, Table 6e and Cansim Series v647785.
Chart 1b: A Comparison of Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Real Gross Domestic Income and Real 
Gross National Product on a per Capita Basis
2002 chained dollars, 1981-2008  9 
Index (PEPI). While the CPI compares the cost, through time, of a fixed basket of commodities, the 
Personal Expenditure Price Index is based on actual expenditures by Canadians, including 
expenditures overseas. As the CPI is the best known measure of inflation relating to households, and 
since it is the most widely used series to deflate nominal personal disposable income, it is the deflator 
used in this report. However, it is important to recognize that the choice of deflator can influence the 





The difference between the CPI and the PEPI is particularly important for the period from 
2000 to 2008, when the PEPI grew significantly more slowly than the CPI (1.68 per cent versus 2.26 
per cent per year) (Chart 1c). The PEPI is wider in scope, and generally includes spending by 
Canadian residents and non-profit institutions serving them. It also includes some of the expenses 
funded by government agencies and includes imputation for some services obtained without explicit 
charges, such as free savings accounts. In comparison, the CPI covers out-of-pocket expenses by 
households. Other methodological differences, such as how components are weighted or how price 
information is obtained, also create discrepancies. In any case, it is common practice in Canada to use 
the CPI to deflate income measures at the individual or household level.  
                                                 
13 Over the 1981-2008 period, the CPI for Canada grew at a compound annual rate of 3.14 per cent, compared to 2.92 per 
cent for the Personal Expenditure Price Index (Table 4 and Table 5). If we used the Personal Expenditure Price Index 
(PEPI) instead of the CPI to deflate personal income over the 1981-2008 period, the compound annual growth rate 
obtained is 0.22 percentage points higher, accumulating to a difference of 13.1 per cent, which is not trivial. As noted in 
the text, most of the difference took place between 2000 and 2008. Over that period, the difference between the two 
indicators was .58 percentage points. In any case, personal income would have shown greater growth if we had used the 
PEPI instead of the CPI. The CPI is used to deflate all income and wage measures in this report. If we had used the PEPI, 
growth in median and average income and wealth would have been 6 per cent higher over the 1981-2008 period, and 









1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
CPI
PEPI
Source : Table 4 and Table 5 
Chart 1c: Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Personal Expenditure Price Index (PEPI) 
Index (1981 = 100), 1981-2008  10 
 
Real personal income per capita grew 36.5 per cent over the 1981-2008 period, an average of 
1.16 per cent per year (Summary Table 1). It is important to note that real personal income per person 
grew at a significantly slower rate than real GDP per capita (Chart 1a).
 This is partly due to the faster 
growth of the CPI compared to the GDP deflator used to deflate nominal GDP, which accounts for 52 
per cent of the difference. Also, faster growth of corporate profits, which are included in GDP but not 
in personal income, contributed to the difference.




Within the 1981-2008 period, the movement of real personal income per capita followed the 
business cycle, falling in recessions and rising in expansions. After declining during the recession of 
the early 1980s, real personal income grew 17.5 per cent between 1983 and 1990, rising from $23,003 
to $27,018 ($2002). After 1990, personal income fell three years in a row, then grew sluggishly, 
reaching its previous 1990 peak only in 1998 (Chart 2a). It continued to grow up to 2001. It then fell 
in 2002, stayed constant in 2003 and then rebounded. By 2008 it was 11.8 per cent above its 2001 
peak and stood at $32,307.  
 
                                                 
14 Real personal income per person average annual growth for 1981-2008 was 1.16 per cent, compared to 1.58 per cent for 
real GDP per capita, a difference of 0.42 percentage points. As noted in the text, the most important factor was the 
difference between the CPI and the GDP deflator, which accounted for 0.22 percentage points, or about 52 per cent of the 
gap. A decomposition of nominal GDP sheds more light on the remaining 0.24-percentage point discrepancy (Table 32 
and Table 33). During the 1981-2008 period, nominal wages, salaries and supplementary income annual growth averaged 
5.44 per cent, slightly lower than nominal GDP growth of 5.68 per cent. Moreover, corporate profits, which represented 
approximately 14.5 per cent of GDP in 2008, grew on average 6.64 per cent annually, pulling GDP growth up. In other 
words, not only are the deflators used for GDP and personal income significantly divergent, but the components of GDP 













1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Real Gross Domestic Product per capita
Real Personal Income per capita
Real Personal Disposable Income per capita
Source : Table 7, Table 8B and Table 9B Peak Year where previous peak value was equalled or exceeeded
Chart 2a: Gross Domestic Product, Personal Income and Personal Disposable Income on a per Capita Basis
($2002), 1981-2008  11 
As was the case for GDP per capita, the four below-average income Atlantic provinces 
enjoyed above average growth in real personal income per capita over the 1981-2008 period, while 
two of the three provinces with above average income, Ontario and British Columbia, experienced 
below average growth. This again resulted in a significant decline in provincial disparities in personal 
income per capita.
15 
3) Personal Disposable Income Per Capita  
 
  Personal disposable income is defined as personal income less current transfers (basically 
direct taxes, such as personal income taxes) to governments. To ascertain trends in the actual 
spending power of Canadians, real personal disposable income per capita is sometimes considered a 
better indicator than real personal income per capita since it represents the average after-tax spending 
power of individual Canadians. Estimates of nominal personal disposable income per person are part 
of National Accounts produced by Statistics Canada and are available at both the national and the 
provincial levels back to 1926.  
     
A quick look at trends in real personal disposable income (PDI) per capita reveals an 
interesting story. During the 1980s, growth in nominal personal disposable income per capita in 
Canada outpaced the CPI. As a result, between the trough of 1983 and the peak of 1989, real personal 
disposable income per person grew at a very strong annual compound rate of 2.13 per cent, and 
reached $21,211 per person ($2002) in 1989 (Table 9B). However, this trend was reversed as the 
Canadian economy experienced a sharp downturn in the following years, i.e. the downturn of 1990-
1991 and a subsequent slow recovery. It took the boom of the late 1990s to return PDI per capita to a 
level equal to that attained in 1989, with the level of $21,847 being attained in 2000. Real personal 
disposable income per capita has since advanced steadily at a 1.71 per cent average annual rate and in 
2008 was $25,019. This rocky road for real personal disposable income per person in Canada over the 
1981-2008 period translated into overall growth of 28.8 per cent between 1981 and 2008, which 
represents a compound annual rate of only 0.94 per cent. This was less than two-thirds of the 1.58 per 
cent compound rate of growth of Canadian real GDP per capita over the same period.  
 
Moreover, while real personal disposable income per capita generally moved in line with real 
personal income per capita, it grew more slowly than the latter. This is explained by the dramatic 
increase of the implicit tax rate in the 1980s and the 1990s, from 17.95 per cent in 1981 to 22.56 per 
cent in 2008 (Chart 2b and Table 10A). The implicit tax rate peaked in 1998, reaching 23.99 per cent. 
However, can we consider a tax hike as having an adverse effect on wellbeing? If we assume 
governments are efficient and reflect the preferences of the population, one might conclude that 
personal income is a better indicator of wellbeing because every penny paid in taxes would be gained 
in government services.
16 Nonetheless, there is no agreement on whether higher taxes and the 
                                                 
15 As shown in Table 8D, personal income per capita as a proportion of the national average rose in Newfoundland and 
Labrador from 62.6 per cent in 1981 to 82.6 per cent in 2008, in Prince Edward Island from 67.2 per cent to 76.3 per cent, 
in Nova Scotia from 79.0 per cent to 85.3 per cent, and in New Brunswick from 72.9 per cent to 85.0 per cent. Equally, in 
two of the provinces with above average personal income per capita in 1981, relative personal income per capita fell over 
the 1981-2008 period, from 108.5 per cent of the national average to 101.9 per cent in Ontario and from 107.4 per cent to 
100.5 per cent in British Columbia. 
16 This depends on one’s view of the value of government expenditures as well as on the proportion of each tax dollar that 
does not translate into government services due to, for example, administrative costs and reduced work incentives.   12 
resulting lower after-tax income improve, worsen, or have no effect on wellbeing, so difficulties in 
deciding on the most appropriate indicator of living standards remain.  
 
 
4) Wages and Productivity Measures 
 
  Since wages represent around two-thirds of personal income, trends in wages largely 
determine trends in aggregate personal income. In the long-term, the key driver of trends in real 
wages is labour productivity growth. An increase in the amount of output a worker produces creates 
an equivalent increase in the amount of income, and this income translates into higher wages and 
profits. Consequently, it is useful to compare real wage and productivity growth to ascertain if real 
wage gains are keeping pace with productivity growth, and if not, why. 
 
  Labour productivity, defined as total economy output per hour worked, increased at an 
average annual rate of 1.30 per cent over the 1981-2008 period. Consequently, one might expect real 
wages to have increased at a comparable rate. However, this has not been the case (Chart 3). Real 
hourly compensation, which includes wages and in-kind benefits, grew much more slowly, at an 
average rate of only 0.82 per cent per year, a little over one-half the rate of productivity growth. This 
represents a difference of 0.48 percentage points per year (Summary Table 2a).
17 If wages are 
                                                 
17 Another issue related to wages concerns the male-female wage differential. Nominal growth in both average and median 
hourly wages for women outpaced those for men over the 1997-2008 period, according to data from the Labour Force 
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narrowly defined, the gap is even more substantial. Over the 1997-2008 period, real median hourly 
wages of employees (instead of real hourly compensation), increased only 0.55 per cent per year and 
real average hourly wages increased 0.73 per cent per year (Table 73b), much slower than real hourly 
compensation which increased 1.71 per cent per year. 
  
 
The first reason behind this variation in productivity and wage growth is the use of different price 
indexes to deflate nominal hourly compensation and nominal output. The Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) is used to deflate nominal labour compensation as the real wages of workers are determined by 
this price index. The GDP deflator is used to deflate nominal output as it captures the prices of output, 
including exports and intermediate and capital goods that are not purchased by consumers and hence 
not directly included in the CPI. With the CPI growing 0.23 percentage points per year faster than the 
GDP deflator over the 1981-2008 period, (3.14 per cent versus 2.91 per cent),
18 the differential 
deflator growth explains 48 per cent of the productivity/wage growth gap.  
 
The remaining 52 per cent of the gap can be accounted for by faster growth in nominal GDP 
than nominal labour compensation, that is, a falling labour share. Since wages are already included in 
income-based GDP and account for about one half of GDP, faster growth in the non-wage 
components of GDP must explain the remaining part of the gap. During the 1981-2008 period, 
average annual growth of nominal wages, salaries and supplementary income was 5.44 per cent, 
lower than nominal GDP growth of 5.68 per cent per year, and significantly slower than the 5.76 per 
cent per year rate of increase of nominal GDP excluding wages and inventory (Table 32). All non-
                                                                                                                                                                     
2008. Equally, the median hourly wage for females rose from 78.8 per cent to 84.2 per cent that of males over the same 
period. 
18 The slower growth in the GDP deflator reflects low rates of increase in the price of investment goods due to the falling 
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Chart 3: Real Hourly Compensation and Productivity Indexes
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wage components of income-based GDP except interest and miscellaneous investment income 
contributed to the faster growth of GDP relative to wages. Profits, in particular, growing at a robust 
6.64 per cent per year, made the most important contribution.
19 In 1981, profits represented 11.3 per 
cent of GDP. By 2008, the share had risen to 14.5 per cent. In this context, the reasons behind slower 
wage growth compared to productivity growth are two-fold: the use of different deflators for wages 
and output and the faster growth in components of income-based GDP, such as corporate profits, 
which are not part of worker compensation.
20   
 
Summary Table 2a: Measure of Wage in Canada Compared to Productivity, Average Annual Change 
(Per Cent) 
  Hourly compensation, total 
economy, CPI deflated 
Hourly compensation, total 
economy, GDP deflator 
Productivity in the total 
economy, GDP per hour 
81-89  0.39  1.06  1.25 
89-00  0.66  1.02  1.58 
00-08  1.37  0.95  0.79 
97-08  1.71  1.41  1.25 
81-08  0.82  1.05  1.30 
Total Growth Rate, % 
81-08  23.6  31.3  39.7 
Source: Table 23 
 
  More recently, the public debate over the dichotomy in the growth of real wages and that of 
labour productivity has centered on the wage estimates from the 2006 Census. The 2006 Census 
found that median earnings for individuals working on a full-time full-year basis barely increased 
between 1980 and 2005. Adjusting for inflation, annual earnings increased from $41,348 to $41,401 
(in 2005 constant dollars), a mere $53 over 25 years. Over the same time period, labour productivity 
in Canada rose 37.4 per cent. The stagnation in real median earnings reflects not only the falling 
labour share and the CPI/GDP deflator differential, factors which were noted earlier, but also 
measurement issues and increasing income inequality.   
 
Sharpe, Arsenault and Harrison (2008) decomposed the census median earnings and labour 
productivity growth gap and found that a small part of the gap between real earnings and labour 
productivity is a result of inconsistent measurement. As shown in Summary Table 2b, about one-fifth 
                                                 
19 Table 32 shows that nominal net income of unincorporated businesses including rent grew at a 6.52 per cent average 
annual growth rate between 1981 and 2008, with capital consumption allowances increasing at a 6.00 per cent average 
annual rate, and net taxes (taxes less subsidies) at a 5.60 per cent rate. Interest and miscellaneous investment income 
advanced at only a 3.37 average annual rate. In relative terms, the faster growth of corporate profits accounts for 101.5 per 
cent, or 35.2 percentage points, of the 34.7-percentage-point difference between the growth of wages and the growth of 
GDP minus wages and inventories for the 1981-2008 period. Taxes less subsidies contributed 10.5 per cent, capital 
consumption allowance about 46.1 per cent, unincorporated businesses 38.5 per cent and interest and investment income, 
which grew slower, had a negative contribution of 96.6 per cent.  
20 One can note that the comparison of wages (total wages per hour) and productivity (output per hour) growth is 
analogous to the comparison of personal income per capita and GDP per capita. In each comparison the denominator is 
the same (hours worked in the first and population in the second). In the first comparison, personal income is compared 
with output, while in the second wages, the key component of personal income, is being compared with output.   15 
of the 1.26-percentage-point gap between annual median earnings growth and annual labour 
productivity growth over the 1980-2005 period was due to inconsistent measurement.  
  
Summary Table 2b: Factors Explaining the Difference Between Median Real Earnings and Labour 
Productivity Growth in Canada, 1980-2005 







Median Real Earnings and Productivity Gap, 
of which:  1.26  100.0 
Measurement Issues  0.25  19.8 
Growing Inequality  0.35  27.6 
Falling Labour’s Terms of Trade  0.42  33.3 
Falling Labour Share   0.25  19.8 
Source: Sharpe, Arsenault and Harrison (2008) 
 
To make a meaningful comparison between real earnings and labour productivity, the same 
unit of labour input must be used. While census earnings are reported for full-time full-year workers, 
productivity is reported for all workers and is generally expressed on an hourly basis. In this analysis, 
the transformation from full-time, full-year workers to hours was divided in two steps (Summary 
Table 2c). First, note that the average earnings of full-time full-year workers grew at about the same 
rate as the earnings of all earners, where an earner is defined as anyone with earnings during the year 
rather than an average of the monthly number of earners as is the case for the definition of annual 
average employment. Second, the number of hours worked per earner has increased slightly over the 
1980-2005 period, up 2.25 per cent or 0.09 per cent on an annual basis.
21 Adopting a more 
appropriate measure of labour input, namely hours worked, thus increases the gap by 0.10 percentage 
points (7.9 per cent). 
 
Second, the census definition of earnings excludes supplementary labour income (SLI). On an 
annual basis, average labour compensation grew 0.35 percentage points faster than average earnings, 
in part because labour compensation includes SLI and earnings do not. This difference in growth rates 
explains slightly more than one-quarter of the gap between the growth in real median earnings and 
labour productivity.
22 
                                                 
21 The number of hours worked per earner tends to be pro-cyclical, i.e. favorable labour market conditions tend to increase 
the average number of hours worked for individuals working in a given year. Over the 1980-2005 period, the number of 
hours worked per earner per year reached a trough in 1982 at 1,463 hours and peaked in 1998 at 1,593 hours (Labour 
Force Survey). In this context, the difference between 1980 and 2005 is relatively small at 35 hours per year, from 1,521 
hours in 1980 to 1,556 in 2005. 
22 Statistics Canada defines supplementary labour income to include employer contributions to pension plans (private or 
public), supplementary health benefits, employment insurance (EI) and worker’s compensation. Since 1961, SLI has risen 
from 5 per cent of labour income to 12 per cent in 2008. This increasing importance is attributable primarily to: (1) a 
significant increase in contribution rates for the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans particularly since 1998; and (2) the 
increasing importance of welfare benefits such as private health and dental benefits plans, which represented 3.0 per cent 
of labour income in 2005, up from only 1.0 per cent in 1961. All other components of SLI increased in importance over 
the 1961-2005 period; private pensions (2.4 to 3.8 per cent); employment insurance payments (0.7 to 1.5 per cent); retiring 
allowances (0.0 to 0.7 per cent); and worker’s compensation payments (0.8 to 1.3 per cent).   16 
 
Summary Table 2c: Reconciling Growth in Median Real Earnings and Labour Productivity Growth in 
Canada, 1980-2005 
 
Earnings and Productivity Growth Gap  Compound Annual Growth Rates 
Real median earnings of full-time full-year workers  0.01 
Labour productivity (Real output per hour)  1.27 
Total gap  1.26 
Contribution to Median Real Earnings and Productivity Gap 
Absolute  Relative 
(points)  (per cent) 
From median to average earnings  0.35  27.6 
Change in definition of labour input, of which:   -0.10  -7.9 
from full-time full-year workers to all earners  -0.01  -0.6 
from earners to hours  -0.09  -7.3 
From earnings to total compensation  0.35  27.8 
From CPI to GDP deflator  0.42  33.3 
Change in the labour share of nominal GDP  0.25  19.8 
Total – All Factors  1.26  100.0 
Source: Sharpe, Arsenault and Harrison (2008) 
 
The use of median earnings instead of average earnings accounted for about one-quarter of the 
gap between median real earnings and labour productivity growth. The difference between median 
and average earnings growth reflects increasing earnings inequality in Canada over the period. 
Median real earnings of the top 20 per cent of full-time full-year earners grew 16.4 per cent, while 
those of the bottom 20 per cent fell 20.6 per cent. The reasons for the growing earnings inequality are 
poorly understood. Some argue that this development reflects market forces at play and more 
specifically the growing demand for highly skilled labour. Others make the case that it reflects 
governance structures that allow persons in positions of power, such as Chief Executive Officers, to 
obtain earnings increases not commensurate with their contribution to output.
23  
 
As noted earlier, the use of different deflators, i.e. the change in labour’s terms of trade, is also 
an important factor. It accounted for one-third of the median earnings/labour productivity growth gap 
between 1980 and 2005. From a consumer perspective, total compensation must be adjusted using a 
consumption deflator, such as CPI, in order to obtain a consistent indicator of purchasing power that 
is comparable over time. Over the 1980-2005 period, the CPI grew 0.42 percentage points faster than 
the GDP deflator. Yet, the theoretical link between real wages and labour productivity requires that 
                                                 
23 Saez and Veall (2005) find that the increase in total income since the late 1970s in Canada is concentrated among the 
top one per cent of earners, whose share of income increased from 5 per cent in the late 1970s to 10 per cent in 2000. The 
top 0.1 per cent in turn accounted for much of the increase, with their share going from 1.0 to 4.3 per cent over the period. 
They suggest that the threat of migration to the United States, where the surge in top income share started earlier (1970), 
might have spurred the surge in Canada. They support their case with evidence from Quebec where residents have a lower 
propensity to migrate because of language and cultural differences and where the top income share increase has been 
much more modest. While the finding of increased income inequality due to the fast rise of incomes at the top of the scale 
has been confirmed in many subsequent studies (Murphy, Michaud and Wolfson (2008) and Heisz (2007) for example), 
the drivers behind this trend remain contentious.   17 
both variables be deflated using the same deflator. When both measures are deflated using the same 
deflator, a further 0.42 percentage points, or 33.3 per cent, of the gap is explained.  
 
The remaining 0.25 percentage points (19.8 per cent) median earnings/labour productivity gap 
was due to the falling labour share in GDP, a result in line with that obtained earlier. Some of the 
factors behind the falling labour share are easy to identify; a rising profit share that can be linked to 
rising resource rents and increasing returns to capital. As was noted earlier, faster growth in the non-
wage components of GDP explains the falling labour share. Profits, growing at a robust 6.59 per cent 
per year, made the most important contribution. Factors driving the fall in the labour share and factors 
explaining the change in the labour’s terms of trade are explored in more detail in Sharpe, Arsenault 
and Harrison (2008) and Harrison (2009). 
B. Income Per Family Unit – Based on Household Surveys 
 
While personal disposable income based on the national accounts is an important indicator of 
the average after-tax income of Canadians and, by extension, of standards of living based on private 
consumption, it cannot be disaggregated by socio-economic characteristics, and median income 
cannot be calculated. However, such data can be obtained from other sources, namely the Survey of 
Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), which replaced the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) in 
1998.
24 These household surveys were specifically designed to monitor economic shifts experienced 
by individuals and families and to provide a comprehensive set of national data on the fluctuations in 
income of a typical family or individual over time. The SLID estimates have been traditionally 
released with a lag of 16 months from the reference year, compared to a two month lag for national 
accounts-based income estimates. It is important to note that these estimates are not completely 
consistent with national accounts, since they use somewhat different definitions of income and do not 
cover an identical population.
25  
 
Household survey-based income estimates are available at the national and provincial level 
from 1980 to 2007 on a consistent basis. However, since we use national accounts data starting in 
1981, we only use SCF/SLID data starting in 1981. We first concentrate on the impact of the growth 
in the number of family units over time, followed by an analysis of the evolution of both average and 
median household income.  
 
                                                 
24 The SLID began collecting longitudinal data in 1993. Its estimates replaced SCF estimates starting in the 1998 reference 
year. There was a five-year overlap which confirmed the relative consistency of the data between the two surveys. 
25 The SLID excludes residents of the Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, residents of institutions and persons 
living on Indian reserves (less than 3 per cent of the population). Multiplying the average after-tax income of family units 
by the number of family units, we obtain an aggregate household income of $794 billion in 2007 (2007 dollars) according 
to SLID. By comparison, personal disposable income according to the national accounts stood at $951 billion in 2007 
(current dollars). The SLID aggregate was thus 83 per cent of the national accounts aggregate. Most of this difference is 
due to the fact that the national accounts include income to associations of individuals serving households, which appear 
mainly in the “unincorporated business net income” and “Interest, dividends and miscellaneous investment income” 
portions of personal disposable income (see earlier footnote for more details).   18 
 
1) Trends in the Number of Family Units 
 
In the SLID, households are called family units. Statistics Canada differentiates between two 
main categories of family units, i.e. economic families and unattached individuals.
26 Trends in the 
number of households have a considerable impact on the average and median income of family units 
over time. In Canada, the growth in the number of households consistently outpaced population 
growth (Chart 4 and Tables 1 and 2A). For the 1981-2007 period, the number of family units 
increased at an annual compound rate of 1.61 per cent, while population grew only 1.09 per cent 
annually. In other words, the number of households increased 51.5 per cent compared to a 32.7 per 
cent increase for population. Consequently, the average number of persons per family unit fell from 
2.72 in 1981 to 2.38 in 2007, down 12.4 per cent (Table 3).  
 
The fall in the number of persons per family unit can be explained by the rapid growth in the 
number of unattached individuals, up 89.2 per cent between 1981 and 2007. Their share of the total 
population increased from 10.3 per cent to 14.8 per cent and their share of total family units increased 
from 27.6 per cent to 34.5 per cent. The rapid growth in the number of unattached individuals and 
falling economic family size are the result of numerous factors including increased divorce and 
                                                 
26 An economic family is defined as a group of two or more persons who live in the same dwelling and are related to each 
other by blood, marriage, common law or adoption. An unattached individual is a person living either alone or with others 
to whom he or she is unrelated, such as roommates or lodgers. A child must be the child of the major income earner (by 
birth, adopted, step, or foster) and be under age 18. “Other relatives” are persons related to the major income earner by 
blood, marriage, adoption or common-law which are not their spouse or children. Lone-parent families exclude families 

















Source : Table1, Table 2A, Table 2B and Table 2C 
Chart 4: Growth in Population, Number of Households, Unattached Individuals and Economic Families
Index (1981 = 100), 1981-2007  19 
separation rates, fewer children and more widows and widowers due to an aging population. This 
trend is offset somewhat by more adult children staying at home.
27  
 
As just pointed out, growth in the number of households during the 1981-2007 period was 
51.5 per cent, driven by population growth but also by changes in the composition of households. 
Among non-elderly economic families (families of two persons or more for which the major earner is 
under 65 years old), the fastest growing categories were other non-elderly families (203.4 per cent), 
lone-parent families (62.7 per cent)
28 and married couples (64.5 per cent), the groups that are likely to 
have a smaller household size (Summary Table 3 and Table 2D). 
 
On the other hand, the number of non-elderly two-parent families fell 6.0 per cent, likely due 
to the rising number of baby-boomers’ children reaching majority age and leaving the family house. 
At the same time, growth in the number of unattached individuals (89.2 per cent) was strong, with 
non-elderly males driving the increase (up 114.4 per cent). The changes in the composition of 
households, with the number of persons living alone, the number of married couples without children 
and the number of lone-parent families all increasing considerably and the number of two-parent 
families with children decreasing, led to a decrease in average family size.  
 
                                                 
27 Falling household size might seem unimportant, but it has a considerable impact on the living standards of ordinary 
Canadians. In effect, “economies of scale” inherent to larger families, such as the common use of refrigerators and 
furniture or the savings related to buying food in bulk, are lost. In order to take into account “economies of scale” of larger 
families, Statistics Canada uses an equivalence scale where the oldest person in the family is given a factor of 1.0, the 
second oldest a factor of 0.4, every other family member aged 16 or over a factor of 0.4 and every other family member 
under the age of 16 a factor of 0.3. Then, the income is divided by the sum of the family factors. However, this adjustment 
is used only for the quintile distribution of income and for calculating the Low-Income Cut-Offs (LICOs). It is generally 
not used for median and average income or in the calculation of income distribution indicators such as the Gini 
coefficient.  
 
Equivalence scales are widely used in analysis of income trends (Phipps and Garner, 1994). The OECD uses an 
equivalence scale, with a factor of adjustment for family size equal to the square root of the number of family members. 
For example, for a family of three, the adjusted income will be equal to “family income / 1.73”. It is interesting to note 
that for a small family, there is almost no difference between the OECD and Statistics Canada’s equivalence scale. For 
two, three- or four-person families, the adjustment factors will likely be 1.4, 1.7 and 2.0 respectively, both with Statistics 
Canada and the OECD scale. However, as families become larger, the difference widens. For example, a family with two 
adults and six children will have an adjustment factor of 3.2 with Statistics Canada scale compared to 2.8 with the OECD 
scale.  
 
Using an equivalence scale is in some way a compromise between per capita measures (which assume no economies of 
scale) and per household measures (which assume infinite economies of scale). An example might provide more clarity. 
For example, let us suppose a two persons family, each earning $35,000. In this case, the income per household is 
$70,000. In the case of divorce the average household income drops to $35,000. On the other hand, in both scenarios 
(married or divorced) per capita income is unchanged at $35,000. If we apply an equivalence scale to approximate the 
living standards of the aforementioned family, their equivalent income on a per capita basis is equivalent to an income of 
$50,000 ($70,000/1.4). In the case of divorce, equivalized income falls 30 per cent, compared to a 50 per cent decrease 
according to the household measure and no change according to the per capita measure. Adjusted for family size, growth 
in average after-tax income per household is 29.7 per cent over the 1981-2007 period, compared to 22.5 for unadjusted 
household income, a difference of 7.2 percentage points (Table 11G). 
28 The strong growth in lone-parent families was accompanied by a compositional shift, with male lone-parent families 
increasing its share of lone-parent families from 15.2 per cent in 1981 to 18.2 per cent in 2007. In fact, the number of male 
lone-parent families grew almost twice as fast as female lone-parent families, with growth reaching 95.4 per cent and 56.9 
per cent respectively.    20 















  1981  2007  1981-
2007  1981  2007  1981-
2007  1981  2007 
1981-
2007 
All family units   9,132  13,837  51.5  100.0  100.0  -6.9  2.67  2.33  -0.34 
Economic families, two persons or 
more  6,611  9,067  37.2  72.4  65.5  1.1  3.31  3.02  -0.29 
Elderly families   806  1,370  70.0  8.8  9.9  -8  2.35  2.19  -0.16 
Non-elderly families   5,805  7,698  32.6  63.6  55.6  1.3  3.44  3.17  -0.27 
Married couples without children  1,354  2,228  64.5  14.8  16.1  -12.8  2.00  2.00  - 
Two-parent families with 
children   3,081  2,897  -6.0  33.7  20.9  0  4.21  4.13  -0.08 
Married couples with other 
relatives   643  972  51.2  7.0  7.0  0.3  3.55  3.58  0.03 
Lone-parent families   429  698  62.7  4.7  5.0  3.2  2.99  2.89  -0.10 
Other non-elderly families   298  904  203.4  3.3  6.5  6.9  2.43  2.77  0.34 
Unattached individuals   2,521  4,769  89.2  27.6  34.5  0.3  1.00  1.00  - 
Elderly males   191  339  77.5  2.1  2.4  0.4  1.00  1.00  - 
Elderly females   529  863  63.1  5.8  6.2  4.4  1.00  1.00  - 
Non-elderly males   965  2,069  114.4  10.6  15.0  1.6  1.00  1.00  - 
Non-elderly females   837  1,498  79.0  9.2  10.8  -6.9  1.00  1.00  - 
Source: Table 2D 
2) Average Income Per Family Unit 
   
The data on average and median household income can be presented using either market, total 
or after-tax income.
29 As with personal disposable income, the income measure most closely related 
to consumption and personal savings possibilities of the average household is after-tax income. 
Effectively, it represents the average amount of money left after direct taxes on consumption and 
saving for each family unit. However, an analysis of all three statistics can be interesting in 
pinpointing the different sources of income. All income measures from SLID published by Statistics 
Canada were already deflated using the CPI. As noted earlier, if the PEPI had been used, annual 
                                                 
29 Market income is the sum of earnings (from employment and net self-employment), net investment income, (private) 
retirement income, and the items under "Other income". It is equivalent to total income minus government transfers. It is 
also called income before taxes and transfers. Total income refers to income from all sources including government 
transfers before deduction of federal and provincial income taxes. It may also be called income before tax (but after 
transfers), money income or nominal income. All sources of income are identified as belonging to either market income or 
government transfers. After-tax income is total income, which includes government transfers, less income tax. Income tax 
includes taxes on income, capital gains and withdrawals from Registered Retirement Savings Plans, after taking into 
account exemptions, deductions, non-refundable tax credits and the refundable Quebec abatement. Contributions to 
Employment Insurance (EI) and the Canada and Quebec Pensions Plans (CPP and QPP) are not included in income taxes, 
nor are they deducted from income to arrive at after-tax income. However, the Canadian System of National Accounts 
(CSNA) definition of taxes on production includes these payroll taxes, in accordance with international recommendations 
on national accounting.    21 
growth for all income measures would have been about 0.22 percentage points higher on average over 
the 1981-2007 period, and about 0.58 percentage points higher on average over the 2000-2007 period. 
 
Summary Table 4: Household-Based Measures of Real Aggregate Income in Canada, Average Annual 














income tax per 
household 
Average after-
tax income per 
household 
81-89  0.25  3.41  0.56  3.33  0.00 
89-00  0.20  0.65  0.25  0.46  0.18 
00-07  1.28  1.13  1.24  -0.96  1.79 
81-07  0.51  1.62  0.61  0.95  0.56 
Total Growth, % 
81-07  14.0  51.9  17.2  27.8  15.5 
Source: Table 10B, Table 10E, Table 11A, Table 11B and Table 11C 
 
Average market income expressed in constant 2007 dollars for all family units in Canada grew 
from $53,500 in 1981 to $61,000 in 2007, an average annual growth of 0.51 per cent or a total of 14.0 
per cent, below the 25.9 per cent growth of real disposable income per capita over the same period 
(Summary Table 4 and Chart 6). Of course, the much greater growth in the number of households 























Source : Table 11A, Table 11B and Table 11C Peak Year where peak value was equalled or exceeded
Chart 5: Average Market, Total and After-Tax Income per Family Unit
$2007, 1981-2007  22 
 
In a manner similar to national accounts aggregate income measures, average market income 
rises during economic expansions and falls during recessions and periods of weak growth (Chart 5). 
This is reflected in an increase in average market income during the 1984-1989 expansion, followed 
by four years of falling income and, finally, an upward trend from 1994 to 2001. In 2001, market 
income leveled off. Over the 1996-2001 period, average market income increased 16.0 per cent, 
significantly more than in any other five-year period for which data are available. This represents a 
compound annual growth rate of 3.02 per cent per year, much higher than the second-best period at 
1.94 per cent (1984-1989).
30 Between 2001 and 2007, market income grew 1.32 per cent per year on 
average. 
 
   Average total income of all family units followed similar trends, increasing 17.2 per cent 
between 1981 and 2007 or 0.61 per cent per year, outpacing average market income by 3.2 percentage 
points (Summary Table 4). Government transfers, which increased 51.9 per cent between 1981 and 
2007, explain the difference.
31 In relative terms, the importance of government transfers increased 
between 1981 and 2007, from 8.8 per cent of total income to 11.4 per cent (Summary Table 5). Over 
the 1981-1989 period, average total income increased 4.6 per cent, reaching $61,400 in 1989 ($2007). 
Then, between the peak of 1989 and the trough in 1993, average total income fell 9.3 per cent. Only 
in 2000 was the 1989 level reached again (Chart 5). Between 2000 and 2007, average total income 
increased 9.0 per cent.  
 
Summary Table 5: Implicit Income Tax and Government Transfers Rate (per cent) 
  
Implicit income tax rate  Implicit rate of 
government transfers 
1981  15.3  8.8 
1989  19.0  11.0 
1995  19.3  14.3 
2000  19.6  11.5 
2007  16.7  11.4 
Source: Table 10C and 10F 
 
From the point of view of individual purchasing power, the trend in average after-tax income 
is more relevant than that of total income. Average after-tax income followed a fairly similar path as 
average market income, growing slightly slower over the 1981-2007 period at 15.5 per cent or 0.56 
per cent per year (Table 11C). In absolute terms, after-tax household income increased from $49,700 
in 1981 (2007 dollars) to $57,400 in 2007. This slower growth meant that taxes increased faster than 
total or pre-tax income, which is consistent with our analysis of real personal disposable income. 
                                                 
30 If we use SLID income aggregate to calculate the growth of income per person for the 1981-2007 period, we obtain an 
average annual growth for average market income per person of 1.02 per cent, for average total income per person of 1.13 
per cent and for average after-tax income per person of 1.07 per cent.  
31 In fact, the increase over the 1981-2007 period has taken place mostly during downturns. Indeed, while growth in 
average total income closely followed growth in average market income during the boom period of 1983-1989 (9.6 per 
cent compared to 9.9 per cent) and 1996-2001 (12.9 per cent compared to 16.0 per cent), it diminished considerably less 
than market income did during the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s. This translated into an increase in transfers 
over the cyclically neutral period of 1981-2007   23 
Indeed, the implicit income tax rate increased from 15.3 per cent in 1981 to 16.7 per cent in 2007, 
although it was down significantly from 19.6 per cent in 2000 (Summary Table 5). As noted above, 
whether higher taxes are contributing to wellbeing depends on the extent to which increased 
government services are contributing to wellbeing. 
 
Interestingly, all three measures of average household income show similar results (Chart 5). 
All the ground gained from 1981 to 1989 was lost in the first half of the 1990s. From 1996 to 2001, 
Canadians enjoyed a steady rise in income and the 1989 peak was regained. All three measures show 
that income growth stagnated in the 2001-03 period and then picked up in 2004, but it this growth 
will not be sustained in the recession that began in 2008.  
3) Average Income by Family Type  
  
  Average market income growth between 1981 and 2007 was shared unequally among 
different types of families. Average market income for economic families ($77,300 in 2007) grew 
21.0 per cent during the period, with two-parent families with children growing ($93,300 in 2007) 
among the fastest at 31.4 per cent (Table 11H). Lone-parent families’ average market income grew 
25.3 per cent between 1981 and 2007 ($37,200 in 2007), but this was partly due to a compositional 
shift, i.e. the share of male lone-parent families, who have a much higher average market income than 
their female counterparts ($55,800 compared to $33,100 in 2007), was higher in 2007 than in 1981, 
going from 15.2 per cent to 18.2 per cent.
32 Finally, average market income for unattached individuals 
grew 14.2 per cent between 1981 and 2007. 
 
Trends in average total income by family type show widespread growth between 1981 and 
2007, with all family types in positive territory (Table 11I). There was strong growth among the 
elderly population’s average total income. Total income of elderly families grew 32.5 per cent, while 
that of elderly male unattached individuals was up 44.0 per cent and that of elderly female unattached 
individuals 41.9 per cent. Both the income of economic families (24.4 per cent) and of unattached 
individuals (16.7 per cent) grew significantly.  
 
Average after-tax income by family type followed similar trends (Summary Table 6 and Table 
11J). Between 1981 and 2007, income for economic families (22.5 per cent) grew faster than income 
for unattached individuals (14.2 per cent). Among non-elderly economic families, the income for two-
parent families with children increased 30.4 per cent, from $62,900 in 1981 to $82,000 in 2007, 
recording strong growth. Elderly unattached individuals’ income grew 35.4 per cent during the 1981-
2007 period, with males’ average after-tax income reaching $31,000 and females’ income reaching 
$25,800 in 2007. However, average after-tax income for non-elderly unattached males increased only 
2.5 per cent. The trend for lone-parent families was encouraging, with a 27.4 per cent increase over 
the 1981-2007 period, bringing the average after-tax income for that group at $41,800 in 2007.   
 
                                                 
32 The above average increase in incomes of lone parents may also reflect the movement of a significant numbers of single 
parents from welfare to the workforce. While gross incomes may be higher, childcare costs and work-related expenses 
may mean that the net income of lone parents did not increase.    24 
Summary Table 6: Trends in Average After-tax Income Per Family Unit, by Family Type, 1981 and 
2007, in $2007 
  1981  2007  Total Growth Rate, % 
All family units  49,700  57,400  15.5 
 Economic families, two persons or more  58,700  71,900  22.5 
  Elderly families  42,200  54,200  28.4 
  Non-elderly families  60,900  75,000  23.2 
   Married couples  57,400  70,000  22.0 
   Two-parent families with children   62,900  82,200  30.4 
   Married couples with other relatives   82,200  101,100  23.0 
   Lone-parent families   32,800  41,800  27.4 
   Other non-elderly families   50,700  62,500  23.3 
 Unattached individuals   26,100  29,800  14.2 
  Elderly males   22,900  31,000  35.4 
  Elderly females   19,100  25,800  35.1 
  Non-elderly males   31,900  32,700  2.5 
  Non-elderly females   24,700  27,800  12.6 
Source: Table 11J 
4) Government Transfers and Taxes  
 
  As discussed earlier, one of the effects of transfers and income tax in Canada is to reduce 
inequalities. In 2007, the average government transfer was $7,900 per household ($2007) and the 
average income tax paid was $11,500 (Table 10D and Table 10G). Therefore, the net effect was that 
average after-tax income per family unit was $3,600 lower than average market income. However, the 
differences among quintiles were considerable. In absolute terms, it was the second quintile which 
benefited the most, receiving an average government transfer of $10,000 and paying an average 
income tax amount of only $2,800, which translated into an average $7,200 increase in after-tax 
income compared to market income. The first or lowest quintile received $6,800 more in government 
transfers ($7,700) than it paid in income tax ($900). At the other end of the spectrum, households in 
the highest quintile received only an average of $5,200 in government transfers while paying an 
average of $34,800 in income tax, a net effect of -$29,600 on their after-tax income. Overall, the 
bottom quintile received about 19.6 per cent of all government transfers and paid 1.6 per cent of all 
income tax while the top quintile received 13.2 per cent of government transfers and paid 60.6 per 
cent of the country’s income tax. Government transfers were thus more equally distributed among 
quintiles than income tax. More than 80 per cent of all income tax revenue was paid by the top 40 per 
cent of households.  
5) Median Income of Family Units 
 
While average income is a convenient way to control for population growth when tracking 
aggregate income, it has certain drawbacks. First, it is sensitive to extreme values. Unusually high or 
low income will have a large impact on the average income of Canadians, which may not give   25 
accurate information about the change in income for a majority of families. The second disadvantage 
follows from this: average income does not give any information about the distribution of income. 
This is where median income becomes a useful measure. The median corresponds to the midpoint of 
the distribution. Hence, it is not affected by extreme values. Also, it can shed light on the distribution 
of income. If median income is lower than average income, the distribution is skewed to the left and 
vice-versa. In general, income distributions are skewed to the left, which means they are more 
concentrated at the low end. Thus, median income is generally lower than average income. 
  
In Canada, trends in median income tell a much different story than trends in average income. 
One of the three measures of median income actually decreased and the other two experienced very 
little growth over the 1981-2007 period (Chart 6 and Summary Table 7). 
 
The difference between median and average income is striking. In 1981, median market 
income per family unit was $6,000 ($2007) below average income per family unit, and was 
equivalent to 89 per cent of average market income. This gap more than doubled to $15,800 in 2007, 
with median market income equivalent to only 74 per cent of average market income (Chart 7). This 
suggests that as the country has become richer as a whole, middle-class and lower income families 
have seen their market income fall relative to that of richer family units. 
 
   
 In addition, while median market income was falling considerably in absolute terms during 
recessions and periods of slow growth, it did not fully recover during the expansion that followed. For 
example, median market income per household fell $8,800 between 1989 and 1993, from $46,300 to 
$37,500, but regained only $7,700 in the following recovery and expansion, reaching $45,200 in 

























































Source : Tables 7a, 8b, 9b, 11a, 11b, 11c, 12a, 12b and 12c
Chart 6: Measures of Real Income on a per Capita and per Household Basis
Total Growth, per cent, 1981-2007   26 
rebound of over 20.2 per cent between 1997 and 2007, median market income was still 4.8 per cent 
lower in 2007 than in 1981.  
 
Summary Table 7: Median Income per Household in Canada, Average Annual Change (per cent) 
   Median market 
income per 
household 
Median total income 
per household 
Median after-tax 
income per household 
81-89  -0.32  0.12  -0.31 
89-00  -0.93  -0.63  -0.45 
00-07  1.12  1.27  1.67 
81-07  -0.19  0.11  0.16 
Total Growth, % 
81-07  -4.8  2.9  4.2 




Median household total income saw a small increase of 2.9 per cent during the same period, 
1981-2007 (Table 12B). The difference between market and total median income, attributable to 
government transfers, is larger than the one observed between average market and total income. 
Naturally, this suggests, in line with intuition, that government transfers are aimed towards the low 
end of the distribution. Nonetheless, the 2.9 per cent increase in median total income per household is 











Source : Table 12A, Table 12B and Table 12C Peak Year where peak value was equalled or exceeded
Chart 8: Median Market, Total and After-Tax Income per Family Unit
$2007, 1981-2007  27 
Finally, after-tax median income per family unit increased $1,900 or 4.2 per cent between 
1981 and 2007 (Table 12C). Similarly to total and market median income, it reached a low point in 
1997, a level 14.1 per cent under the previous high of 1981 (Chart 8). Since then, it has marched 
forward, but only passed the 1981 level in 2006.  
 
The picture of living standards trends provided by median income is inconsistent with the 
widespread impression Canadians have of a steady progression in living standards based on average 
income measures, and on persons, not households. Not only does it imply an only moderate change of 
ambiguous direction for the living standards of the median Canadian between 1981 and 2007, but it 
also means that government redistribution, through transfers and taxes, did not totally offset the 
reduction in median market income per family unit until 2006. Different income measures tell 
different, indeed contradictory, stories. 
6) Median Income by Family Type  
 
  The fall of 4.8 per cent in median market income for all family units over the 1981-2007 
period did not affect every family type. For example, median market income for elderly families 
increased 41.3 per cent over the period, from $17,900 to $25,300, due mainly to a very robust 85.4 
per cent increase in elderly married couples’ median market income (Table 12G). Similarly, median 
market income for non-elderly families increased 9.9 per cent over the period, led by a 20.3 per cent 
increase in two-parent families with children. However, the faster growth in the number of elderly 
families (with lower median income) compared to other types of economic families translated into 
slow growing median market income for economic families between 1981 and 2007 (5.7 per cent). 
Also, while median market income for unattached individuals grew only per year 1.5 per cent during 
the 1981-2007 period, elderly males and elderly females recorded strong income growth (108.3 per 
cent and 155.2 per cent respectively).   
 
  The main factor behind the low growth of 2.9 per cent in median total income per family unit 
over the 1981-2007 period was also the compositional shift from higher income family units to lower 
income family units. For example, median total income for economic families increased 11.5 per cent 
over the period, from $63,500 in 1981 to $70,800 in 2006 (Table 12H), but its share of the number of 
family units fell from 72.4 per cent to 65.5 per cent. Meanwhile, the median total income for 
unattached individuals increased 11.3 per cent from $23,900 in 1981 to $26,600 in 2007, and its share 
of the number of family units grew from 27.6 per cent to 34.5 per cent. Yet, the stronger growth in the 
number of low-income level family types (unattached individuals) led to an much smaller increase in 
household median total income than for either family type. Similarly, stronger growth in the number 
of elderly families (which have an total income level of about two-thirds that of non-elderly families) 
dragged down growth in median total income for economic families, despite 41.7 per cent income 
growth for elderly families and 14.2 per cent growth for non-elderly families.  
   
Trends in median after-tax income are similar to median total income trends. Between 1981 
and 2007, median after-tax income for economic families increased 13.6 per cent and unattached 
individual’s median after-tax income increased 11.5 per cent, but due to the compositional change 
whereby there were more unattached individuals in 2007 than in 1981, there was only a 4.2 per cent 
increase in the all family units’ median after-tax income (Summary Table 8 and Table 12I). The two 
groups reporting a decline in median after-tax income were non-elderly unattached males (-7.1 per   28 
cent) and non-elderly unattached females (-1.3 per cent). Elderly unattached females were the group 
with the lowest median after-tax income ($21,300 ($2007)), while non-elderly married couples with 
other relatives, at $93,800 in 2007, were the group with the highest median after-tax income.  
 
Summary Table 8: Trends in Median After-Tax Income per Family Unit, by Family Type, 1981 and 
2007, in $2007 
 
1981  2007  Total Growth 
1981-2007 
All family units  44,800  46,700  4.2 
 Economic families, two persons or more  54,400  61,800  13.6 
  Elderly families  32,900  44,900  36.5 
  Non-elderly families  56,800  65,500  15.3 
   Married couples  55,100  61,000  10.7 
   Two-parent families with children   58,400  73,000  25.0 
   Married couples with other relatives   77,400  93,800  21.2 
   Lone-parent families   28,400  36,300  27.8 
   Other non-elderly families   46,400  57,900  24.8 
 Unattached individuals   21,700  24,200  11.5 
  Elderly males   16,500  23,400  41.8 
  Elderly females   14,500  21,300  46.9 
  Non-elderly males   29,700  27,600  -7.1 
  Non-elderly females   23,000  27,100  -1.3 
Source: Table 12I 
7) Trends in the Subjective Economic Situation of Families 
 
  It is useful to compare actual income trends with the perceptions of Canadians toward the 
economy and their own personal economic situations. These perceptions influence Canadians’ 
wellbeing. If Canadians think the economy is heading towards a recession, they might be anxious 
about losing their job or the adequacy of their savings. On the other hand, if they are upbeat about the 
economy, they might feel more economically secure and hence less apprehensive about the future, 
which in turn would increase their wellbeing.  
 
Ipsos Reid, a polling firm, has conducted a quarterly survey concerning Canadians’ 
expectation for the future of the Canadian economy and their personal situation since 1991. Results 
for most provinces are also available, but the Atlantic provinces are aggregated and so are 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The most relevant questions for this report are:  
 
  Thinking about the next year or so, do you, yourself, generally feel that the 
Canadian economy will improve, stay about the same, or get worse? 
 
  Thinking about your family, do you feel that your own economic situation will 
improve, stay the same, or get worse? 
   29 
Data about the proportion of respondents expecting the economy to improve, stay the same or 
get worse are available (Table 28A and Table 28B). Here we focus on the balance of opinions, i.e. the 
percentage of respondents expecting an improvement minus the percentage expecting the situation to 
worsen, to examine changes in expectations. Therefore, a positive balance of opinions means that 
more people expect the situation to improve, while a negative balance of opinions indicates that more 




In general, Canadians have positive expectations for the future of the economy. In fact, 
between 1991 and 2008, the only years in which the balance of opinion was negative was in 1996 (-2 
per cent) and 2008 (-18 per cent) (Chart 9). In every other single year, there were more Canadians 
who thought the economy would improve than Canadians who believe it would get worse. Starting in 
1997, Canadians expected a buoyant economy, with the optimists outnumbering the pessimists by 26 
per cent. This trend continued up to 2000, when the balance of opinion was still 23 per cent. 
However, in 2001, with the bursting of the high tech bubble, Canadians’ expectations for the 
economy fell drastically but stayed positive, at +2 per cent. The balance of opinion then quickly 
rebounded, reaching roughly 15 per cent in 2003, and then hovered between 0 and 10 for the 
following three years, before turning negative in 2008.
33  These trends more or less reflected the 
evolution of the business cycle. 
 
                                                 
33 This question may be a bit misleading for some people because an “improvement” is not clearly defined. If GDP goes 
up, one could say the economy has improved. But some people prefer to look at the rate of growth of GDP, which means 
that even if the economy is growing, respondents might consider that the Canadian economy is worsening if the rate of 









1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Family's Economic Situation
Canadian Economy
Source : Table 28A and Table 28B. 
Note:  For the family economic situation, data for 2003 -2009 are based on an average of all surveys in the year.
For the canadian economy, there are no data for 1994. Data is thus interpolated for that year. Moreover, data 
for 2002-2009 are based on an average of all surveys in the year. 
Chart 9: Balance of Opinions  (Positive minus Negative) About the Future of the Canadian Economy and 
the Economic Situation of One's Family
1991-2009, in per cent  30 
When asked about their own economic situation, Canadians were definitely more optimistic 
than pessimistic over the 1991-2008 period. The lowest balance of opinion registered was 6 per cent 
in 1992, immediately following the recession. This constant positive perception by Canadians of their 
personal economic outlook is interesting because it suggests that individuals thought they were 
generally outpacing the economy. In the early 1990s there was a higher proportion, between 17 and 
19 per cent, of Canadians who believed their economic situation would worsen. However, the 
proportion who thought their situation would improve was slightly larger, fluctuating between 24 and 
29 per cent. In 1997, the economy roared ahead, and so did Canadians’ personal expectations. During 
that year, the balance of opinion reached 17 per cent. The gap between optimists and pessimists 
continued to widen, peaking in 2000 at 25 per cent. After edging down in 2001, Canadians’ 
expectations reached their highest level in February 2003, with 44 per cent of Canadians expecting an 
improvement in their economic situation and only 10 per cent expecting a worsening. Since then, the 
balance of opinion remained high, around 20 per cent.
34 Even in 2008, when Canadians were 
expecting a downturn, the balance of opinions averaged 8 per cent. 
C. Wealth Per Capita  
   
Trends in the state of economic wellbeing cannot be captured only with income data. Not only 
can we enjoy today’s income in the present, but we can also transform wealth accumulated in the past 
into present consumption. As well, wealth can provide economic security and a personal safety net in 
cases of economic adversity, such as a death or disability of a family member in the workforce. 
Therefore, to measure economic wellbeing at any point in time, one needs to take into account both 
income and wealth.  
 
The national balance sheet accounts publish estimates of different types of financial and non-
financial wealth holdings from which average net worth
35 per person or per family unit can be 
calculated. These estimates seem to match very closely estimates from household wealth surveys, but 
no socio-economic disaggregation of national accounts wealth estimates is possible. Estimates for net 
worth from the national balance sheet accounts are available from 1961 to 2008 in current dollars. 
Since the wealth of individuals can be considered as future spending power or consumption, those 
values are deflated by the CPI to obtain a time series in real terms. 
 
Household wealth surveys provide a much more complete picture of wealth holdings and 
wealth distribution, but they are conducted infrequently in Canada. The most recent estimates 
available are from the 2005 Survey of Financial Security, the first such survey since 1999. Earlier 
wealth surveys in 1970, 1977 and 1984 were conducted jointly with the annual Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF), the predecessor to SLID. Unlike national account estimates, wealth data from 
household surveys cannot easily be compared across time as they use slightly different definitions of 
wealth (e.g. including public pensions or not). On the other hand, these surveys not only provide 
                                                 
34 The dichotomy between Canadians expectations for the economy and their personal economic situation might stem 
from the fact that they do not see their personal economic situation in terms of growth rate, but simply in terms of growth. 
35 Net worth is assets minus liabilities. Both non-financial (residential structures, non-residential structures, machinery and 
equipment, consumer durables, inventories, land) and financial (official reserves, currency and bank deposits, deposits in 
other institutions, foreign currency deposits, consumer credit, trade accounts receivable, bank loans, other loans, Canada 
short-term paper, other short-term paper, mortgages, Canada bonds, provincial bonds, municipal bonds, other Canadian 
bonds, life insurance and pensions, corporate claims, government claims, shares, foreign investments, other financial 
assets) assets and liabilities are included.   31 
estimates of average and median wealth, but also allow the disaggregation of wealth holdings by 
socio-economic characteristics.  
1) Wealth – National Accounts Estimates  
 
  The most striking element in the national balance sheet is the importance of the persons and 
unincorporated business sector in total net worth (Table 13A). In 2008 the total net worth of this 
sector stood at $5.2 trillion, 86.5 per cent of the national balance sheet net worth (Table 13A and 
Table 13F). Most of Canada’s wealth lies in the hands of individuals as opposed to its corporations or 
government. Of course, this is not too surprising, since corporations are publicly held through the 





Canadians are greatly affected by the extent of their wealth holdings. Most consider their 
assets, such as their house or their financial assets, as delayed consumption, either for them in 
retirement or for their descendants through bequests. To adjust the aggregate nominal net worth of 
persons and unincorporated business for inflation and population/household growth, we used the CPI 
and population/family unit estimates from the SLID (Table 13B). Interestingly, the wealth of 
Canadians seems to be increasing more steadily and more rapidly than all income measures. Over the 
1981-2007 period, wealth per capita increased an average of 2.11 per cent every year, while wealth 
                                                 
36 It is also interesting to note the steady decline of the government’s net worth between 1981 and 1996 resulting from 
continuous deficits, which was related to the steady increase of non-residents’ net worth as government deficits were 
largely financed abroad. In 2007, after numerous consecutive years of frugal fiscal policy, the government had a positive 
net worth for the first time since 1984; the government had a nominal net worth of $14 billion in 2007 ($64.9 billion in 
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Source : Table 13B and Table 4                
Chart 10: Average Net Worth of Persons and Unincorporated Business, per Capita and Family Unit
(thousands of $2007), 1981-2008  32 
per family unit increased 1.59 per cent annually over the period 1981-2008 (Summary Table 9). Real 
net worth fell only in 1982 and during the 1990-1991 downturn (Chart 10).  
 
Summary Table 9: Real Net Worth of Persons and Unincorporated 
Business, Annual Change (per cent) 
  Net worth per capita  Net worth per family unit 
81-89  1.86  1.09 
84-89  3.02  2.28 
89-00  1.83  1.47 
00-08  2.57  2.14 
81-08  2.11  1.59 
Total Growth Rate, % 
84-99  38.2  28.9 
81-07  75.6  53.1 
Source: Table 13B 
 
One factor explaining this growth could be an aging population. As people age, they tend to 
accumulate more wealth (Table 19B). Consequently, as the Canadian population grew older, 
aggregate wealth grew too. However, this cannot entirely explain the rapid expansion of Canadian 
wealth. Other factors that have contributed to increased wealth from 1981-2007 include large 
increases in housing prices and the increased value of the stock market. As the next section 
demonstrates, this increase in wealth has been very unevenly distributed among Canadians. 
 
Another element affecting Canadians’ wealth, natural resources, is not taken into account 
when calculating the national net worth from the national balance sheet accounts. However, estimates 
of the value of natural resources are available in the national wealth accounts. It is interesting to see 
the continuous growth in the value of natural resources in Canada (Table 13C). With data from the 
national wealth account, starting in 1981, we can see that the value of resources such as timber (188.9 
per cent), energy resources (454.3 per cent), metallic minerals (110.4 per cent) and non-metallic 
minerals (948.8 per cent) increased significantly between 1981 and 2008. Of course, these estimates 
are in current dollars, and the progression in real terms is considerably smaller. Nonetheless, in 2008, 
energy resources were valued at $1.12 trillion, more than 14 per cent of Canada’s tangible assets. 
Metallic and non-metallic minerals together represented about $325.8 billion and timber alone 
represented $257.3 billion. Because most of these resources are non-renewable, it may seem 
surprising to see their value increase. This is due not only to price movements, but also to the constant 
stream of new discoveries. Natural resources have played an important role in the development of the 
Canadian economy and the growth in Canadian living standards and they still represent a major 
element of the country’s wealth. 
2) Wealth – Based on Household Surveys 
 
The definition of wealth has changed over the years for the Survey of Financial Security (SFS) 
in Canada. Before 1999, wealth did not include the contents of the home, collectibles and valuables 
and annuities and registered retirement income funds. Moreover, the 1999 survey introduced an   33 
innovation to Canadian wealth measurement in the form of a new methodology to estimate the wealth 
value of employer pension plans. To allow comparison between the 1999 results and those of earlier 
wealth surveys, Statistics Canada has produced data for 1999 which are adjusted using the earlier 
surveys’ definition. Such adjustments were not made to estimates from the 2005 SFS, and the latter 
can thus only be compared directly with estimates from 1999.  
 
In the first section, we examine trends between 1970 and 1999, using the earlier definition of 
wealth. In the second section, we discuss the trends in wealth between 1999 and 2005 using the new 
definition introduced in 1999. The reader should note that for this reason, estimates for 1999 
contained in the first section will differ from estimates for 1999 discussed in the second section.  
a. Trends in wealth from 1970 and 1999 
 
Using data adjusted to reflect the older definition of wealth, we find a definite upward trend in 
average wealth per family unit (Table 19D). At the aggregate level, the average wealth per family unit 
increased 112.1 per cent in real terms between 1970 and 1999, or $93,072 ($1999). However, the 
increase was not steady over time, with about half (48.2 per cent) taking place between the 1970 and 
1977 surveys, a stagnation (1.2 per cent) between the 1977 and 1984 surveys and the other half (50.7 
per cent) between 1984 and 1999. For the 1984-1999 period, average wealth per family unit increased 
36.6 per cent, compared to a 30.8 per cent increase according the national accounts estimates for the 
same period. 
 
The analysis of wealth by family type for the 1999 survey arrives at conclusions similar to 
those on income by family type. The main winners were elderly couples and elderly unattached 
individuals (Table 19G). Between 1984 and 1999, the former increased their average wealth by 41.3 
per cent or $81,989 (1999$) while the latter increased its average wealth by 75.5 per cent or $59,433 
($1999). Surprisingly, the increase in the median wealth for those group were also quite high, with 
elderly couples increasing their median wealth by $56,425 (46.6 per cent) and elderly unattached 
individuals by $28,620 (69.2 per cent). Other groups that performed well between 1984 and 1999 
were couples without children and lone-parent families (at least in relative terms). Unattached 
individuals under 65 posted weak gains, their average wealth increasing only $16,684 and median 
wealth increasing a meager $228 over the 1984-1999 period. 
b. Trends in wealth from 1999 and 2005 
 
  The Survey of Financial Security conducted in 2005 gives an in-depth picture of the wealth of 
Canadians. Interestingly, estimates of net worth per household obtained from the SFS in 2005 are 
relatively close to national accounts estimates of net worth per households.
37 In the 2005 SFS, 
average net worth per household was estimated at $364,300 ($2005). In comparison, the estimate of 
net worth per household for the same year from the national accounts was $315,296
38 ($2005). The 
similarity in the estimates adds credibility to both sources.  
 
Based on the current definition of wealth used by Statistics Canada, the average family unit 
net worth grew 29.6 per cent between 1999 and 2005, from $281,000 (constant 2005 dollars) to 
                                                 
37 Using the number of households from SLID. 
38 Table 47B lists this value in $2001. For comparison within the paper, this value was converted to $2005.   34 
$364,300 (Table 49). Growth of real median net worth was over 20 per cent for almost every family 
type over the 1999-2005 period. The one exception was unattached individuals; this group saw only 
3.9 per cent growth, from $33,400 (2005$) in 1999 to $34,700, and also had the lowest median net 
worth. Other non-elderly families had the highest growth in median net worth (46.1 per cent), 
increasing from $144,300 in 1999 to $210,800 in 2005. Elderly families had the highest net worth of 
all family units in 2005, at $443,600, and also saw high net worth growth at 29.3 per cent over 1999-
2005. Economic families had higher median net worth and saw higher growth than unattached 
families. Economic families saw growth of 29.9 per cent over the 1999-2005 period, moving from a 
median net worth of $177,400 in 1999 to $230,500 in 2005. The higher net worth growth of economic 
families likely reflects more than just age and earning ability differences in comparison to unattached 
individuals, it also reflects the economies of scale that allow for savings within family units. 
 
  More recent insights on the wealth of Canadians can be gained from a paper by James B. 
Davies (2009) that explores the impact of asset prices changes on the economic security of Canadian 
over the 2005-2009 period. While Davies notes that significant declines in asset values have occurred 
between May 2008 and February 2009, he concludes that, in the absence of changes in asset 
quantities, the result of the price declines has been to return mean family wealth in real terms, as of 
February 2009, to the level observed in the 2005 SFS.  
III. Income and Wealth Distribution 
 
Osberg (1985), in his paper entitled “The Measurement of Economic Welfare”, explained 
precisely the importance and difficulties involved in measuring income and wealth distribution in the 
context of economic wellbeing: 
  
“When we ask for a measure of the economic wellbeing of society, we are asking for a way of 
summarizing the experiences of dissimilar individuals, a way of weighing the losses of the losers 
against the gains of the winners and deciding which is greater.”  
   
There are different approaches and ethical questions related to the effect of income 
distribution on economic wellbeing. First, does it matter at all? Does a dollar enhance the wellbeing 
of a rich individual as much as the same dollar would improve that of a poor individual? In general, in 
line with the notion of fairness, most people would agree that economic wellbeing is dependent on the 
status of the least well-off. However, even if one agrees with this proposition, we then face a second 
issue. Should we focus on absolute measures of poverty, i.e. do the least well-off have the basic 
means to live properly; or on relative measures of poverty, i.e. are the least well-off increasingly poor 
when compared to the average citizen? In this report, we discuss both measures. 
   
  We will focus our attention on a number of measures of income inequality and poverty (or low 
income). The data used to analyze income inequality and low income comes from the SLID/SCF 
household surveys available for the 1980-2007 period. We will first look at trends in the quintile 
distribution of income and at income inequality using quintile income ratios (e.g. ratio of average 
income of the top to bottom quintile). Next, we will examine income inequality based on the most 
widely used measure, namely the Gini coefficient. We will then look at estimates of the after-tax Low 
Income Cut-Offs (LICOs) published by Statistics Canada, which are also based on the SLID/SCF 
estimates. The discussion will include trends in the incidence of low income as well as trends in the   35 
depth of low income (low income gap). We will also focus on the Low Income Measure, a purely 
relative measure of low income based on the estimates for families and individuals gathered from T1 
files, i.e. administrative tax return data. This data can be disaggregated by socio-economic 
characteristics (although with less detail than SLID estimates) and by geographic unit (with more 
detail than SLID estimates). Finally, we will examine data from the Market Basket Measure of low 
income (MBM), an absolute measure of low income. 
 
  Constraints on the availability of data on wealth distribution will make it difficult to have as 
clear a picture of trends in income distribution. We will use data provided in the Surveys of Financial 
Security (SFS) of 1999 and 2005, and in earlier wealth surveys conducted in 1970, 1977 and 1984, to 
provide an overall portrait of wealth distribution in Canada, especially using median wealth and 
disaggregating by socio-economic characteristics. 
A. Income Distribution 
   
  Income disparities have a number of negative implications for society. Not only do they affect 
the wellbeing of those who they do not benefit from the creation of wealth, but inequalities can also 
affect the wellbeing the entire population through lessened social cohesion, increases in crime or, 
more generally, widespread discontent. Moreover, economic inequality may also in some cases slow 
down economic growth (Sharpe, 2003). Most people would agree that a society not only has the duty 
to create wealth, but also to have a certain degree of fairness in its distribution.    
1) Income Trends by Quintile    
 
Before we examine the quintile
39 distribution of income, it is important to note certain points. 
First, the population used for the quintile distribution excludes unattached individuals, taking into 
account only economic families. This is due to the unavailability of quintile data including unattached 
individuals. Moreover, income of economic families is adjusted for family size using the Statistics 
Canada equivalence scale described earlier. Therefore, the inequalities captured by trends in the 
quintile distribution are not affected by different family sizes and the change over time in the 
composition of households.    
 
In 2007, the adjusted market income of the first quintile of economic families was $10,000 
($2007) compared to $98,500 for the top quintile, a difference of $88,500 (Chart 11). The difference 
for total income was slightly smaller, at $84,200. Finally, the gap between the bottom and the top 
quintile was smallest for adjusted after-tax income, with the bottom quintile adjusted income at 
$16,100 and the top quintile almost five times as high at $78,200, a difference of $62,100.  
 
An analysis of the income distribution by quintile reveals that the real adjusted
40 income of the 
top quintile of economic families increased much more rapidly than that of the other four quintiles for 
all three measures of household income (market, total and after-tax). For example, adjusted after-tax 
                                                 
39 A quintile is a portion of a frequency distribution containing one-fifth of the total sample. In this case, the top quintile 
represents the average adjusted income of the 20 per cent of all economic families who recorded the highest income. The 
bottom quintile is the average adjusted income of the 20 per cent of economic families with the lowest income.  
40 See an earlier footnote in Section IIB for a quick review of the methodology used to adjust income using an equivalence 
scale.   36 
income of the top quintile rose by 38.7 per cent during 1981-2007, while the increase for all four 
other quintiles was only in the 25 per cent range (Chart 12). In other words, the adjusted after-tax 
income of economic families in the top quintile was increasing more than 50 per cent faster than that 
of persons in the other four quintiles during the period. Trends in the quintile distribution of market 
























Bottom quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Top quintile
Market income Total income After-tax income
Source : Table 24A, Table 24B and Table 24C




























Bottom quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Top quintile
Market income Total income After-tax income
Source : Table 24A, Table 24B and Table 24C
Chart 12: Adjusted Market, Total and After-Tax Income, Economic Families,  Change by Quintile for the 
Total 1981-2007 Period,
per cent  37 
 
The change in the quintile distribution of adjusted income between 1981 and 2007 indicates 
clearly that income generated during that period went predominantly to the top 20 per cent of the 
income distribution. Indeed, of the $9,300 average increase in adjusted after-tax income per economic 
family, 46.9 per cent can be accounted for by the increase in the income generated by the top quintile, 
which increased by an average of $21,800 between 1981 and 2007.
41 For total income, it was 54.0 per 
cent that went to persons in the top quintile and for market income it represented a stunning 63.8 per 
cent of the increase. 
 
  Because the adjusted income of the top quintile was rising more rapidly, its share of total 
adjusted income rose considerably (Chart 13). In fact, the increase in the share of total adjusted 
income appropriated by the top quintile overshadowed all other quintiles. For example, the share of 
adjusted market income of the top quintile increased 5.2 percentage points between 1981 and 2007, 
from 39.7 per cent to 44.9 per cent. Because the total adjusted income of the top quintile was growing 
more rapidly and because its initial income was higher, the share of total adjusted income received by 
other quintiles decreased. Over the 1981-2007 period, the share of market income generated by the 
lowest quintile fell from 5.0 per cent to 4.6 per cent or 0.46 percentage points (Chart 13). The share of 
adjusted market income of the second quintile decreased 1.93 percentage points, the third quintile 




                                                 
41 For comparison, the bottom quintile accounted for 7.1 per cent, the second quintile for 10.1 per cent, the third quintile 























Bottom quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Top quintile
Market income Total income After-tax income
Source : Table 24B, Table 24C and Table 24D
Chart 13: Quintile Shares of Adjusted Market, Total and After-Tax Income, Economic Families, Change 
Between 1981 and 2007
percentage points  38 
A relative measure of income inequality is the ratio of the top to bottom quintile income of 
economic families. Assuming the validity of the equivalence scale, we can say that the ratio really 
does describe the level of income available to the top 20 per cent of the population compared to the 
bottom 20 per cent. In other words, we can interpret a ratio of four by saying that for each dollar of 
income received by the lowest quintile, the highest quintile received four dollars. Note that if both the 
lowest and the highest quintile increase their income by one dollar, the new ratio would be lower, 





   The trends in the ratio of the top to bottom quintile for market income appear to follow the 
business cycle (Chart 14). The ratio hovers around 10, which means that the top 20 per cent of the 
population earns ten times more than the bottom 20 per cent (Summary Table 10 and Table 15A). 
Over the 1981-2007 period, this gap grew 24.8 per cent. It was at a low point in 1981, at 7.90. After 
reaching 10.77 in 1993, this ratio fluctuated between a peak of 11.71 in 1998 and a trough of 9.85 in 
2007.  
 
If we look at the ratio for total income, we come to similar conclusions. Over the 1981-2007 
period, the ratio of the top to bottom quintile of total income increased 14.6 per cent, from 5.19 in 
1981 to 5.95 in 2007. The startling element is the impact of government transfers on the level of the 
ratio. While the ratio hovers around ten to one for market income, it is only about six to one for total 
income (Summary Table 10). This is the result of the high government transfer rate for the lowest 
                                                 
42 One can see that easily if we assume a $10 income for the lowest quintile and a $40 income for the highest quintile. In 
this case, the ratio is 4. If the income of the lowest quintile increases by $1 and that of the highest ratio increases by $4, 
the ratio remains unchanged (44/11 = 4). Yet, the absolute gap increases from$ 30 to $33. Therefore, a stagnant ratio 













Source : Table 15A, Table15B and Table 15C
Chart 14: Top to Bottom Quintile Ratio for Market, Total and After-Tax Income, Economic Families, 1981-
2007  39 
quintile (amounting to 41.2 per cent of adjusted total income) compared to the highest quintile (2.7 
per cent) (Tables 24a and 24b). The main notable difference between market income ratios and total 
income ratios is the relative stability of the latter, which did not increase as significantly in the early 
1990s and, in turn, did not decrease as much in the second half of the 1990s. The stability of the 
quintile ratio of total income – compared to the increase in the market income quintile ratio – means 
that the gap between rich and poor, in absolute or per cent terms, did not widen as much as the one for 
market income.  
 
Summary Table 10: Ratio of Top to Bottom Quintile in Canada, Adjusted for Family Size 
 
Market income  Total income  After-tax income 
1981  7.90  5.19  4.41 
1989  8.18  5.14  4.23 
2000  10.36  6.22  5.11 
2007  9.85  5.95  4.86 
Point change     
81-89  0.29  -0.05  -0.17 
89-00  2.18  1.08  0.88 
00-07  -0.51  -0.27  -0.26 
81-07  1.95  0.76  0.45 
Total growth, %     
81-07  24.8  14.6  10.2 
Source: Table 15A, Table 15B and Table 15C 
 
The analysis for the ratio of the top to bottom quintile of after-tax income is slightly different. 
Between 1981 and 2007, the ratio of the top to bottom quintile for after-tax income also increased, 
from 4.41 in 1981 to 4.86 in 2007, a 10.2 per cent increase. Broadly, the same trend seems to apply to 
after-tax ratios as applies to total income ratios, except for the somewhat larger decrease in the after-
tax ratio in the latter part of the 1980s and its smaller increase in the following economic downturn 
(Table 15C).  
 
In 1994, the after-tax income quintile ratio was virtually at the same level as it was in 1981. In 
comparison, the total income ratio was 8.9 per cent higher in 1994 than in 1981. However, as GDP 
growth accelerated in the latter part of the 1990s, after-tax income ratios edged up, reaching 4.86 in 
2007, 10.2 per cent higher than in 1981. Thus, it appears that the top 20 per cent of the population 
became richer faster than the bottom 20 per cent. In absolute terms, the difference was even starker: 
for every new dollar in the pockets of the bottom quintile, the income of the top quintile was 
increasing by approximately five dollars.  
2) Gini Coefficient 
 
  To track broad trends in income inequality, the Gini coefficient is a well accepted indicator. It 
reflects the dispersion of the income distribution, and its value ranges from 0 to 1. While a value of 
zero would indicate that income is equally divided among Canadians, a value of 1 would mean that   40 
only one household receives all the income in the economy. Therefore, when income inequality 
increases, the Gini coefficient goes up and vice-versa.  
 
Summary Table 11: Gini Coefficient in Canada for All Family Units, Absolute Value and Total Absolute 
and Percentage Change Over the Period 
  Market 






Effect of Transfers 
and Taxes 
  (1)  (2)  (3) = (2) – (1)  (4)  (5) = (4) – (2)  (6) = (3) + (5) 
1981  0.434  0.374  -0.060  0.348  -0.026  -0.086 
1989  0.46  0.385  -0.075  0.351  -0.034  -0.109 
2000  0.515  0.431  -0.084  0.392  -0.039  -0.123 
2007  0.507  0.429  -0.078  0.393  -0.036  -0.114 
Average Annual Growth Rate, % 
81-89  0.73  0.36  2.83  0.11  3.41  3.01 
89-00  1.03  1.03  1.04  1.01  1.26  1.10 
00-07  -0.22  -0.07  -1.05  0.04  -1.14  -1.08 
81-07  0.60  0.53  1.01  0.47  1.26  1.09 
Total point change 
81-89  0.026  0.011  -0.015  0.003  -0.008  -0.023 
89-00  0.055  0.046  -0.009  0.041  -0.005  -0.014 
00-07  -0.008  -0.002  0.006  0.001  0.003  0.009 
81-07  0.073  0.055  -0.018  0.045  -0.010  -0.028 
Total per cent change 
81-89  6.0  2.9  25.0  0.9  30.8  26.7 
89-00  12.0  11.9  12.0  11.7  14.7  12.8 
00-07  -1.6  -0.5  -7.1  0.3  -7.7  -7.3 
81-07  16.8  14.7  30.0  12.9  38.5  32.6 
Source: Table 14A, Table 14B and Table 14C 
 
The choice of income measure (market, total or after-tax) will have an impact on the level of 
the Gini coefficient. Since government transfers and taxes are aimed at reducing income disparities, 
we should expect a higher Gini coefficient for market income than for total income and an even lower 
one for after-tax income. In fact, in 2007, the Gini coefficient for market income was 0.507, the one 
for total income was about 85 per cent of the market income Gini coefficient at 0.429 and the after-tax 
Gini coefficient was 78 per cent of the market income Gini coefficient at 0.393 (Summary Table 11). 
It is also important to keep in mind that since Statistics Canada does not adjust income for household 
size in the calculation of the Gini coefficient, its value is likely overstated compared to an estimate 
which adjusts for household size.
43 The Gini coefficient presented here is the one for all family units. 
                                                 
43 For example, the Gini coefficient for a family of six earning a total of $50,000 and an unattached individual earning 
$50,000 would be 0. However, one cannot say this is a totally equal distribution as the unattached individual enjoys more 
income than each family member. It is possible to estimate a Gini coefficient using adjusted income with the SLID micro-
data, but these values would not be easily available and could be subject to criticism because of a lack of transparency. If   41 
Estimates for different types of unattached individuals and economic families of different sizes are 
also available.  
 
Between 1981 and 2007, the Gini coefficient based on market income increased 16.8 per cent, 
from 0.434 to 0.507. At first glance, trends in the Gini coefficient of market income for all family 
units appear to be countercyclical. We can observe that during recessions, such as in 1982 and 1990-
1991, sharp increases in the Gini coefficient occurred (Chart 15). Conversely, during periods of 




However, downward pressure seems to have been less intense than upward pressure. While 
the Gini coefficient increased 8.1 per cent between 1981 and 1983, it only edged down 1.9 per cent 
during the following recovery and expansion up to 1989. Similarly, while the Gini coefficient grew 
7.7 per cent between 1990 and 1997, it shrank only 1.7 per cent during the 1997-2007 period. 
Apparently, the least well-off suffer more during a downturn and, similarly, seem to benefit 
somewhat more during better economic times. This is because the economically vulnerable lose their 
jobs during a downturn, increasing the market income gap between the low and high income 
households and gain employment during an upturn reducing the gap. 
 
Analysis of the total income Gini coefficient is quite similar to that of market income. 
However, government transfers not only reduce inequalities, they also dampen the effects of the 
business cycle on the distribution of income. As noted earlier, the total income Gini coefficient is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
one is interested mainly in the trend of inequality as opposed to the absolute level of inequality, the issue of the choice of 











Source : Table 14A, 14B and 14C Business Cycle Peak
Chart 15: Gini Coefficient for Market, Total and After-Tax Income, All Family Units, 1981-2007  42 
significantly lower than the one for market income, with a value of 0.429 in 2007 compared to 0.507 
for market income (Summary Table 11 and Table 14B). These lower income inequalities are coupled 
with lower volatility in the distribution of income. In effect, the Gini coefficient of total income per 
family unit rose only 4.5 per cent during the 1981-1983 period and 5.8 per cent between 1990 and 
1997. Similarly, the Gini coefficient decreased only marginally during the 1983-1989 recovery (1.5 
per cent) and actually grew slowly during the boom of 1997-2007, increasing 2.6 per cent. As a result, 
the Gini coefficient of total income per family unit increased less than the one for market income, 
with a compound annual growth of 0.53 per cent per year and a total growth rate of 14.7 per cent, 
compared to annual growth rate of 0.60 per cent and total growth of 16.8 per cent for market income. 
However, it still does indicate a significant widening of the gap between have and have-not families.  
 
Over the 1981-2007 period, the Gini coefficient of after-tax income increased 12.9 per cent, 
from 0.348 in 1981 to 0.393 in 2007 (Summary Table 11). As noted, Canada’s progressive tax 
system, in the same way as government transfers, lessens income inequalities at a point in time. In 
fact, not only did it reduce the Gini coefficient, it also flattened it over time, diminishing the effects of 
unequal market income growth on income inequalities (Table 14C). For example, the Gini coefficient 
of after-tax income for all family units increased only 3.7 per cent between 1981 and 1983, compared 
to 4.5 per cent and 8.1 per cent for the total and market income Gini respectively. During the recovery 
and expansion up to 1989, it edged back down 2.8 per cent only to climb back up in the following 
years, particularly during the second half of the 1990s. In 2007, it was 12.9 per cent above its 1981 
level, pointing to rising inequalities among Canadians, even based on after-tax income.  
 
  All in all, it appears that income inequalities are on an upward trend in Canada due to growing 
market income inequalities. These inequalities increase during recessions and do not return to pre-
recession levels during the following recovery and expansion. Reasons for this situation are still 
poorly understood but may reflect growing demand for skilled workers and lower demand for 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers.  
3) Low Income Measures 
a. After-Tax Low Income Cut-Offs 
 
  Low Income Cut-Offs (LICOs) are a threshold used to determine the number of people with 
low income. They represent a level of income at which a family of a certain size would have to spend 
20 percentage points more of its income on food, shelter and clothing than the average family of the 
same size.
44 Statistics Canada calculates those values for both before-tax and after-tax income. 
However, we have restricted our analysis to after-tax LICOs as they represent the actual income used 
                                                 
44 LICOs are established using data from the Family Expenditure Survey, now known as the Survey of Household 
Spending. They are calculated for seven different family size, from unattached individual to family of seven or more, and 
for five community sizes, from rural to urban areas with a population of more than 500,000. The average proportion of 
income spent on food, shelter, and clothing is calculated using the 1992 Family Expenditure Survey and then 20 per cent 
is added to find the proportion over which a family is considered low income.  Using income data for that year, one can 
derive the cut-off values. Thereafter, the CPI is used to adjust the basic set of cut-offs for different years. According to 
Statistics Canada, LICOs should not be used to represent the poverty line because the debate on how to define poverty is 
still unresolved. For more information on Statistics Canada position on the use of LICOs as poverty line, see Fellegi 
(1999).    43 
to purchase necessities. Along with LICOs, we include data on the average low income gap
45 to see if 
the depth of poverty – the difference between the income of low income households and the LICO 
line – has changed. 
 
The percentage of persons in low income declined 2.4 percentage points between 1981 and 
2007: 11.6 per cent versus 9.2 per cent (Chart 16a and Summary Table 12). The economic downturn 
of the early 1980s increased the percentage of persons in low income to 14.0 per cent in 1983, a 2.4 
percentage point increase over the 1981 level. However, the following recovery and expansion 
lowered the proportion of persons in low income to a trough of 10.2 per cent in 1989. Then, the 
recession of the early 1990s hit hard, bringing the percentage of low income persons to a peak of 15.7 
per cent in 1996. This peak in the low income rate occurred well after the output trough in 1992, 
because of the persistence of double digit unemployment rate up to 1996. The subsequent expansion 
brought the proportion of low income persons close to the pre-recession level, at 11.2 per cent in 
2001. The percentage of low income persons rose slightly to 11.6 per cent in 2002 and 2003 before 




The percentage of persons under 18 years old living in low income families followed roughly 
similar trends, although the incidence was higher for children than for all persons. Nonetheless, the 
proportion of persons under 18 living in low income families fell from 12.6 per cent in 1981 to 9.5 
per cent in 2007. Child poverty was exacerbated by recessions, reaching 16.2 per cent in 1984 and 
                                                 
45 The low income gap is the amount that a low income family falls short of the relevant LICO. For the calculation of this 
gap, negative incomes are treated as zero. For example, a family with an income of $15,000 and a LICO of $20,000 would 
have a low income gap of $5,000. In percentage terms this gap would be 25 per cent. The average gap for a given 
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Source: Table 16B, Table 16D and Table 17A
Chart 16a: Percentage of All Persons (Including Children) Under the After-tax Low Income Cut-Offs (LICOs) 
($2007), 1981-2007
%  44 
18.4 per cent in 1996. These levels were respectively 2.5 per cent and 3.2 per cent higher than the 
levels observed in the overall population in the same years.  It should be noted that the decline in 
child poverty rates observed in Canada is not only the result of better economic conditions, but also a 
consequence of effective policies such as the Canada Child Tax Benefit and the National Child 
Benefit Supplement.
46  
   
Another distinct characteristic in trends in the percentage of persons under the after-tax LICO 
is the considerable fall in elderly poverty between 1981 and 2007, albeit from a high level (Table 
16L). Elderly poverty fell 16.2 percentage points during the period, from 21.0 per cent in 1981 to only 
4.8 per cent in 2007 (Summary Table 12). This development reflected the increased government 
transfers to the elderly in the form of Canada Pension Plan/Quebec Pension Plan, Old Age Security, 
and Guaranteed Income Supplement payments.
47  
 
In contrast to the significant fall in the percentage of children and elderly persons under the 
after-tax LICO, the percentage of persons 18 to 64 years old below the after-tax LICO increased 0.1 
percentage points, from 9.8 per cent in 1981 to 9.9 per cent in 2007. This increase was due to two key 
features: (1) a compositional change in the type of households toward family types with above 
average poverty levels; (2) and the performance of non-elderly unattached males, which form the only 
family type group that experienced an increase in its incidence of low income over the 1981-2007 
period. While the compositional shift was the most important factor, the fact that non-elderly males 
experienced an increase in low-income incidence of roughly one-fifth (4.9 percentage points) while 
all persons experienced a decline of approximately the same magnitude (one-fifth, or 2.4 percentage 
points) should be noted. These data suggest that poverty declines were not necessarily related only to 
improving economic conditions, but also to programs which appear to have successfully lowered 
poverty in targeted populations (e.g. CCTB and NCB for children, GIS and CPP for the elderly).  
 
As was noted earlier in the report, the number of unattached individuals grew much faster than 
the number of economic families between 1981 and 2007. Moreover, unattached individuals reported 
a consistently higher percentage of persons below the after-tax LICO compared to economic families. 
Indeed, despite falling from 35.5 per cent in 1981 to 27.4 per cent in 2007, the share of unattached 
individuals below the after-tax LICO was still much higher than that of economic families (6.0 per 
cent). As a result, even though both the percentage of persons in economic families and the 
percentage of unattached individuals below the after-tax LICO decline substantially (31.8 per cent 
and 23.6 per cent respectively), the increasing share of unattached individuals in the composition of 
family units reduced the gains in poverty reduction. Though the proportion of people living with 
after-tax low incomes has decreased (20.7 per cent) the fall would have been much greater were it not 
for the changing structure of families in Canada. In fact, if in 2007 family composition had been the 
                                                 
46 Indeed, the introduction of the Canada Child Tax Benefit and the National Child Benefit Supplement in the 1995-1996 
fiscal year has coincided with a considerable fall in the child poverty rate (Table 16L). In fact, since 1996, the percentage 
of persons under 18 years of age under the after-tax LICO decreased 8.9 percentage points, a larger decrease than for 
adults aged 18-64 (5.1 percentage points) or the elderly (4.9 percentage points) for the same period. This turn of events 
finally brought child poverty below the 1981 level of 12.6 per cent. The gains from poverty reduction for children in two-
parent families, which decreased from 8.4 per cent in 1981 to 6.5 per cent in 2007, was offset somewhat by the increase in 
the share of family units that are single parent families. Female lone parent families had much higher child low income 
rates despite a substantial decline from 48.7 in 1981 to 26.6 in 2007. 
47 For example, CPP payments increased nearly ten-fold in nominal terms, from $2.3 billion in 1981 to $25.4 billion in 
2006, the most recent year for which data were available (Table 64).   45 
same as in 1981 (using the ten detailed family types in Table 16K), the percentage of persons under 
the LICO would have been one percentage point lower in 2007. For families, the percentage would 
have been nearly 2 percentage points lower based on the ten main family groups (Table 16I).  
 
Summary Table 12: Trends in the Percentage of Persons Under the After-Tax LICO, by Age Group and 
Sex, 1981 and 2007, in per Cent, Unless Otherwise Indicated 
  
1981  2007  Per cent change, 
1981-2007 
All persons   11.6  9.2  -20.7 
Under 18 years   12.6  9.5  -24.6 
18 to 64 years   9.8  9.9  1.0 
65 years and over   21.0  4.8  -77.1 
Males   9.9  9.0  -9.1 
Females   13.3  9.4  -29.3 
Persons in economic families   8.8  6.0  -31.8 
Males  8.1  5.7  -29.6 
Females  9.6  6.3  -34.4 
Elderly persons  7.3  1.1  -84.9 
Under 18 years   12.5  9.4  -24.8 
18 to 64 years   7.2  5.5  -23.6 
Unattached individuals   35.5  27.4  -22.8 
Males   27.2  27.4  0.7 
Females   42.5  27.5  -35.3 
Elderly persons  49.7  13.9  -72.0 
Males   39.0  18.8  -66.7 
Females   53.5  31.9  -73.3 
Under 65 years   29.8  32.0  7.4 
Males   24.8  29.7  19.8 
Females   35.6  35.1  -1.4 
Source: Table 16L 
 
The low income gap measures the average amount needed by a low income family to reach 
the LICO. It is expressed in constant 2007 dollars. In 2007, it stood at $6,700, a level equal to the 
1981 level (Table 17A). Over the 1981-2007 period, the low income gap did not fluctuate greatly, 
ranging from $6,200 in the trough of 1989 to $7,200 reached in 1998 and 1999 (Chart 16b). Thus, low 
income families remained at about the same distance from the LICO between 1981 and 2007.  
 
The low income gap differs among different family types (Table 17C). For example, elderly 
families in 2007 had a low income gap of $6,900 ($2007) compared to $7,200 for non-elderly 
families. For the 1981-2007 period, lone-parent families improved their position considerably, with 
their low income gap falling 27.8 per cent, from $9,200 in 1981 to $7,600 in 2007. It was the greatest 
improvement in all major categories of economic families. Among unattached individuals, elderly 
females notably saw a substantial reduction of 38.5 per cent, from $3,900 in 1981 to $2,400 in 2007.     46 
 
b. Low Income Measure 
 
  The low income measure (LIM) is a purely relative measure of low income and the threshold 
is calculated using median adjusted income. First, each household’s income is adjusted using 
Statistics Canada’s equivalence scale. Then the median income is calculated, i.e. the income where 
half the families have a higher adjusted income and the other half have a lower adjusted income. The 
LIM is then represented by half that median adjusted income.
48 The LIM is defined on a national 
level, which means the line is the same in Ontario as in Prince Edward Island or British Columbia. 




  The LIM could be seen as an alternative measure to the LICO as it is easier to understand and 
more straightforward. However, the drawback is that it is purely relative. For example, if the real 
income of all households doubled, there would be no change in the percentage of persons under the 
LIM. Also, there is no adjustment for community size, and it is not based on a basket of goods. These 
                                                 
48 The LIM is a fixed percentage (50 per cent) of median national adjusted family income where adjusted indicates a 
consideration of family needs. The family size adjustment reflects the precept that family needs increase with family size. 
A family is considered to be low income when their income is below the LIM for their family type and size. When the 
median adjusted income is determined, the LIM for family types other than unattached individual is found by multiplying 
the median adjusted income by the sum of the factors of the family size (e.g. one parent and two kids would be 1 + 0.4 + 
0.3 = 1.7). A low income person is a person part of a low income family. 
49 The LIM presented here is from T1 family files, for which estimates are currently only available back to 1997. It is not 
consistent with the dataset (which is survey based) used to estimate the MBM and the LICO. Historical data for the LIM 
could be obtained from other data sources (e.g. SLID), but Statistics Canada’s only published measure of LIM on Cansim 
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Chart 16b: Estimates of the After-Tax Average Low Income Gap per Household 
(2007$, 1981-2007)  47 
differences in definitions can lead to different changes in the LICO and the LIM. For example, 
between 1999 and 2000, while the percentage of persons under the LICO edged down 0.5 percentage 
points (Table 16L), the percentage of persons under the LIM increased 0.5 percentage points (Table 
18B). 
 
In 1997, 16.1 per cent of the population was under the LIM. There was a downward 
movement over the next nine years, with the LIM at 14.9 per cent in 2006 and fluctuating in a range 
from 16.1 per cent to 14.9 per cent over the 1997 to 2006 period (Chart 16c and Table 18B). LIM 
estimates currently give a higher percentage of low income persons than LICO estimates and tend to 
be more stable. 
 
The LIM also suggests a much higher rate of child poverty, with 19.6 per cent of children (0-
17 years of age) living in low income families in 2006 (Chart 16c and Table 18B). This was down 
from the 1997 value of 22.0 per cent, but is in sharp contrast with the 11.4 per cent estimates from the 




Similarly, the percentage of elderly persons in low income families is not moving in the same 
direction as the LICOs. Using the LIM, the percentage of elderly in low income families rose from 
3.6 per cent in 1997 to 6.4 per cent in 2006, a 2.8 percentage point increase (Chart 16c). However, the 
LICOs suggest that the percentage of elderly persons in low income families fell 3.6 percentage 
points between 1997 and 2006, from 9.0 per cent to 5.4 per cent. Of course, those results not only 
suggest different realities, but also different policies to address those realities. The choice of the low 
income indicator can thus have considerable effect on our perception of the incidence of low income 
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Chart 16c: Percentage of Persons Under the After-Tax Low Income Measure (LIM) 
1997-2006
Source: Table 18B  48 
c. Market Basket Measure 
 
  The Market Basket Measure (MBM) is an absolute measure of low income developed by 
Human Resources and Skills Development Canada in partnership with provincial and territorial 
ministries responsible for social policy with the assistance of Statistics Canada. A specific basket of 
goods and services was selected and the prices of these goods and services monitored in different 
communities across Canada.
50 If a household’s disposable income falls below the cost of the basket of 
goods and services in the MBM in their community (size and location), members of that household 
are considered to be in low-income. Different thresholds are estimated for different family size and 
composition. 
   
The main difference with the LICOs is that the MBM takes into account the size of the 
communities not only for the cost of shelter, but for all components of the basket. Therefore, the 




In 2006, the most recent year for which MBM estimates are available, 11.9 per cent of all 
persons were in low income on an after-tax basis according to the MBM. By comparison, the after-tax 
                                                 
50 The basket includes specified quantities and qualities of goods and services related to food, clothing and footwear; 
shelter; transportation (public transit or use of a used vehicle); and other household needs such as school supplies, 
personal care products, a telephone, etc. Expenses such as child care and non-insured health costs are not included in the 
basket because they vary greatly from family to family. In order to account for these expenses, the cost of these items is 
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Chart 17: Market Basket Measure (MBM), After-Tax LICO and After-Tax LIM, 2006
per cent  49 
LICO estimate was 10.5 per cent and the LIM estimate was 14.9 per cent.
51 While the incidence of 
low income measured by the MBM was higher than the LICO estimate for economic families, it was 
lower for unattached individuals (Chart 17 and Table 38a).  
 
The MBM provides higher estimates of low income for lone-parent families than the low 
income cut-offs. This results from the MBM’s definition of disposable incomes, since single-parent 
families are likely to have child care and health care expenses that are deducted from the family’s 
total money income resulting in a higher gap between total and disposable income. For lone-parent 
families, in 2006, the MBM estimate was 30.3 per cent, the after-tax LICO estimate was 24.3 per 
cent, and the LIM estimate was 33.1 per cent. In general, the 2006 MBM low income estimates were 
higher than the LICO estimates. Overall, the MBM is a useful complementary measure to Statistics 
Canada’s LICO, but the lack of historical estimates makes it difficult to use as an indicator of trends 
in low income.  
d. Low Income Dynamics 
 
  Opportunities to improve one’s situation are a core value of western societies. But an 
individual’s power to make life better, to go up the social scale and improve one’s family lot is not a 
given. The study of the dynamics of low income reveals that some have a harder time moving out of 
low income than others. This is an important factor for wellbeing, because not only are the long-term 
poor excluded from sharing the nation’s wealth, but their low-income situation is not temporary, it is 
structural. Measuring the persistence of low income and understanding its determinants are essential 
to create appropriate policies because people in a state of persistent low income do not need the same 
types of support as people that suffer a temporary setback.  
 
  The study of low income dynamics was made possible by the initiation of longitudinal 
household surveys, such as the SLID. In one of the first attempts at analyzing low income dynamics 
in Canada, researchers at Human Resources Development Canada (2000) looked at the 1992-1996 
period using the Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). In that study, they defined as long-run 
poor someone who, during the five years covered by the study, was under the low income line for at 
least half of the period. They found this group to be sizeable, representing 6 per cent of the Canadian 
population and about 40 per cent of the low income population in any given year. The policy 
implications of these findings are important. The recognition of low income as both a temporary and a 
permanent state underlines the importance of diverse policies targeting different groups.  
 
More recent work by Finnie and Sweetman (2003) using the same data and an entry and exit 
model of low income dynamics found that “family status is a strong determinant of movement into 
and out of low income”. For example, they found that unattached individuals and lone parents had 
higher entry rates and lower exit rates than married persons. There was also an age factor, which 
indicated that younger families with children suffered more and longer low income spells. 
Interestingly, they also showed that long-term low income feeds itself, i.e. the more years spent in low 
income, the more likely one is to remain low-income in the future. Of course, these results were often 
inferred and generalized from static low income data, but this research paper documented the extent 
of low income as a dynamic phenomenon.  
                                                 
51 The estimates used to compare are the pre-revisions estimates given in HRDC (2003). In May 2005, Statistics Canada 
considerably revised LICOs estimates due to revisions in the SLID estimates for income.   50 
 
  Other studies, using a slightly different definition of persistent low income, produced similar 
results. Corak et al. (2003) used SLID data covering the 1993-1998 period and found that 2.9 per cent 
of Canadians were in a low income state for the entirety of the six year period. Also, of those in low 
income at the beginning of the period, 24.4 per cent were still in low income five years later. 
However, while almost a quarter of the Canadian population (24.1 per cent) experienced low income 
at least once during the period, 38.4 per cent were not in a state of low-income a year later. This 
confirms the HRDC findings that while low income is a temporary state for a large share of the 
population, it is persistent for a significant number of low-income individuals.  
 
 
   
Hatfield (2003) identified the groups most likely to be affected by persistent low income. In 
this case, a person was considered to experience persistent low income if the cumulative income of 
the economic family over the 1996-2000 period fell short of the cumulative amount of that family’s 
post-transfer, post-income tax low-income cut-offs for this period as measured by Statistics Canada. 
Five groups, i.e. lone parents, unattached individuals aged 45-64, recent immigrants (less than 10 
years), persons with work-limiting disabilities, and Aboriginal people living off-reserve, represented 
25.9 per cent of the population but 62 per cent of persistent low income persons. As a comparison, 
people not included in those five groups represented 74.1 per cent of the population, but only 37.9 per 
cent of persistent low income persons (Chart 18). Over 1996-2000, 25.6 per cent of lone parents were 
considered to be in a persistent state of low-income (Chart 19). The proportions for recent immigrants 
and persons with work-limiting disabilities were similar. The group with the highest share of 
persistent low income was unattached individuals aged 45-64, at 33.7 per cent. Aboriginal people 
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* The five groups are lone parents, unattached 45-64, recent immigrants (10yrs), 
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Chart 18: Share of Population, Low Income (2000) and Persistent Low Income (1996-2000) Depending on 
Socio-Economic Characteristics  51 
However, this compares unfavourably with the low-income persistence rate for the rest of the 
population – 4.2 per cent. 
 
A more recent study by Statistics Canada (2009) used longitudinal data from the SLID for the 
years 2002-2007 period. The study found considerable turnover among those below the LICO. For 
instance, of those who had been below the LICO in 2006, 40 per cent were no longer below it in 
2007. Results also show that for many, low income is a temporary phenomenon. From 2002 to 2007 
one in five Canadians experienced at least one year below the LICO. Forty per cent of those 
Canadians who experienced low income did so for only one year, while 21 per cent experienced low 
income for two years.  
 
  The impact of persistent low-income on wellbeing is self-explanatory. Persons in a low 
income situation face the threat of social exclusion. This is worsened when low income is persistent 
and when opportunities for advancement are missing. Therefore, it is important that trends in the 
dynamics of low income be considered when developing a policy framework to fight low income. 
 
 
B. Wealth Distribution 
 
  As with income disparities, wealth distribution has an impact on the wellbeing of Canadians. 
A society where the poor do not share the benefits of increasing wealth is poised to create social 
instability with its attendant costs, a growing sense of exclusion and a sense of unfairness. 
Everywhere in the world, one can see the disastrous consequences of inequitable wealth distribution. 
From landless Brazilian peasants calling for agrarian reform to the constant indignation caused by the 
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Chart 19: Incidence of Low-Income (2000) and Persistent Low Income (1996-2000)
per cent  52 
invariably leads to anger and social disruption, although at different degrees. Moreover, equitable 
wealth distribution contributes to the establishment of common social goals, i.e. to a society where 
citizens are willing to support wide-ranging policies aimed at increasing the country’s wealth because 
they know that they will share in the new prosperity.  
 
As was noted earlier, data on the wealth of households are released infrequently in Canada. 
The Survey of Financial Security (SFS) provides an extensive set of data concerning the accumulated 
wealth of Canadians and can be disaggregated by socio-economic characteristics. Unfortunately, only 
two wealth surveys were released in the last twenty years in Canada, one in 1999 and another in 2005. 
Earlier wealth surveys were conducted in 1970, 1977 and 1984, but they are not strictly comparable to 
the 1999 and 2005 surveys. As was noted earlier, Statistics Canada did provide adjusted estimates for 
1999 which allow a comparison with earlier surveys, but no such estimates exist for the 2005 survey. 
In this part, we will first look at the change that occurred in median wealth and then we look at trends 
in the distribution of average wealth.
 52  In this section, the data is ordered based on wealth holdings, 
not on income. For example, the “bottom quintile” refers to household with the least wealth, not 
necessarily those with the least income.  
1) Median Net Worth 
 
The evolution of median net worth is quite interesting (Table 19B). If we include all family 
units, median real net worth increased 23 per cent between 1999 and 2005 (Chart 20b). However, if 
we look at the quintile distribution, we realize that wealthy families increased their median net worth 
much faster than poor families from 1999 to 2009. The bottom 20 per cent of the wealth distribution 
actually saw their median net worth decrease, by 9 per cent. The second bottom quintile slightly 
increased its median net worth, up 7 per cent on 1999. The largest per cent accumulation in total net 
worth was recorded by the second from top quintile, which advanced 31 per cent or $85,600 in 
constant 2005 dollars. The largest gross increase was received by the top quintile; the top quintile saw 
median net worth grow 28 per cent or $191, 300 (Chart 20a). The middle quintile also saw high 
growth (23 per cent), but still well below the top two quintiles. Growth in net worth was clearly 
skewed in favour of the upper quintiles.  
                                                 
52 Household net worth distribution is influenced by a number of socio-economic factors. Since we focus on the change in 
wealth over time, as opposed to its distribution at any point in time, we decided to keep the discussion of these issues 
separated and include them in a footnote. Family composition has an impact on both average and median net worth. In 
1999, unattached individuals had a lower average net worth than economic families, with respectively $123,600 and 
$308,800 (1999$) (Table 19A). The difference in median net worth is more striking. The median economic family had a 
net worth five times larger than the median unattached individual. This unequal distribution seems to be worse for males 
than for females, with unattached men’s median net worth amounting to $21,800 compared to women’s $43,500 (which 
may be related to the different age structure across gender). Other obvious factors included age and income (Table 19B). 
Overall, both average and median net worth increased with age. This seems obvious given that the principal assets of 
Canadians are generally their house and their pensions, which are assets generally held in larger quantities by older 
households. However, this positive relationship between age and net worth did not hold for family units for which the 
major income recipient was 65 years old or more. Median net worth for that category was 22.3 per cent lower than the 55-
64 age group, but still 9.6 per cent larger than the 45-54 age group. Of course, this is not a surprise as when people retired 
and start living off their pension, their net worth may decrease. The relation between income and net worth was even more 
direct. Income and wealth are related in the same way that investment and capital stock are. One is a flow and the other is 
a stock. Obviously, if the income flow is larger, chances are the wealth stock will also be larger. Effectively, both average 
and median net worth increases in line with income. Data from the 2005 survey confirms that median net worth for 
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Source : Table 19b
Chart 20b: Quintile Real Median Net Worth, All Family Units, Change Between 1999 and 2005
per cent  54 
2) Distribution of Average Net Worth 
 
Average wealth by quintile shows that wealth is distributed even more unequally than is 
indicated by the quintile medians. The average net worth for all families was $364,300 in 2005 (using 
2005 dollars), up 29.6 per cent from $281,000 in 1999 (Chart 21).  The lowest quintile actually had a 
negative net worth, the average net debt was $2,400. Each subsequent quintile saw greater growth 
than the last in both nominal and per cent terms. Growth was heavily skewed to the top quintiles and 
only the top two quintiles saw net worth growth above the national rate. The top quintile had the 
highest growth, having grown 31.2 per cent from $963,300 in 1999 to $1,264,200 in 2005. The top 
quintile was responsible for over 72 per cent of total net worth growth over the 1999-2005 period 
whereas the bottom quintile’s net worth growth was equivalent to -0.2 per cent of net worth growth 
(roughly in line with their share of total wealth, 69 per cent and -0.1 per cent respectively)(Chart 22a). 
The top decile obtained 55 per cent of all new wealth created between 1999 and 2005, and was 




As was noted earlier, to monitor the trends in net worth before 1999, some adjustments need 
to be made to the 1999 data. These adjustments have been made by Statistics Canada to provide 
comparable data between the two surveys.
53 They allow us to compare the change in the net worth of 
Canadians between 1984 and 1999.  
                                                 
53 In 1984, net worth excluded the contents of the home, collectibles and valuables and annuities and registered retirement 
income funds. The 1999 SFS adjusted estimates differ considerably from non-adjusted data. For example, median net 
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Chart 21: Comparison of Quintile Average Net Worth in 1999 and 2005 ($2005), All Family Units 
Source :Table 19I  55 
 
Using the earlier definition of wealth, between 1970 and 1977 the unequal distribution of 
newly created wealth was, in relative terms, to the disadvantage of the top decile, with their share of 
total wealth decreasing from 53.3 per cent to 50.7 per cent over the period. This trend was reversed 
between 1977 and 1984, and the concentration of wealth at the top decile intensified significantly 
between 1984 and 1999. In fact, between 1970 and 1999, 75.0 per cent of the wealth increase went to 
the top 20 per cent, with the top 10 per cent reaping 57.8 per cent of new wealth. By comparison, the 
average wealth of the bottom 20 per cent decreased by almost $2,000 over the period ($1999) and was 
still in negative territory in 1999 at $-5,144. The bottom half only gained 4.2 per cent of the wealth 
created between 1970 and 1999, amounting to an average increase of $7,750 per family unit. 
Conversely, the top half increased its average wealth by $178,458. As was noted earlier, these same 




The skewed distribution of new wealth amplified existing inequalities in the wealth 
distribution in Canada. Between 1984 and 1999, the richest 10 per cent increased its share of wealth 
by 3.9 percentage points, from 51.8 per cent to 55.7 per cent (Table 19C). All other deciles saw a fall 
in their shares of wealth over the same period. 
 
If we focus on an even smaller portion of the distribution, wealth appears to be even more 
concentrated than the previous analysis suggested, with 29.0 per cent of all wealth in the hand of the 
top 2.5 per cent of households in 1999 (Table 19E). Average wealth among the top 2.5 per cent was 
$2,278,863, a number hard to grasp for the average Canadian. The increasing concentration of wealth 
and income in the hands of a fairly small portion of individuals seems to be taking place elsewhere as 
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Source : Table 19I
Chart 22a: Share of Total Net Worth Growth for All Quintiles, 1999-2005  56 
3) A Summary Measure of Wealth Distribution 
 
In order to obtain a summary measure of wealth distribution, it is useful to focus on the ratio 
of wealth of the top half to the bottom half.  Such a measure avoids focusing on a very narrow portion 
of the wealth distribution, which may be significantly affected by age. We derive a time series for 
these measures by using the 1999 and 2005 surveys as benchmarks, and then extending these 
estimates backwards using the estimated change in the measure from estimates using the earlier 
definitions for the 1977, 1984 and 1999 surveys. Data are interpolated for years between surveys 
(Table 19D and Table 62). Using these data, Chart 22b shows that wealth inequalities in Canada have 
unambiguously increased between 1981 and 2005. The ratio of the wealth held by the top half to the 
bottom half is estimated to have increased from 11.8 in 1981 to 17.8 in 2005.  
 
 
IV. Income Volatility 
 
  Higher income volatility is a phenomenon that leads to heightened household economic risk. 
The Los Angeles Times published a series of articles in 2004 discussing the growth of economic risk 
for American families. In an article entitled “If America Is Richer, Why Are Its Families So Much 
Less Secure?” journalist Peter G. Gosselin discusses the broad reasons behind ever-larger swings in 
household incomes in the United States: 
 
“…over the last 25 years, economic risk has been steadily shifted from the broad 
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Source : Table 62: Data for 1999 and 2005 from SFS.  Data for 1977 and 1884 obtained using rates of change from 77-99 and 84- 99.  All 
other data imputed
Chart 22b: Average Wealth Distribution: Ratio of Top Half to Bottom Half of Wealth, 1981-2005  57 
 
Economists started to look seriously into short-term income volatility with an article by Moffit 
and Gottschalk in 1994 entitled “The Growth of Earnings Instability in the U.S. Labor Market”. Using 
data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics,
54 Moffit and Gottschalk differentiate between 
permanent and transitory earnings to ascertain if volatility in the latter has increased or decreased 
since the 1970s. To calculate volatility, they used the variance of transitory earnings. They not only 
found that fluctuations in transitory earnings have increased, but also that they were both large and 
widespread and that the effects were more pronounced with low-wage workers.  
 
Increased income volatility not only contributes to financial insecurity.  The impact on 
families can be disastrous. While the U.S. labour market definitely experienced a substantial increase 
in wage volatility, one can question whether this trend was also observed in Canada. In this section, 
we briefly review selected literature on the subject of earnings instability. We then discuss trends in 
bankruptcies in Canada. 
A. Earnings instability 
 
To produce an indicator of income volatility, panel data which track the same person over a 
number of years are essential. Income volatility needs to be calculated at an individual level, not at an 
aggregate level. In order to do this, one needs micro-data from the SLID. As SLID data only began in 
1996 and follows people for a maximum of 6 years, it is difficult to create a long-term income 
indicator from this source.  
 
An alternative to SLID is tax data. In a recent study using this data source Morissette and 
Ostriovsky (2006) examined earnings instability in Canada for different family types over the 1984-
2004. Earnings instability was measured as the short-term (annual), up-and-down movements of an 
individual’s or family’s earnings around a longer-term moving average of six years. They found no 
strong evidence of a widespread increase in earning instability in the past two decades. Lone mothers 
in the bottom third of the earning distribution were found to have the highest earnings instability. 
Government transfer payments were found to play a particularly important role in reducing income 
instability. The report concluded that long-term earnings instability is concentrated among those with 
low earnings, hindering their financial security and social inclusion.  
 
This finding was somewhat contradicted by another study focusing on the changes in earnings 
instability between the 1982-189 and 1990-1997 periods. Using tax data and the methodology of 
Moffit and Gottschalk (1994), Beach, Finnie and Gray (2006:8) find that there was an “increase in 
overall earnings variability between 1982–1989 and 1990–1997, largely confined to men. This 
increase was driven by widening long-run earnings inequality. Increased instability of workers’ 
earnings played a secondary role in the overall increase in men’s earnings variability.” This finding 
fits well with earlier data which suggested that unattached males were the only group experiencing an 
increase in the incidence of low-income.  
 
                                                 
54 The Panel Study on Income Dynamics, or PSID, began interviewing in 1968 and has a sample of approximately 5,000 
families. For more information, see http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu .   58 
B. Personal bankruptcies 
 
An interesting indicator of income volatility may be the number of consumer bankruptcies per 
capita. Since bankruptcies often are the outcome of a sudden and unpredicted loss of income, they 
could be a symptom of income volatility. Estimates for Canada and the provinces are provided to 
Statistics Canada by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy and are available for the 1976-
2008 period. In discussing the effect of economic downturns on bankruptcy, it is also important to 
point out the other factors that play a role in the evolution of bankruptcies in Canada. Bankruptcy 
laws and changes in the perception and the stigma attached to bankruptcies can also affect the number 
of bankruptcies over time. Therefore, a change in the number of consumer bankruptcies per capita 
cannot necessarily be interpreted as a rise in income volatility. However, there is likely a relationship 
between the two phenomena.  
 
The trend in consumer bankruptcies in Canada certainly points to a sharp rise in the risk 
shouldered by consumers (Chart 23). In 1976, consumer bankruptcies per 10,000 persons were only 
4.3. In 1982, in the middle of an economic downturn, there were 12.2 consumer bankruptcies per 
10,000 people, almost triple the rate observed six years earlier. However, as economic conditions 
improved, the rate of consumer bankruptcies fell back, reaching 7.6 in 1985. This subsequent drop 




Yet, the improvement would not last long. In 1986, bankruptcies started rising again, reaching 
22.2 per 10,000 in 1991, more than five times the 1976 level. The level of bankruptcies receded only 
slightly in the following three years. Despite improving economic conditions, consumer bankruptcies 
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Chart 23: Consumer Bankruptcies per 10,000 Persons, 1976-2008 Chart 23: Consumer   59 
market conditions steadily improving, consumer bankruptcies per capita averaged 25.7, almost six 
times the rate in 1976. This increase in bankruptcies cannot therefore be explained by an ailing 
economy. It cannot be explained by a weak labour market. In this case, rising consumer bankruptcies 
suggest a sharp increase in the amount of risk taken or shouldered by consumers. It points to higher 
income volatility. It may also reflect changes in bankruptcy law and evolving societal attitudes toward 
bankruptcy (e.g. less stigma). Nonetheless, this rise in bankruptcies is in line with the conclusions of 
Beach, Finnie and Gray (2006) poiting to increase income volatility in the 1990s than in the 1980s.  
V. Economic Security 
 
  Economic security is a broad concept. It covers subjects such as employment security and 
opportunities, access to food and housing, and the existence of a social safety net. It is assumed that, 
in general, people are risk averse. They prefer to have a stable income, rather than an unstable 
income. They prefer to know the future rate of inflation in order to plan their retirement. There is a 
social cost to labour flexibility. Advocating a more flexible labour market, if it involves introducing 
more instability and uncertainty into individuals’ lives, might reduce wellbeing.  
 
  Are Canadians given the opportunity to participate in the economic life of the country? To 
answer this question, we will first discuss the central issue of labour market security. We will look at 
the employment, participation and unemployment rates. Then we will discuss the incidence and 
duration of unemployment and alternative ways to measure involuntary aspects of work and the 
under-utilization of the workforce using broader indicators of unemployment. Then, we will address 
long-term unemployment, job quality, job anxiety and the incidence of low wages.  
 
  Next, we will look at housing security using the Royal Bank of Canada Housing Affordability 
Index and at census data on the adequacy, affordability and suitability of housing published by the 
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC). 
 
  We will then talk about the availability and the relevance of food insecurity indicators to track 
living standards security. We will discuss the findings of a recent survey, namely the Canadian 
Community Health Survey (CCHS).  
 
  The subject of income and job security will be discussed using subjective answers given to 
questions asked for the Personal Security Index 2003 (PSI) and Ipsos Reid. 
 
  Finally, we will examine trends in the coverage provided by the social safety net in Canada. 
We will discuss trends in minimum wages, social assistance benefits, employment insurance, and 
child benefits, as well as provide a brief discussion of the CSLS aggregate economic security index 
and its components. The last section will discuss how minority groups, particularly immigrants and 
Aboriginal Canadians, have fared in recent years.  
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A. Labour Market Security
55 
 
  “A man without a job is a dead man”. Many have heard this sentence, and many more have 
felt the sting of unemployment. The impact of unemployment on an individual’s life is often drastic 
and rarely beneficial. Giving people ample opportunities to work certainly has a favourable impact on 
wellbeing. Fully utilizing all potential labour not only leads to superior economic output, but also to 
rising living standards and, to a certain degree, the prevention of social exclusion. 
1) Employment Rate and Participation Rate 
 
Over the 1981-2008 period, both the participation rate and the employment rate increased 
slightly. The participation rate represents the proportion of people searching for work or working as a 
percentage of the working age population, defined as persons 15 and over. In Canada, the steady rise 
in the participation rate amongst women pushed the overall participation rate up 2.8 percentage 
points, from 65.0 per cent in 1981 to 67.8 per cent in 2008. The employment rate, i.e. the number of 
persons employed as a proportion of the population of working age, followed similar trends. From 
60.1 per cent in 1981, it increased 3.5 percentage points reaching 63.6 per cent in 2008. Overall, both 
the participation and the employment rate moved cyclically, falling in the recessions of the early 
1980s and 1990s, and increasing in the ensuing recoveries and expansions (Chart 24).  
 
 
                                                 








1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Participation Rate
Employment Rate
Source : Table 37
Chart 24: Participation Rate and Employment Rate, 1981-2008, in Per Cent  61 
2) Unemployment rate   
 
   The official unemployment rate is one of the most cited indicators of economic conditions. 
Official measures are available on a consistent basis for the 1976-2008 period for both Canada and 
the provinces. These estimates are based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which provides 
employment and unemployment estimates on a monthly basis and with a lag of eight to thirteen days 
for the reference month.   
 
Unemployment is generally considered a lagging indicator, as opposed to a leading indicator, 
because it is generally the result of a slowdown in the economy, not the cause. During a recession, 
employment falls as businesses reduce production and layoff workers. In Canada, the official 
unemployment rate has closely followed the business cycle (Chart 25). In the five years before the 
1981-82 recession, the unemployment rate averaged 7.7 per cent. During the recession of 1981-82, 
the labour market built up considerable slack, with the unemployment rate reaching a peak of 12.0 per 
cent in 1983. The economic recovery slowly opened new employment opportunities, integrating more 
and more workers into the workplace. In 1989, the unemployment rate was back where it was before 
the recession, at 7.5 per cent. Then, Canada suffered one of its most long-lasting recessions, triggered 
by the Bank of Canada’s fight against inflation. The unemployment rate rose to a peak of 11.4 per 
cent in 1993. Both the employment and participation rate fell. The labour market conditions started to 
improve in 1994, with the unemployment rate falling steadily, down to 6.8 per cent in 2000. Between 
2001 and 2006, the unemployment rate averaged 7.1 per cent, but by 2007 it had fallen to 6.0 per 
cent, the lowest rate recorded over the entire 1976-2008 period. In 2008 the rate of unemployment 
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Chart 25: Official and Supplementary Measures of Unemployment Rate, 1981-2008  62 
Before the current economic crisis hit the Canadian economy in the latter part of 2008, 
compared to the situation in the first half of the 1980s and 1990s, the Canadian labour market offered 
much greater employment opportunities, as illustrated by frequent employer complaints of labour 
shortages, particularly in Western Canada. But, even then, unemployment remained high in certain 
regions, with Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island both having unemployment 
rates above 10 per cent in 2008. 
3) Incidence and Duration of Unemployment 
 
The incidence of unemployment is the average number of persons experiencing a bout 
unemployment in a given year over the number in the labour force. In Canada, the incidence of 
unemployment decreased 2.7 percentage points, or 10 per cent, between 1981 and 2008, from 26.0 
per cent to 23.3 per cent. Within the 1981-2008 period, the incidence of unemployment was cyclical, 
but the swings were not particularly large, ant the incidence generally remained between 20 and 25 
per cent of the labour force, meaning that between one in four or one in five individual experienced a 




The average duration of unemployment was 13.7 weeks in 2008, two and half weeks lower 
than the average duration experienced in 1981 (15.2 weeks), a roughly 10 per cent decline. In other 
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Chart 26: Index of Unemployment Duration and Unemployment Incidence (1981=100), 1981-2008   63 
the result of both a lower incidence and a lower duration, with each variable accounting for half the 
decline.  
 
Yet, within the period, most of the fluctuations in the unemployment rate was related to 
changes in duration, not incidence. Indeed, while the incidence of unemployment was relatively stable 
within the period, this was not the case for the duration of unemployment. Within the 1981-2008 
period, the average duration experienced large swings (Chart 26). For example, between 1981 and 
1983, the average duration increased by 6.7 weeks, from 15.2 weeks to 21.9 weeks (Table 25). 
Similarly, during the economic downturn of the 1990s, the average duration increased from 16.9 
weeks in 1990 to 25.2 weeks in 1993.  
 
The relative stability of the incidence of unemployment coupled with the swings in 
unemployment duration within the period suggest that recessions primarily affect people who are at 
risk of being unemployed, such as the young, and those who were unemployed at the beginning of the 
recession. Those vulnerable groups, who often already experience spells of unemployment during 
periods of economic growth, see their unemployment spells lengthen during recessions. 
4) Supplementary Measures of Unemployment 
 
  Alternative measures of unemployment provide insights into the overall under-utilization of 
labour. The official measure of unemployment is restricted to people who are actively looking for a 
job. However, this measure can be misleading, because in some areas, employment opportunities are 
so scarce that numerous individuals decide to stop searching for work. They are called discouraged 
workers, and despite their desire to work, they are not included in the unemployment rate statistics. 
Another form of under-utilization of labour is part-time workers who want full-time employment. 
Those workers, called involuntary part-time workers, are not included in the official measure of 
unemployment. Supplementary measures of unemployment, such as the unemployment rate plus 
discouraged searchers and the unemployment rate plus involuntary part-timers are only available on a 
consistent basis since 1997 for Canada and the provinces. Tracking those measures provides a more 
complete understanding of labour under-utilization. 
 
By adding discouraged workers, we obtain a measure called unemployment rate plus 
discouraged searchers.
56 These estimates differ little from the official unemployment rate figures 
(Table 22B). For the 1997-2008 period, the difference between the two measures oscillated between 
0.6 percentage points in 1997 and 0.1 percentage points in 2005, 2006 and 2007. In 2008, the 
difference was 0.2 percentage points. This implies that in 2007, for example, there were only about 
26,000 discouraged searchers in Canada. In general, the percentage of discouraged workers increased 
in line with the unemployment rate. However, their addition did not change significantly the degree or 
the trend in labour under-utilization. Moreover, they did not affect the trend of unemployment. 
Similarly to the official rate, the unemployment plus discouraged workers reached a trough in 2000, 
at 7.1 per cent, and then stabilized around 7.5 per cent in the following years until reaching a new low 
of 6.1 per cent in 2007 before returning to 6.3 per cent in 2008. 
 
                                                 
56 Discouraged searchers are people who wanted and were available to take work in the reference period but who did not 
look for a job because they believed none were available. The unemployment rate plus discouraged searchers is calculated 
by adding discouraged searchers to the nominator and the denominator of the unemployment rate formula.    64 
  The unemployment rate plus involuntary part-time workers (but excluding discouraged 
workers) is a more complicated measure.
57 However, it is an essential measure of under-utilization of 
the labour force. It represents the potential workforce which is not employed as fully as it wants to be. 
The difference between the official unemployment rate and the measure including involuntary part-
time workers is significant. It ranged from 3.2 percentage points in 1997 to 1.8 percentage points in 
2007 (1.9 percentage points in 2008) (Table 22B). As with discouraged workers, the percentage of 
involuntary part-time workers (in full-time equivalent) is smaller in a tight labour market and grows 
in line with the unemployment rate. The measure shows that the effect of a downturn is not only to 
create unemployment, but also to create underemployment, i.e. situations where people cannot work 
the number of hours they desire.   
 
The two alternative measures of unemployment gauge the slack in the labour market. They 
both show a vibrant labour market in the years following the turn of the millennium. Canadians’ 
employment opportunities improved significantly to 2007. However, by using broader measures of 
unemployment, we realize that the Canadian labour market still under-utilizes almost 8 per cent of its 
labour. This still has to be a concern. Work is not only a source of income: it can also be a source of 
pride and stability for individuals and families.    
5) Long-Term Unemployment 
 
Long-term unemployment is very different than short-term unemployment, both in term of its 
causes and its consequences for individuals and society. Long-term unemployment can result in social 
exclusion for the most vulnerable and tends to increase inequalities in income. Moreover, it increases 
significantly the burden on the social assistance system and may contribute to unemployment 
hysteresis, i.e. the unemployed suffer loss of skills as their unemployment spell lengthens gradually 
becoming chronically unemployed. The negative relationship between the duration of unemployment 
and the probability of returning to work is well known.  
 
The incidence of long-term unemployment is generally defined as the number of persons 
unemployed for 52 weeks or more over the number of persons unemployed. In Canada, the incidence 
of long-term unemployment was 18 per cent higher in 2008 than it was in 1981 (Chart 27 and Table 
25A). However, it is still three to six times lower than in some European countries.
58  
 
In 1981, the incidence of long-term unemployment was 5.7 per cent (53,000 persons). After 
the 1981 recession, this proportion jumped, reaching 11.8 per cent in 1983. During the recovery and 
expansion, long-term unemployment edged down, but never returned to its pre-recession level. In 
1990, it was still at 7.1 per cent. The recession of the 1990s pushed the incidence of long-term 
unemployment to levels never seen before in Canada. In 1994, 17.4 per cent of the unemployed were 
in that situation for a year or more. This high incidence of long-term unemployment might have made 
some people chronically unemployed, either because of a loss of skills over time or because they 
                                                 
57 Involuntary part-time workers are people who work part-time but would prefer to work full-time hours. They are 
calculated as full-time equivalent. In other words, if a part-time worker is only working half the average number of hours 
of full-time workers at his main job, only 0.5 unemployed are added to the nominator and the denominator.  
58 According to OECD (2004) statistics, Canada’s incidence of long-term unemployment was 9.7 per cent in 2002, 
compared to 8.5 per cent in the United States, 23.1 per cent in the United Kingdom, 33.8 in France, 47.9 in Germany, 59.2 
in Italy and 30.8 in Japan.    65 
became discouraged. The recovery in the late 1990s had a positive effect on long-term 
unemployment, but, again, the incidence of long-term unemployment never returned to its pre-
recession level. The incidence of long-term unemployment did not fall below 9.0 per cent between 
1992 and 2005, but in 2006 the rate dropped to 8.3 per cent and dropped further, to 7.1 per cent in 
2007 and 6.7 per cent in 2008. The reductions in the incidence of long-term unemployment have 
brought the rate down to levels not seen since the early 1980s, with only 1981 having lower incidence 
over the entire 1981-2008 period. While the high levels of long-term unemployment of the 1990s may 





This suggests that recessions have a lasting effect on long-term unemployment as the 
incidence of long-term unemployment remains high well after the end of recessions. The deflationary 
policy of the central bank in the early 1990s may have had long-term consequences for some workers, 
making them chronically unemployed. Structural changes in the labour market such as the aging 
labour force (older workers have, on average, much longer spells of unemployment than younger 
workers) could also contribute to this problem. Nonetheless, since long-term unemployment tends to 
touch the most vulnerable of society, the impact on wellbeing needs to be taken into account. 
6) Job Quality  
 
  Labour market analysts welcome lower unemployment statistics as lower unemployment 
contribute to economic security. However, the unemployment rate is not the only labour market 
indicator that affects economic security. The characteristics and stability of jobs are also important. 
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Chart 27: Medium (26-51 weeks) and Long Term (52 weeks and over) Unemployment as a Proportion of 
Unemployment, 1981-2008, in Per Cent  66 
amount of training available and the quality of the work environment. However, many of those 
indicators are hard to track and data are not easily gathered.
59  
  
One indicator of job quality is the Canadian Employment Quality Index (EQI) produced by 
CIBC. It focuses on three quality measures: the part-time/full-time distribution, the relative 
compensation of a given job and its relative stability. All three indicators are objective measures and 
use sectoral employment to define relative compensation and stability. For example, full-time jobs in 
the public sector are considered to have high compensation and high stability. Therefore, a higher 
share of public sector jobs would raise the EQI. Even if employment rises, if the increase is due 
completely to the creation of low stability and low compensation part-time jobs, the EQI will fall. The 
EQI was released monthly from 1988 to 1994 and has been released quarterly since 1994 at the 
national level.  
 
 Job quality is important because it helps to better understand the trends behind the 
employment numbers. For example, if employment rises and job quality falls, one could suppose that 
even though employment numbers are good, they might not translate into higher income because of 
falling job quality.  
 
Since 1988 the CIBC EQI has been on a more or less steady downward course, falling 11.3 
per cent by 2008 (Chart 28). This suggests that job quality, or at least this definition of job quality, 
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Source : Table 40
Chart 28: CIBC Employment Quality Index (January 1994=100), 1988-2008  67 
7) Job Stability 
 
If a person leaves a job for voluntary reasons, it is not a negative development, so any measure 
of job stability based on overall employment trends can be misleading. Thus, to monitor trends in job 
stability it is more appropriate to track persons who suffer an involuntary job loss, that is job losers. 
To examine trends in job stability, we have used Statistics Canada data on job losers, more 
particularly data on individuals who were laid-off (Table 39).
60 We find that if we account for both 
permanent and temporary job losers, the proportion of job losers in employment fell 2.6 percentage 
points between 1981 and 2008. In 2008, only 5.4 per cent of employed people were laid-off, among 
the lowest levels (5.3 per cent in 2007) ever recorded in the history of the current version of the LFS, 
which runs from 1976 to 2008 (Chart 29). Of course, the proportion of job losers was cyclical, and in 
2008 stood at less than half the level observed during or shortly after recessionary periods in 1982 
(12.6 per cent), 1983 (12.7 per cent) and 1992 (11.7 per cent). Nonetheless, there seems to be a long-
term downward trend in the proportion of job losers in Canada. As the likelihood of job loss 
decreases, one can expect job anxiety to follow. 
 
 
8) Job Anxiety 
 
Job anxiety can be devastating for an individual and his or her family. It can lead to stress, 
health problems and poorer productivity. While subjective indicators are generally considered less 
reliable or less precise than objective indicators, for the purpose of measuring wellbeing they often go 
                                                 
60 A job loser in a given month is defined as someone who is currently not working because they were laid-off, either 
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Chart 29: Job Losers as a Propotion of Employment, 1981-2008
per cent  68 
directly to the core of the question: “How do you feel about …?” In the quarterly Ipsos Reid survey 
discussed earlier in the context of individuals’ general economic outlook, one question relates to job 
anxiety: 
 
  Are or is anyone in your household, worried about losing their job or being laid 
off? 
 
The results have been relatively constant in the last few years and closely followed trends in 
the proportion of job losers. Since 1999, the proportion of Canadians that are worried that they or 
someone in their household will lose their job has stabilized around 20 per cent, and has remained 
below that level since 2003 (Chart 30a). However, between 1990 and 1997, the story was quite 
different. In 1990, the proportion of Canadians anxious about their job was at 26 per cent. This 
proportion reached a peak in 1993, at 35 per cent. This means that a third of Canadians believed they 
or someone in their household was at risk of losing their job. In the following years, the proportion 
slowly edged back, to 32 per cent in 1995 and 25 per cent in 1997. However, even after the growth of 
the late 1990s, the proportion of job anxiety barely fell below 20 per cent. In 2000, the peak of the 
economic cycle, 19 per cent of Canadians were worried about losing their job. This is probably 
caused by uncertainties associated with the business and the product market conditions or to 
individual preferences, which means that about a fifth of Canadians to experience job anxiety on a 




The Canadian Council on Social Development has developed the Personal Security Index 
which includes both objective and subjective indicators. It was first published in 1998 and released on 
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Chart 30a: Is There Anyone in Your Household Worried about Losing Their Job or Being Laid Off? 
1990-2008, per cent  69 
released for Canada, but data for provinces are not publicly available. For the purpose of this report, 
we will strictly look at the subjective part of the PSI at the national level. The PSI includes one 
question relating to job anxiety is:  
 
  I think there is a good chance I could lose my job over the next couple of years.  
 
The perception indicator concerning the job market is broadly consistent with the available 
objective data. Between 1998 and 2002, the unemployment rate fell from 8.3 per cent to 7.7 per cent. 
Moreover, 1998 was preceded by numerous years of high unemployment. This translated into 
stronger confidence in the job market in 2002 than in 1998. The proportion of people not concerned 
about losing their job increased from 47 per cent in 1998 to 62 per cent in 2002 (Chart 30b). 
Similarly, the proportion who considered there was a good chance they would lose their job in the 
next couple years fell from 37 per cent in 1998 to 23 per cent in 2002. In 2002, the PSI estimate (23 
per cent) was almost identical to the Ipsos Reid estimate (22 per cent). 
 
 
9) Temporary Jobs 
   
  Temporary jobs do not provide job security and are generally associated with poor working 
conditions. Thus, an increasing proportion of temporary jobs are usually a negative development for 
worker wellbeing. Trends in the proportion of employees in temporary jobs between 1989 and 2004 
show a definite increase. Data on temporary workers is available from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
for the 1997-2008 period and from the General Social Survey (GSS) in 1989, 1994, 1998 and 2004. 
While the former provides a consistent time series for the 1997-2008 period, the latter provides data 
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Chart 30b: Fear of Job Loss as Reported by the Personal Security Indicator, 1998-2002
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  Data from the LFS suggest that the proportion of employees in temporary positions increased 
slightly between 1997 and 2008 (Chart 31a and Table 43b).
61 In 2008, 12.2 per cent of employees 
were in temporary jobs, up from 11.3 per cent in 1997. Almost all the increase was in term or contract 
jobs, which went from 5.2 per cent in 1997 to 6.2 per cent in 2008. The proportion of employees in 
casual jobs (3.1 per cent in 2008), seasonal jobs (2.9 per cent in 2008) and other types of temporary 
jobs (0.1 per cent in 2008) remained roughly unchanged over the period.  
 
 
    
Data from the GSS shows a much lower rate of temporary workers, but the overall trend 
remains similar. In 1989, the percentage of employees in temporary jobs was 5 per cent. It increased 
to 7 per cent in 1994 and then leveled off at 9 per cent in 1998 and 2004 (Chart 31b and Table 43). Of 
course, new employees, i.e. employees with two years of seniority or less, were more likely to have a 
temporary job. In 2004, 22 per cent of new employees were holding a temporary job compared to 
only 5 per cent of other employees. Moreover, while the incidence of temporary jobs between 1989 
and 2004 increased 10 percentage points among new employees, it only increased 2 per cent for other 
employees.  
   
                                                 
61 A temporary job has a predetermined end date, or will end as soon as a specified project is completed. It includes 
seasonal jobs; temporary, term or contract jobs including work done through a temporary help agency; casual jobs; and 














Chart 31a: Temporary Workers as a Percentage of all Workers, 1997-2008
per cent
Source: Table 43b  71 
   
This increased reliance on temporary jobs definitely has negative effects on worker job 
security and anxiety, and thus on their wellbeing. The upward trend is noticeable among all groups, 
such as full-time jobs, unionized and non-unionized, men, women, university graduates and non-
university graduates. Morissette and Johnson (2005) suggest that this phenomenon might be the result 
of increased international competition. Moreover, since firms seem to be adjusting at the margin (new 
employees), this trend might continue in the near future.  
10) Persons Working 50 Hours or Over 
 
  One could argue that longer hours of work in North America compared to Europe are not only 
the result of workers’ choices, but are also influenced by social conventions and policies (lower 
marginal tax rate for example). To examine trends in this phenomenon, we will look at trends in the 
percentage of workers working 50 hours or more per week.  
 
  Using estimates for all jobs over the 1981-2008 period, the percentage of workers working 50 
hours or more increased 0.8 percentage points, from 12.1 per cent in 1981 to 12.9 per cent in 2008 
(Table 44A and Chart 31c). The biggest increase was for workers aged 55 to 64, from 10.5 per cent in 
1981 to 11.8 per cent in 2008, or a 1.4-percentage-point change. The youngest age group (15-24 years 
old) reported a decrease in the percentage of workers working 50 hours or more. The percentage of 
workers from the prime-age groups, i.e. workers aged 25 to 54 years old, working 50 hours or more 
increased 0.1 percentage points, from 14.1 per cent in 1981 to 14.2 per cent in 2008. However, for all 
groups, these percentages were well down from the peak in 1996, where 15.7 per cent of workers 
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Chart 31b: Percentage of Employees in Temporary Jobs, 1989, 1994, 1998 and 2004
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It is interesting to know whether the proportion of workers working 50 hours or more is driven 
by an increased workload in their current job, or whether it is related to an increase in multiple job 
holders (that is moonlighting). Data on hours worked at the main job allow us to draw some 
conclusions. Between 1981 and 2008, the proportion of workers working 50 hours or more in their 
main job increased from 10.9 per cent to 11.5 per cent, accounting for more than 80 per cent of the 
increase in the total number of workers working 50 hours or more over the same period (Tables 44A). 
This result is very sensitive to the time period, as if we had used the 1980-2008 period instead, we 
would have concluded that half of the increase was related to multiple job holders, even though that 
group account for only roughly 10 per cent of workers with 50 or more hours worked per week.  
 
Overall, the incidence of workers working 50 hours or more does not seem to have 
dramatically increased or decreased in the last 20 years. Despite increasing in the 1980s, the 
percentage of workers working 50 hours and over has not changed enough to reach a conclusion 
about either its positive or negative impact on labour market conditions and, consequently, workers. 
11) Incidence of Low Wages 
 
  We generally assume that full-time employment is sufficient to provide decent living 
standards. However, in 2000, about 16.3 per cent of Canadians working full-time were in low paid 
jobs, i.e. earning less than $375 per week or $10 ($2000) per hour for 37.5 hours per week (Table 
29B).
62 Worryingly, the incidence of low-pay jobs has not diminished since 1980. Data based on 
                                                 
62 The sample consists of individuals aged 15-64, who are not full-time students, worked mainly full-time, and received a 
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Chart 31c: Percentage of Employees Working 50 Hours or More per Week, Ages 15 and Over, 1981-2008  73 
censuses show that among Canadians working full-time, the proportion in low paid jobs actually 
increased. In 1980, the proportion was 15.4 per cent, 0.9 percentage points lower than in 2000. Yet, 
compared to 1990, the incidence of low-paid had retreated slightly, from 16.9 per cent to 16.3 per 
cent. Of course, the incidence of low-pay was greater for individuals with less education and younger 
workers. Those with less than a high school degree saw their incidence of low-paid jobs increase 
steadily, going from 21.4 per cent in 1980 to 26.3 per cent in 2000. For workers aged 15-24, the 
results were even more striking. While 31.2 per cent of them were in low-paid jobs in 1980, the 
proportion was 45.0 per cent in 2000.  
   
This high incidence of low-paid jobs can come as a surprise since both human capital (in the 
form of education) and productivity increased in Canada between 1980 and 2004. Yet, these results 
match the absence of significant growth in real median hourly wages in Canada since 1980. This 
stagnation of median wages hides considerable adjustments at the margin for firms. In effect, 
according to Morissette and Johnson (2005), median real wages among male workers with two years 
of seniority or less fell 13 per cent between 1981 and 2004. Similarly, real median wages fell 2 per 
cent among newly hired females. In light of the large debts with which many students graduate, the 
high incidence of low-paid jobs among the young is particularly troubling in postponing the chance 
for greater economic security. 
 
Data on the distribution of hourly wages covering the 1981-2004 period confirm that good 
economic conditions did not lower significantly the prevalence of low-paid jobs in Canada (Saunders 
(2009) and Chart 32). Still, between 1981 and 2004, the proportion of employees aged 25-64 earning 
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Chart 32: Employees Aged 17-64 and 25-64 Paid Less Than $10 per Hour ($2001), 1981-2004 
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B. Housing Security 
1) RBC Housing Affordability Index 
   
  In general, we can define basic needs as shelter, food and clothing. At the same time, for 
many Canadians, being a homeowner is an integral part of being a member of society. Thus, 
housing affordability plays an important role in the wellbeing of Canadians. Not only does it 
provide a shelter, but home ownership is a way into becoming part of a community. The Royal 
Bank of Canada (RBC) Housing Affordability Index is a means to evaluate the capacity of 
Canadians to access this vital good. It shows the proportion of median pre-tax household income 
required to service the cost of mortgage payments, property taxes and utilities on a detached 
bungalow.
63 This means that a decline in the proportion represents an increase in affordability and a 
rise in the proportion a decrease in affordability. It is estimated on a quarterly basis for each 





Every year from 1996 to 2005 had an index value below the 1985-2008 average index value. 
However, in 2006 the RBC Housing Affordability Index increased past the average of the 1985-2005, 
and increased further to 2008. In 2008, the index reached 45.2 per cent, higher than the 36.3 per cent 
from 1985, but lower than the peak of 49.0 per cent reached in 1990. The salient characteristic of 
trends in housing affordability is the strong relation between interest rates and housing affordability 
                                                 
63 It is based on a 25 per cent down payment and a 25-year mortgage loan at a five-year fixed rate.  
64 However, since the affordability index is based on pre-tax median income, it does not take into account provincial 
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Chart 33: RBC Housing Affordability Index and 5-year Mortgage Interest Rates (per cent), 1985-2008  75 
(Chart 33). Of course, since mortgage payments depend heavily on interest rates, this relation is to be 
expected. However, in 1985, despite 5-year mortgage interest rates averaging 12.13 per cent, only 
36.3 per cent of pre-tax median household income was used for housing purposes. This ratio shot up 
dramatically in the following years, reaching a peak of 49.0 per cent in 1990. This corresponded to 
the interest rate peak, which reached an average of 13.4 per cent during the same year. These high 
interest rates were mainly caused by the Bank of Canada’s new resolution to fight inflation and reach 
a low and stable inflation target of 2 per cent. Up to 2001, housing affordability by and large followed 
interest rates. However, as the economy slowed down and stock markets fell, investors started to look 
more and more at the housing market, creating considerable house price inflation. Between 2001 and 
2005, the Housing Affordability Index increased despite lower interest rates. The relationship 
resumed after 2005, with both interest rates and the RBC index increasing in 2006 and 2007, and then 
leveling off in 2008. However, with RBC affordability index at 45.2 per cent in 2008, houses are still 
much more affordable than at their peak during the 1990 recession.
65 
2) Housing Affordability, Adequacy and Suitability – CMHC 
  
  While affordability is the most widely used indicator of housing availability, it does not take 
into account other factors such as the adequacy and the suitability of Canadian houses. In this case, an 
adequate dwelling is defined as a house which does not require any major repairs, as reported by their 
residents. Suitability is defined using the National Occupancy Standard requirements which identify 
the suitable number of bedrooms according to the number and type of residents in the household.
66 




The comparison between the 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006 census data for these three criteria 
reveals an amazing stability in the Canadian housing market (Chart 34). For example, the percentage 
of Canadian households meeting the adequacy criteria was 92.2 per cent in 1991, 92.1 per cent in 
1996 92.2 per cent in 2001, and 92.9 per cent in 2006. We can observe the same stability for the 
suitability indicator, which only varied between 93.1 per cent and 94.0 per cent for all four censuses. 
If we disaggregate between owners and renters, we observe the same steadiness in the result. 
However, renters systematically under-perform owners for all three indicators.   
 
Interestingly, the affordability indicator tells a different story than the RBC Index in terms of 
trends. According to census data, only 77.8 per cent of households met the affordability criteria in 
1996, less than both 1991 (80.0 per cent) and 2006 (78.6 per cent). This seems at odds with the RBC 
Index, which shows an increase in affordability between 1991 and 1996. Moreover, the housing 
affordability indicator between 1991 and 2001 remained stable (only a 0.2 percentage point 
difference). Given that household income rose between 1991 and 2001 and that interest rates were 
                                                 
65 The index fell 12.9 per cent from 2008 to the first quarter of 2009, from 45.2 per cent to 39.4 per cent, a level not seen 
since 2006. 
66 Each cohabitating adult couple, each unattached household member 18 years of age and over, each same-sex pair of 
children under age 18 and additional boy or girl in the family are considered to need a bedroom. If there are two opposite 
sex siblings under 5 years of age, it is considered suitable for them to share a bedroom. Moreover, bachelor units, which 
have no bedroom, are considered suitable for a household of one individual.  
67 For renters, shelter costs include rent and any payment for electricity, fuel, water and other municipal services. For 
owners, they include mortgage payments (principal and interest), property taxes, condominium fees and payments for 
electricity, fuel, water and other municipal services.     76 
significantly lower in 2001 than in 1991, a stable affordability index points towards a substantive 
surge in real house or utilities prices between 1991 and 2001. As for the differences in trends between 
the RBC Index and the Census data, it may stem from the restricted definition of the former, which 
only takes into account prices for a detached bungalow.  
 
 
   
C. Food security 
 
  Many factors can hamper food security. The most important is low income, but a lack of 
information and remote location can also contribute to food insecurity. The monitoring of food 
security, or rather the measurement of food insecurity, generally relies on data gathered from surveys. 
In Canada, three key surveys have gathered data on food insecurity: the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Children and Youth (NLSCY) which has produced data on child hunger since 1994; the National 
Population Health Survey (NPHS) through a supplement in the 1998-1999 survey; and the Canadian 
Community Health Survey (CCHS), the successor to the NPHS, which has asked questions about 
food insecurity starting in the 2000-2001 survey.  In this section, we focus on the results from the 




The NPHS and CCHS contained three questions specifically concerning food security:  
 
                                                 
68 In recent CCHS cycle (i.e. after the 2004 survey), questions concerning food security have been asked, but no data on 
food security have yet been published.   
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Source : Table 26b to Table 26e *A dwelling is acceptable if it meets all three criteria
Chart 34: Percentage of Households Whose Dwelling is Adequate, Suitable and Affordable, per Census 
Year   77 
In the past 12 months, how often did you or anyone else in your household: 
 
  …worry that there would not be enough to eat because of a lack of money? 
 
  …not have enough food to eat because of a lack of money? 
 
  …not eat the quality or variety of foods that you wanted to eat because of a lack of 
money? 
 
For each of the questions, respondents were required to answer often, sometimes or never. 
Respondents who answered “often” or “sometimes” to one or more questions were considered to have 




The 1998/99 NHPS found that over 10 per cent of Canadians were living with some level of 
food insecurity. Almost 35 per cent of people in low-income households reported some form of food 
insecurity while 14 per cent in middle income households, and just over 3 per cent in upper-middle 
and high income households reported any level of food insecurity. 
 
These results were corroborated in the 2000-2001 CCHS. Overall, in 2000/01, 14.7 per cent of 
the population reported some level of food insecurity during the year. Among low income 
households, 44 per cent reported some level of food insecurity.
 70  Similarly, 42 percent of lower-
middle income households reported at least one aspect of food insecurity. Even in middle income 
households, 24 per cent reported some level of food insecurity. Food insecurity also exists at the 
higher income levels with 11 per cent of upper-middle class households and 4 per cent of high income 
households reporting food insecurity. The presence of food insecurity at higher income levels could 
be linked to sudden economic collapses that lead to temporary episodes of food insecurity.  
   
Among the different aspects of food insecurity, compromised quality was the most 
widespread, with 12 per cent of the population reporting they did not eat the quality or variety of food 
they wanted because of a lack of money. Food anxiety, or worrying about not having enough to eat, 
ranked close second with 11 per cent. During the 2000/01 CCHS, 7 per cent of the population 
reported that they or someone in their family did not have enough to eat because of a lack of money at 
some point during the last year. Hunger was closely related to income, as 28 per cent of low and 
lower-middle income households reported that they had enough to each due to a lack of money at 
some point in the year. Still, 5 per cent of the middle to high income families said they did not have 
enough to eat (Chart 35). 
 
Aggregate results from CCHS cycle 2.1 (Statistics Canada, 2004) suggest that only 6.8 per 
cent of respondents experienced some level of food insecurity in 2004, a much lower proportion than 
                                                 
69 Statistics Canada (2001). Food Insecurity in Canadian Households. Health Reports. 12(4), 11-22. 
70 Income Adequacy categories are defined as follows: Lowest: <$10,000 if 1 to 4 people, <$15,000 if ≥5 people; Lower 
Middle: $10,000 to $14,999 if 1 or 2 people, $10,000 to $19,999 if 3 or 4 people, $15,000 to $29,999 if ≥5 people; 
Middle: $15,000 to $29,999 if 1 or 2 people, $20,000 to $39,999 if 3 or 4 people, $30,000 to $59,999 if ≥5 people; Upper 
Middle: $30,000 to $59,999 if 1 or 2 people, $40,000 to $79,999 if 3 or 4 people, $60,000 to $79,999 if ≥5 people; 
Highest: ≥$60,000 if 1 or 2 people, ≥$80,000 if ≥3 people   78 
in earlier surveys.  The results from cycle 2.2 of the Canadian Community Health Survey, conducted 
in 2004 and released in 2007, offer further insight into the prevalence of food insecurity in Canada. In 
2004, 9.2 per cent of Canadian households suffer from food insecurity. While high, this is down from 
the 2000/01 survey which found that 15 per cent of households suffered from food insecurity.  
 
 
In addition to confirming that food insecurity remains a real issue for Canadian policymakers, 
the 2004 findings adds further support to the previous assertion that food insecurity and income are 
highly correlated. Food insecurity had a very large impact on households in the lowest income 
adequacy category (Table 36b, Chart 35). A very large proportion of households in the lowest income 
adequacy grouping (48.3 per cent) were food insecure. The lower middle (29.1) and the middle (13.6) 
income adequacy groupings also showed high levels of food insecurity. The high income groupings 
showed far less susceptibility to food insecurity: the upper middle income adequacy group had a food 
insecurity prevalence of 5.2 per cent and the highest group had a prevalence of food insecurity of only 
1.3 per cent. The existence of food insecurity at the higher income levels may be due to financial 
mismanagement more than an actual inability to pay for food. 
 
Estimates of food insecurity from the most recent CCHS, which were conducted during 2007 
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Source : Table 36b
Chart 35: Prevalence of Food Insecurity by Income Adequacy Grouping, per cent, 2004  79 
D. Income Security 
1) Personal Security Index 
 
  The Personal Security Index published by the Canadian Council on Social Development 
includes subjective indicators that shed light on personal perceptions of wellbeing. Three questions 
relate to income security:  
   
  How adequate would you say your income is in meeting your family’s basic needs? Please 
use a 7-point scale where 1 is “not adequate at all” and 7 is “extremely adequate” and 
the mid-point 4 is “moderately adequate”.  
   
Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements, using a 7-point scale 
where 1 means you “strongly disagree” and 7 means you “strongly agree”, and the mid-point 
4 means you “neither agree nor disagree”.  
 
  If I lose my job, I am confident I could count on government support programs to support 
me and my family adequately while I look for a new job.  
 
  If you and your spouse lost your jobs, how many months could you sustain yourself on 
your current savings (bank counts and RRSPs)? 
   
 
 
Between 1998 and 2002, median after-tax income in Canada rose by $3,300 ($2003). 












Source : Table 41
Chart 36a: Subjective Perception of Income Adequacy as Reported by the Personal Security Indicator, 
1998-2002
per cent  80 
their basic needs fell from 57 per cent to 47 per cent and the percentage feeling that their income was 
inadequate rose from 14 per cent to 17 per cent (Chart 36a). This is an interesting result because the 
perception does not seem to match the actual income statistics. It could mean that Canadians changed 
their perception of what constitutes an adequate income or that a larger number of goods and services 
are now considered basic needs. In all cases, Canadians seem to be less satisfied with their level of 
income in 2002 than they were in 1998, even though their income in 2002 is higher. 
 
Results for the question concerning the ability of income support programs to support 
Canadians temporarily in case of a job loss were almost identical in 1998 and 2002. In 1998, 60 per 
cent felt the programs were insufficient to help them. In 2002, the proportion stood at 59 per cent 
(Chart 36b). With no major change in the percentage of Canadians covered by Employment Insurance 
and the proportion of the coverage compared to average weekly earnings over this period, it is not 
surprising that Canadians’ confidence in those programs has not changed. However, such a low 
degree of confidence in the social safety net should be a matter of concern. 
 
 
   
Finally, the financial security of Canadians seems to have improved dramatically between 
1998 and 2002. The percentage of Canadians who indicate that they are unable to sustain themselves 
for more than one month on their current savings fell from 22 per cent in 1998 to 12 per cent in 2002. 
Improvements in economic conditions probably explain most of that improvement.  
 
Subjective indicators have the advantage of capturing non-measurable elements such as the 
social environment and cultural differences which can affect individual wellbeing and which are 













Source : Table 41
Chart 36b: Confidence in Income Support Programs as Reported by the Personal Security Indicator, 1998-
2002
per cent  81 
competition, some people may feel their job is threatened even though market conditions seem good. 
The resulting anxiety affects their wellbeing and needs to be taken into account. 
2) Debt Levels and Savings Rate 
 
A falling savings rate and an accumulation of debt are often perceived as the result and the 
cause of increasing income insecurity. It is widely assumed that the 1981-2008 economic growth, and 
in particular the post-2000 recovery and expansion, were fuelled by consumer spending, though 
increases in investment were actually much larger proportionately and consumption actually grew less 
quickly then GDP. Nonetheless, growth in consumer expenditures outpaced disposable income 
growth over these periods, leading to an increase in the gross debt-to-income ratio or, more generally, 
in the liabilities-to-income ratio. In fact, growth in household spending and the dramatic fall in the 
savings rate appear to have stemmed from the considerable increase in the value of household assets 
over the period. Relatively strong spending thus seems to be the result of a wealth effect, not of a 
consumer squeeze aimed at sustaining economic expansion.   
  
In Canada, the savings rate, which represents the proportion of personal disposable income 
(PDI) that Canadians save, has followed a downward trend since 1982, although there are signs that 
the rate is increasing since 2005 (Table 46 and Chart 37a). From 20.2 per cent in 1982, it fell to 3.7 




Strong spending was reflected in the amount of liabilities held by households. In 2008, the 
average household had $82,286 in liabilities ($2001), up $41,326 from $40,960 in 1981 (Table 47B). 
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Source: Table 47b and Table 47d
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Chart 37a: Net Worth per Household ($2001, CPI adjusted) and Personal Savings Rate (per cent), 1981-
2008  82 
to $398,723 in 2008. Greater increases in assets translated into an increase in average net worth per 





  The increase in household assets in the 2000-2008 period came mainly from the boom in 
house prices. In fact, residential structures (average household value up $24,479) and land (up 
$32,264) were the fastest growing components.
71 Consumers spent more, but were they less well-off 
as a result? Looking only at the liabilities/income ratio, using personal disposable income (PDI) from 
the national accounts as the measure of income, we obtain the impression that the financial situation 
of the average household is worsening. While liabilities represented only 79 per cent of PDI in 1981, 
they represented 142 per cent of PDI in 2008 (Table 47D and Chart 37b). The upward trend started in 
1984. However, the assets- and net-worth-to-income ratios have been increasing at a faster absolute 
rate over the same time, which means that the average financial security of households has actually 
improved. Indeed, in 2008, the average household had net worth equivalent to 5.44 times personal 
disposable income, up from 3.99 times in 1981, a 36.3 per cent rise. Households could afford to spend 
a larger share of their income (thus the falling savings rate) because the value of their assets kept 
increasing. In other words, households appeared to substitute asset growth for savings. Thus, as their 
net worth increased, the savings rate decreased (Chart 37a). Of course, a fall in asset value as 
                                                 
71 The average household value of consumer durables increased by $388 from 2000 to 2008, shares increased by $10,480, 
currency and bank deposits increased $5,410 and life insurance and pensions increased by $6,214. The only asset category 
that experienced a decline was “other assets” (-$3,883), which includes: “Non-residential structures, Machinery and 
equipment, Inventories, Deposits in other institutions, Foreign currency deposits, Canada short-term paper, Other short-
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Source: Table 9a and Table47B
Chart 37b: Ratio of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth to Personal Disposable Income, on a per Household 
Basis,  1981-2008   83 
occurred in late 2008 puts this behaviour at risk – i.e. the increase in spending based on increasing 
asset value is not necessarily sustainable.
72 
 
In 2005, Statistics Canada conducted the Survey of Financial Security (SFS) and produced 
detailed estimates of Canadians’ assets and debts. In 2005, Canadians’ aggregate debts represented 
only 13.5 per cent of their assets (Table 48). Moreover, 10.2 percentage points of this 13.5 per cent 
were accounted by mortgages, which are generally backed by a real estate asset. Therefore, other 
debts, such as credit card debts, lines of credit, vehicle loans or student loans, accounted for only 3.3 
per cent of total Canadians’ assets. The value of assets was divided among non-financial assets (50.1 
per cent), private pensions (29.0 per cent), financial assets excluding pensions (10.4 per cent) and 
equity in business (10.5 per cent) (Chart 37c).  
    
 
 
Thus, the recent upward trend in consumer debt and the falling savings rate may not have been 
caused by a worsening of financial situation of households, but rather by an expansion in their 
financial security due to the increasing value of their assets, mainly their house and their stock market 
holdings. Moreover, since consumer debt does not represent a large portion of households’ liabilities, 
one can hardly maintain that consumer are being squeezed, at least not at the aggregate level. The 
most likely scenario is that low interest rates spurred both mortgage debt and real estate values, the 
two factors offsetting each other. However, studies concentrating on micro-level data could present a 
different picture. The impact might be different for homeowner, renters, and aspiring home-owners.
73 
                                                 
72 For a good overview of Canadian family finances, see Sauvé (2009). 
73 For more on patterns of spending and their socio-economic aspects, see Chawla and Wannell (2005) who study the 
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Chart 37c: Composition of Assets and Debt in Canada, as a Percentage of Total Assets, 2005  84 
E. Social Safety Net 
 
This section of the report examines developments in three social programs or policies that are 
very important for the living standards of Canadians, particularly low-to-moderate income Canadians. 
They are the minimum wage legislation, welfare or social assistance benefits, and Employment 
Insurance (EI) (know as Unemployment Insurance until 1996). The first two are under provincial 
jurisdiction and the third under federal jurisdiction. The impacts of these programs already manifest 
themselves in the income trends examined earlier in the report, but it is nevertheless useful to look at 
trends in the generosity of the programs. 
1) Minimum Wages  
 
Minimum wages raise the wages of workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, (although 
potentially at the cost of employment, a highly disputed issue among economists), boosting the 
incomes of many low-income households (Battle, 2003). The minimum wage in Canada, an 
employment-weighted average of provincial minimum wages, was $8.49 in nominal terms in 2008 




Over the 1983-2008 period, nominal minimum wages in this country increased at a 3.41 per 
cent average annual rate, above the 2.69 per cent rate for the average wage in the industrial aggregate. 
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Chart 38: Trends in Nominal Minimum Wage as a Proportion of Average Wage, and Real Hourly Minimum 
Wage (CPI Adjusted), 1983-2008  85 
42.1 per cent in 2008 (Chart 38).
74 The relative improvement took place in the 1983-1995 period as 
the minimum/average wage ratio peaked at 41.9 per cent in 1995, and declined to 40.2 per cent in 
2004 before increasing in 2005- 2008 to reach the current level. Chart 38 also shows that in the same 
1983-2008 period, the CPI adjusted real hourly minimum wage only increased at a 0.66 per cent 
average annual rate. 
2) Social Assistance Benefits 
 
Social assistance or welfare benefits go to the most disadvantaged in society. Chart 39 and 
Table 34A, based on data compiled by the National Welfare Council (2006) and National Welfare 
Council (2008), show trends in real average welfare benefits at the national level for four categories 
of welfare recipients based on the population-weighted provincial benefits from 1986 (the earliest 
year for which data are available) to 2007.  
 
    
 
In 1986, a single employable person received an average of $7,230 in welfare benefits 
($2007). Between 1986 and 1992, welfare benefits increased 27.1 per cent for a single employable 
person, reaching $9,189. However, benefits started to edge down in 1993 and fell 10.2 per cent for 
single employable persons in the single year of 1996 due to deep cuts in welfare benefits in Ontario. 
The amount of welfare benefits for a single employable person has continued a downward trend with 
                                                 
74 These measures are sensitive to the choice of wage series. For example, while the industrial aggregate wage series used 
in this section decreased in real terms (only slightly), if we had used total hourly compensation (which includes 
supplementary labour income) growth would have been positive for the period, and the relative gains in terms of the 
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Chart 39: Trend in Welfare Income in Canada (population weighted), 1986-2007
$2007  86 
the average amount received at $6,902 in 2007; since 1993, only 2002, 2006, and 2007 saw increases 
in welfare benefits and in each year the increase was less than $40.  
 
Trends in other groups were similar (Chart 39). The least affected by the fall in welfare 
benefits were single parents with one child, which saw their benefits fall only 0.45 per cent from 
$16,244 in 1986 to $16,172 in 2007. The drop in benefits had been more pronounced for this group, 
but since 2005 benefits have grown by 8.7 per cent in real terms. On the other hand, couples with two 
children suffered a 6.6 per cent fall in benefits, from $22,564 in 1986 to $21,074 in 2007. Similarly, 
persons with disabilities saw their welfare benefits decline 4.7 per cent over the period, reaching only 
$10,929 in 2007.  
   
One measure of the adequacy of welfare benefits is the proportion of the poverty line such 
benefits provide. By this criterion, welfare benefits have generally become less adequate over the 
1986-2007 period (Chart 40). Single employable beneficiaries saw their welfare benefits fall from 36 
per cent of the poverty line in 1986 to 32 per cent in 2007. If we compared to the 1990 peak of 46 per 
cent, it represents a 14-percentage-point fall in benefits as a proportion of the poverty line. Single 
parents with one child, who received 61 per cent of the poverty line in welfare benefit in 1986 were 
still at that level in 2007, but were well down from the 1994 peak of 69 per cent. The trend was 
similar for couples with two children, who saw the proportion of their welfare benefits fall 5 
percentage points between 1986 and 2007, from 58 per cent to 53 per cent, but fell 9 percentage 
points from a peak of 62 per cent in 1994. Finally, persons with a disability also experienced a fall in 
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Chart 40: Trend in Welfare Income as a Proportion of the Poverty Line in Canada (population weighted), 
1986-2007  87 
3) Minimum Wage Relative to Welfare Benefits and the Poverty Line 
 
  Using data published by the National Council of Welfare Reports covering 1986 and the 1989-
2007 period, and minimum wage data from Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, we 
approximated the number of hours of work at minimum wage needed to earn enough money to reach 
the poverty line. All the estimates in this section do not take into accounts income received from 
sources other than work. For example, the number of hours needed to earn the equivalent of the 
poverty line does not take into account that households may still receive the Canada Child Tax 
Benefits. If we were to take these programs into account, the number of hours would likely fall even 
faster over the 1989-2007 period.  
   
  In Canada, the number of hours of work at minimum wage needed to earn the equivalent of 
welfare benefits decreased considerably, mainly because of increasing minimum wages (Table 45B). 
However, the decrease in real welfare benefits between 1986 and 2007 did also contribute to this fall 
in hours. Single employable had to work 17.5 hours at minimum wage to earn as much as on welfare, 
compared to 19.9 hours in 1986. For persons with a disability, the number of hours was 27.8 in 2007 
compared to 31.1 in 1989. The number of hours for single parents with one child was 41.1 in 2007 
(from 44.8 hours in 1986) and for a couple with two children it was down to 53.5 hours, from 62.2 
hours in 1986. This trend is positive in two ways. First, it points to a higher minimum wage. Second, 
it suggests a reduction in the welfare wall, i.e. the incentive to join the workforce, even at the 




Interestingly, the number of hours of work at minimum wage to reach the poverty line has 
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Chart 41: Trend in the Number of Hours of Work per Week at Minimum Wage Needed to Reach the 
Poverty Line, 1986-2007  88 
2007, persons with a disability had to work 54.5 hours to reach the poverty line, 2.7 hours more than 
1989’s 51.8 hours, and the only category of workers which experienced an increase. Single 
employable needed to work 0.5 hours less, from 54.8 hours in 1986 to 54.3 hours in 2007. The 
number of hours needed is still much higher than the average weekly hours of work. Of course, if 
employment subsidies, earned income tax credit and the GST credit were taken into account, the 
number of hours needed may be realistically achieved by a single worker.  
 
Single parents with one child improved their situation considerably, from 73.8 hours of work 
needed in 1986 to 67.5 hours of work in 2007. Again, this improvement, however significant, is far 
off from a situation where a minimum wage single parent worker could plausibly reach the poverty 
line. Finally, the number of hours of work at minimum wage to reach the poverty line decreased 7.0 
hours for couples with two children, from 108.2 hours to 101.2 hours. Assuming both parents are 
employed at minimum wage, they would have to work about 50.5 hours per week each to reach the 
poverty line (once again, without taking into account government transfers and tax credits). 
 
What these statistics demonstrate is the inadequacy of the minimum wage, despite increases 
over time, to lift families out of poverty on its own, even when two family members work full-time. 
More specifically, they point to the essential role played by earning supplements program, which can 
bridge the gap between minimum wage earnings and the poverty line.  
  
4) Employment Insurance 
 
Employment Insurance is a very important income support program for temporary and 
seasonal workers as well as for workers in cyclical sectors. It is a complex program and its generosity 
is affected by a number of program parameters, including the replacement rate and the qualification 
period. Finance Canada produces an index of EI disincentives to work or conversely EI generosity for 
the 1970-2008 period at both the national and provincial level. Finance Canada provided these data to 
the Centre for the Study of Living Standards.
75 
 
Between 1981 and 2008 at the national level, the unadjusted EI Index decreased 71.4 
percentage points, from 163.5 per cent in 1981 to 92.1 in 2008 (Chart 42). In 2008, the EI index was 
lower than in any other year for the 1981-2008 period except for 2007. In other words, the EI/UI 
program in Canada was much less generous in 2008 than in earlier years. This reflected the sharp 
drop in the financial support provided by EI to out-of work workers, both because of a shorter 
duration of benefits and more restrictive qualifying periods. The EI Index reached a peak in 1983 at 
226.4 per cent and a trough in 2000 at 94.2 per cent. The sharpest fall during the period occurred 
between 1993 and 1995, with the index falling 60 percentage points, from 182.6 per cent to 122.6 per 
cent reflecting large cuts in EI generosity during this period. 
 
It is important to note that since qualification period and duration of benefits are related to the 
unemployment rate, trends in the EI generosity index are somewhat endogenous to the trend in the 
                                                 
75 Sargent (1995) developed an economic model in which individuals are assumed to optimize the duration of their 
employment and unemployment spells based on EI/UI parameters. The Sargent EI Disincentives Index, which represents 
the utility-maximizing point in the model, is based on the replacement rate, the minimum EI/UI entrance requirements and 
the maximum EI/UI benefit duration corresponding to entrance requirements.   89 
unemployment rate. When the unemployment rate rises, fewer weeks are needed to qualify for 
benefits and the duration of benefits increases, raising the overall EI generosity index. A constant 
unemployment rate EI generosity index can however be calculated and changes in this index therefore 




The overall trend of the constant unemployment rate EI Index is similar to the unadjusted EI 
Index. Assuming an employment rate of 7.5 per cent, the EI Index shows a decrease of 72.7 
percentage points over the period, from 168.4 per cent in 1981 to 96.7 per cent in 2008. However, 
trends within the period are slightly different. The sharpest fall in the EI Index occurred between 1989 
and 1991, with a 57.9-percentage-point decrease. The EI Index decreased further in the following six 
years, reaching a trough of 89.9 per cent in 1997. Since then, the EI Index increased slightly, reaching 
96.7 per cent in 2008. However, the same conclusion has to be drawn: the EI/UI program was much 
less generous in 2008 than it was during the 1980s and the early 1990s. 
5) Child Benefits 
 
  The most important new social program in recent years in Canada has been the expansion of 
child benefits through the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) and, more importantly, through the 
National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS). The current-dollar amount of funds allocated by the 
federal government to the CCTB base benefit has increased from $2.6 billion in 1995-96 to $3.6 
billion in 2006-2007, while funds allocated to the NCB supplement soared from $0.3 billion in 1995-
96 to $3.5 billion in 2006-2007, and reached $3.7 billion in 2007-2008 (Government of Canada, 
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* The adjusted index is independent of the business cycle and represents only changes in the program 
parameters that are policy driven. It is calculated using a constant unemployment rate of 7.5 per cent.  
Chart 42: Sargent EI Disincentives Index, 1970-2008 (1970=100)  90 
current dollars from $2,540 in 1995-96 to $6,175 in 2006-07 (Government of Canada, 2008), and has 
increased further reaching $6,593 in 2009-2010 (see www.cra-arc.gc.ca for complete details).  
 
  The NCBS has been targeted to low-income families, with full benefits in 2006-2007 received 
by families with income up to $20,435 and some benefits up to $36,378.
76 Consequently, this 
program has been somewhat successful in reducing both the incidence and depth of poverty. For 
example, a 2002 CSLS simulation study of the poverty effects of the NCBS based on the Statistics 
Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Development Model (SPSD/M) found that in 2004 the after-tax 
poverty rate for families with children would be 1.4 percentage points lower than it would have been 
in the absence of NCBS enrichment (CSLS, 2002).  
6) CSLS Economic Security Index 
 
  The Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS) has developed the Index of Economic 
Well-being (IEWB) to capture trends in economic wellbeing through four dimensions – consumption 
flows, stocks of wealth, income equality, and economic security (Osberg and Sharpe, 2002, 2005, 
2009c).  
 
  The economic security domain, the most complex and developed domain of the IEWB, 
consists of four components, called financial risks to economic wellbeing facing the population, 
namely the risk imposed by unemployment, the risk from illness, the risk from single parent poverty, 
and the risk of poverty in old age. Three of these components are in turn composed of more than one 
variable. 
a. Risk from Unemployment 
 
Risk imposed by unemployment is determined by three variables: the unemployment rate, the 
proportion of the unemployed receiving EI benefits, and the proportion of earnings that are replaced 
by EI benefits.  
 
  As noted earlier in the report, the unemployment rate was 6.1 per cent in Canada in 2008, the 
lowest rate attained during the 1981-2008 period, excluding 6.0 per cent in 2007 (Table 51 and Chart 
26). The unemployment rate rose in the early 1980s, peaking at 12.0 per cent in 1983 because of the 
recession, then fell during the recovery and economic expansion during the rest of the decade. This 
pattern repeated itself in the 1990s, with the unemployment rate rising to 11.4 per cent in 1993 and 
then slowly unwinding to 6.8 per cent in 2000. Unlike the early 1980s and 1990s, the early 2000s did 
not experience a significant economic downturn, so the unemployment rate has been relatively stable 
since 2000, peaking at 7.7 per cent in 2002 before falling to a low of 6.0 per cent in 2007. The 
unemployment rate increased slightly to 6.1 per cent in 2008.  
   
                                                 
76 In a number of provinces, families on welfare see their welfare benefits reduced by the increase in the NCBS, a situation 
that has been criticized by welfare advocates. An objective of the NCBS has been to decrease the disincentive for welfare 
families to enter the labour market or reduce the welfare wall by providing benefits for low income families with children 
whether the parents are on welfare or working.   91 
  In 2008, proportion of the unemployed receiving EI benefits was 43.3 per cent,
77 down from 
66.6 per cent in 1981 and 83.8 per cent in 1989 (Table 51 and Chart 43). It appears that the EI system 
became more generous in terms of coverage in the 1980s, but that this generosity fell significantly 
from 1989 to 1997, and has since stabilized. 
 
  In contrast to the falling coverage ratio, EI benefits as a proportion of average earnings have 
exhibited a high degree of stability (Chart 43). In 2008, EI benefits replaced 41.6 per cent of earnings, 




The aggregation procedure for the variables that make up the risk of unemployment 
component of the economic security domain is complex. The procedure can be summarized in two 
key steps. First, the indicators on the EI coverage ratio and on the percentage of earnings replaced by 
benefits are multiplied to obtain an index of the financial protection from unemployment provided by 
the EI system. Second, the unemployment rate and the financial protection indexes are weighted to 
produce the overall index of security from the risk imposed by unemployment. Since low 
unemployment levels are an unambiguously better way to ensure employment security, the 
unemployment rate is considered much more important than the EI system as a source of economic 
security for the working population. Consequently, in the aggregation of the overall index it is given a 
weight of four-fifths, compared to a weight of one-fifth for the financial protection index.  
                                                 
77 Strictly speaking the 43 per cent is the ratio of the number of persons receiving EI benefits to the number of 
unemployed. It is unlikely that all EI beneficiaries are classified as unemployed by the Labour Force Survey, especially in 
a region where there are few job prospects. And of course new labour market entrants may be unemployed but not eligible 
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Source: Table 51
Chart 43: Trends in the EI Financial Assistance in Canada, 1981-2008  92 
b. Financial Risk from Illness 
 
  The second component of the economic security domain is the financial risk imposed by 
illness. In Canada, health care deemed medically necessary provided by hospitals and doctors’ offices 
is free of charge to all citizens through public medicare programs. In this sense the financial risk 
imposed by illness is much less than in countries without such universal coverage like the United 
States. But there is still significant private expenditure on health care in Canada and these 
expenditures have been rising rapidly. Included are spending for dental care, drugs taken outside 
hospitals, unlisted medical services such as acupuncture, and delisted medical services (physiotherapy 
and vision care are examples of medical services that have been recently delisted in Ontario). Also 
included are procedures considered socially desirable even though medically unnecessary, such as 
plastic surgery.  
 
Unreimbursed private expenditure on health care rose from $6.3 billion current dollars in 1981 
to $50.0 billion in 2008. This represented nearly a doubling of private health spending as a share of 
disposable income, from 2.66 per cent to 5.29 per cent (Table 52 and Chart 44). Such a development 
can be considered a deterioration in the economy security of Canadians. Increased private health 




c. Risk from Single-Parent Poverty 
 
  The third component of the economic security domain is the risk of single parent poverty. This 
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Source : Table 52.
Chart 44: Trends in the Proportion of Unreimbursed Private Expenditure on Healthcare in Personal 
Disposable Income in Canada, 1981-2008
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the poverty rate for lone female-headed families, and the poverty gap for these families. These latter 
two variables when combined give the poverty intensity. Poverty is defined in relative terms as the 
proportion of households below one-half median income (equivalent to the LIM discussed in an 
earlier section of this report). 
   
  The divorce rate for married couples, defined as the number of divorce divided by the number 
of married couples in a given year, was 0.89 per cent in Canada in 2008, the lowest rate in a quarter 
century (Table 53). The divorce rate rose from 1.12 per cent in 1981 to a peak of 1.47 per cent in 
1987 and has since been on a downward trend (Chart 45), reflecting possibly the aging of the 




It is well known that the poverty rate is particularly high for female lone parent families. In 
2008, this rate was 35.5 per cent (Table 53). But it fell considerably more or less continuously over 
the 1981-2001 period. Despite a large increase in 2002, subsequent years saw poverty resume its 
decline such that the current level is 46.8 per cent below the 1981 level of 66.7 per cent (Chart 46). 
 
  In contrast to the decline in the single parent poverty rate, the poverty gap in 2008 was 
virtually identical to that in 1981 (29.0 versus 30.4 per cent). But the poverty gap did fall significantly 
from 1981 to a trough of 21.7 per cent in 1993 before giving up the gains in the 1994-2003 period 
(Table 53 and Chart 46). There has been a moderate decline from the 2003 level of 30.3 per cent. 
 
  The overall component for the risk of single parent poverty is calculated as the product of the 
divorce rate, the poverty rate for single parents and the poverty gap for single parents. The index 
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Source: Table 53           Note: The divorce rate is defined as the number of divorce divided by the number of married couples.
Chart 45: Trends in the Divorce Rate in Canada, 1981-2008 
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greater than the individual improvements for the divorce rate (-19.5 per cent) and female single parent 




d. Risk of Poverty in Old Age 
 
  The fourth component of the economic security domain is the risk to poverty in old age. This 
component is proxied by the poverty intensity experienced by the households headed by a person 65 
and over.   
 
  The poverty rate for the elderly in Canada has been cut in half over the last quarter century, 
falling from 18.7 per cent in 1981 to 6.9 per cent in 2008 (Table 54 and Chart 47). The downward 
trend has been uneven as the poverty rate was even lower in the mid-1990s at between 3 and 4 per 
cent.  
 
  The poverty gap of seniors has also fallen significantly over the past quarter century, from 
26.9 per cent in 1981 to 17.4 per cent in 2008, a 35.4-per cent decline. Unlike the rather haphazard 
path of elderly poverty rate, the poverty gap has been on a more or less steady downward trajectory. 
     
 
  The overall component of the risk of poverty in old age, poverty intensity, is the product of the 
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Source : Table 53
Chart 46: Trends in the Poverty Rate and Poverty Gap Ratio for Lone Female Families in Canada,
1981-2008   95 
54), representing a fall of 76.2 per cent. Again, this was larger than the falls of the poverty rate (63.1 
per cent) and the poverty gap (35.4 per cent) taken separately because of the multiplicative effect. 
 
e. Aggregation of the Components of Economic Security into Overall Economic Security Domain 
Index  
 
  The scaled values of the four components of the economic security domain are aggregated to 
obtain an overall scaled index for the domain. The weights used for this aggregation procedure are 
constructed from the relative sizes of the populations subject to each risk. 
 
In terms of the risk of unemployment, it is assumed that the entire population aged 15 to 64 
years is subject to this risk. In 2008, this was equivalent to 69.5 per cent of the total population (Table 
68). In terms of the financial risk associated with illness, it is assumed that 100 per cent of the 
population is at risk. In terms of the risk of single-parent poverty, it is assumed that all married 
women and their children who are under 18 are at risk. In 2008, this group represented 35.1 per cent 
of the population. In terms of the risk to poverty in old age, it is assumed that the population aged 45-
64 is most at risk. This group represented 27.3 per cent of the population in 2008. The component 
specific weights are generated by adding up all the proportions of the population subject to the four 
risks (232) and then standardizing to unity by dividing each proportion of the population affected by 
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Source : Table 54
Chart 47: Trends in the Poverty Rate and Poverty Gap Ratio for Elderly Families in Canada, 1981-2008   96 
 
  Because of demographic shifts, the proportion of the population affected by the 
different risks, and hence the weights, varies over time. With the aging of the population, the 
proportion of the population in the 15-64 age group has increased from 68.1 per cent in 1981 to 69.5 
per cent in 2008, the proportion of the population aged 45-64 rose from 18.9 per cent to 27.3 per cent, 
and the proportion of married women with children under 18 fell from 45.3 per cent to 35.1 per cent.  
 
  The contribution of each component is the product of its scaled value and weight. For 
example, in 2008 the contribution of the risk of unemployment was 0.191 (0.637*0.300), financial 
risk from illness 0.143 (0.332*0.432), the risk of single parent poverty 0.115 (0.766*0.150), and the 
risk of poverty in old age 0.100 (0.853*0.118). Aggregating the contributions gives 0.558, which is 
the value of the overall economic security domain in 2008.  
 
  The overall index of economic security fell 0.10 points (or 15.5 per cent) from 0.660 in 1981 
to 0.558 in 2008 (Chart 48a). The weighted contribution of three of the components to economic 
security increased between 1981 and 2008 – the financial security from unemployment (0.3 per cent 
per year), the security from by single-parent poverty (1.21 per cent per year) and the security from 
poverty in old age (2.72 per cent per year) (Chart 48b). This means that the entire decline in the 
overall economic security in Canada over the 1981-2008 was driven by the rapid decline in the 
security from illness, with its contribution falling 3.2 per cent per year over the 1981-2008 period. 
The large weight given to this component (about 43 per cent of the security index) also contributed to 
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Chart 48a: Overall Index of Economic Security for Canada, 1981-2008
Source: Table 55  97 
 
 
7) Vulnerable Social Groups 
 
  In the Canadian context, particular attention must be given to certain groups which tend to 
reap less of the benefits stemming from economic growth. In this section, we briefly review the recent 
performance of immigrants and Aboriginal Canadians in terms of income and labour market 
outcomes to assess whether or not they have followed overall Canadian trends or not.  
 
  In terms of unemployment rate, recent immigrants (those who entered the country 6 to 10 
years ago) and very recent immigrants (those who entered the country in the last five years) to Canada 
have seen their fortunes improve in both the 2001 and 2006 censuses. In 1996, the unemployment rate 
among very recent immigrants stood at 18.0 per cent (Table 71a). It decreased to 12.7 per cent in 
2001 and fell further in 2006, reaching 12.3 per cent. Yet, if compared to unemployment among non-
immigrants, very recent immigrants lost ground between 1996 and 2006: in 2006 their unemployment 
rate was 92 per cent higher that of non-immigrants, compared to 82 per cent in 1996. In other words, 
very recent immigrants did benefit from the overall trend towards better labour market outcomes, but 
less so than non-immigrants.  
 
The unemployment rate for recent immigrants followed a similar trend, from 13.4 per cent in 
1996 to 8.4 per cent in 2006. They also gained ground in relative terms, with their unemployment rate 
decreasing from 35 per cent above that of non-immigrants in 1996 to 31 per cent above that of non-
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Income data paints a much worse picture. Between 2000 and 2005, economic families headed 
by a very recent immigrant experienced a decline in real average total income, from $55,615 to 
$53,556 (Table 71b). The ratio of very recent immigrant income to non-immigrant income fell from 
72.7 per cent in 2000 to 64.1 per cent in 2006. These patterns were replicated for real median total 
income, with very recent immigrants and immigrants as a whole losing ground both in absolute and 
relative terms between 2000 and 2005 (Table 71c). 
 
The Aboriginal population fared slightly better than immigrants, experiencing relative 
improvements in addition to absolute improvement in labour market outcomes between 2001 and 
2006 (Sharpe, Arsenault, Lapointe and Cowan, 2009). The unemployment rate of Aboriginal 
Canadians fell from 19.1 per cent in 2001 to 14.8 per cent in 2006, or from 169 per cent higher that of 
non-Aboriginal in 2001 to 135 per cent in 2006 (Table 72a). Their employment rate also increased, 
from 49.7 per cent in 2001 (80.4 per cent the non-Aboriginal level) to 53.7 per cent in 2006 (85.6 per 
cent the non-Aboriginal level) (Table 72b). These improvements, however, should not obscure the 
fact that Aboriginal Canadians remain grossly under-employed when compared to other Canadians. 
 
VI. Overall Trends in the Living Standards Domain 
 
  This report has discussed trends in a large number of indicators of living standards covering 
average and median income and wealth, the distribution of income and wealth, income volatility, and 
economic security. This section attempts to summarize and synthesize these trends to develop a 
coherent story about the evolution of living standards in Canada over the last quarter century.  
 
A. Overall Trends 
 
1) Canadians Are on Average Better Off in Terms of Income and Wealth 
 
  The first message from the data is that Canadians have on average higher income in 2007 and 
2008 than in 1981. But the magnitude of the real income gains is very sensitive to both the choice of 
unit of analysis (persons versus households) and the choice of income measure (total or pre-tax versus 
after-tax income).  
 
The number of households grew almost 60 per cent faster than the number of persons over the 
1981-2007 period (51.5 per cent versus 32.7 per cent) so real income trends on a household basis 
show much less progress than on an individual basis. As the average tax rate also increased over the 
period, after-tax income measures show less growth than pre-tax measures. 
 
National account income measures show that between 1981 and 2007 real personal income 
per capita rose 34.8 per cent, and real personal disposable income per capita 25.9 per cent (and 36.5 
per cent and 28.8 per cent respectively for the 1981-2008 period). In contrast, income estimates from 
household surveys (SCF/SLID), which are currently only available to 2007, show that total real 
income per household increased 17.2 per cent and after-tax real income per household rose 15.5 per 
cent. Greater growth in the number of households than persons account for these differences. Part of   99 
the increase in real income of course reflected an increase in hours worked, with the average weekly 
hours worked per person of working age up 3.2 per cent over the 1981-2008 period. 
 
  The average wealth of Canadians also increased substantially over the 1981-2008 period. 
National accounts balance sheet estimates show that average real net worth was up 73.3 per cent on a 
per capita basis and 51.7 per cent on a household basis. 
 
2) Income and Wealth Inequality Has Increased 
 
  The second message is that income growth has been unevenly shared among Canadians, with 
the rich garnering a disproportionately large portion of the gains. For economic families, the after-tax 
income of the top quintile, or fifth, of households, adjusted for family size, rose 39 per cent between 
1981 and 2007, while the increases for the other quintiles were in the 20-25 per cent range. An even 
more unequal pattern was observed for total and market income. This led to a significant rise in the 
income share of the top quintile, offset by declines in the income shares of the other four quintiles. 
These developments resulted in the Gini coefficient, a measure of overall income inequality, 
increasing significantly, with most of the increase in the 1990s. The Gini coefficient for market 
income increased by 16.8 per cent between 1981 and 2007. The increase in inequality was greatest for 
market income and least for after-tax income, implying that increases in both government transfers 
and taxes offset somewhat the rise in market income inequalities, at least in the 1980s.  
 
The rising inequality also meant that median income measures performed much worse than 
average income measures. Indeed, over the 1981-2007 period, median market income per household 
actually declined 4.8 per cent, while median total income rose 2.9 per cent and after-tax income rose 
4.2 per cent.  
 
  The picture of living standard trends provided by median income is inconsistent with the 
widespread impression Canadians have of a steady progression in living standards based on average 
income per capita measures. Median after-tax income of all family units only surpassed 1981 levels in 
2006. Not only does it imply a decrease in living standards for the median Canadian household 
between 1981 and 2005, but it also means that government redistribution, through transfers and taxes, 
did not totally offset the reduction in median market income per family unit until 2006. 
 
  Wealth distribution also became much more unequal between 1984, 1999 and 2005. This 
trend was particularly obvious between 1999 and 2005, the two years for which data on the 
distribution of wealth include pensions. Indeed, median real net worth per household increased only 
23.2 per cent between 1999 and 2005 compared to 29.6 per cent for average net worth. Median real 
net worth for the bottom quintile fell 9.1 per cent, compared to a 28.5 per cent rise for the uppermost 
quintile. 
 
3) Some Progress Has Been Made in Reducing Poverty 
 
  The third message is that the rising income inequality has meant that while the increased real 
average income has translated into some improvement in the poverty rate, these improvements would 
likely have been greater if income gains had been more evenly shared. Nonetheless, poverty has fallen 
to a record low, with the after-tax Low Income Cut-off (LICO) rate for all persons 2.4 percentage   100 
points lower in 2007 than in 1981 (9.2 per cent versus 11.6 per cent). Poverty in 2007 reached its 
lowest level since Statistics Canada began tracking it in 1976, and was down 1.3 percentage points 
from its previous low of 10.5 per cent in 2006. The poverty gap, that is the amount of money by 
which the average poor family unit falls short of the poverty line, was the same in 2007 and in 1981 – 
$6,700 (2007 dollars). 
 
4) Overall Improvement in Labour Market Conditions 
 
The fourth message is that there has been improvement in overall labour market conditions, a 
key determinant of living standards, over the 1981-2008 period. Within the period, there were two 
sub-periods of very poor labour market conditions, namely the early 1980s and first half of the 1990s. 
The unemployment rate in 2008 was 6.1 per cent, down from 7.6 per cent in 1981. Despite the lower 
unemployment rate, the proportion of long-term unemployed, that is those who had been unemployed 
52 weeks or more, was greater in 2008 than in 1981 – 6.7 per cent versus 5.7 per cent. 
 
The most important development has been the increased employment rate, that is, the ratio of 
the employed to the working age population. This rate reached 63.6 per cent in 2008, up from 60.1 
per cent in 1981 due to the rise in the aggregate participation rate (67.8 per cent versus 65.0 per cent), 
which itself was driven completely by the increased labour force participation of women. Another 
positive development has been the decline in the incidence of job loss from 8.0 per cent in 1981 to 5.4 
per cent in 2008. 
   
5) Frayed Social Safety Net Provides Less Support for the Disadvantaged 
 
  Certain key social programs for working age people now provide less income support to the 
disadvantaged than they did in the past. Welfare benefits, expressed in constant dollars, were 
significantly lower for all four types of welfare recipients in 2007 than in 1986. Employment 
insurance in 2008 was less generous, in terms of required qualification period and duration of 
benefits, than in 1981. These developments have likely contributed to the increase in income 
inequality. 
 
On the other hand, the introduction of the child tax credit and the National Child Benefits 
Supplement in the mid-1990s, the only major new social program established since the 1970s, has 
provided additional income to poor working families and lowered the poverty rate for this group 
somewhat. Equally, the national minimum wage in 2008 represented 42 per cent of the average 
industrial wage, up from 35 per cent in 1983.  
B. Sustainability of Living Standards 
 
  Canadians enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the world. An important issue is 
whether this level of living standards can be sustained for future generations. Leaving aside 
environmental sustainability issues, which are beyond the scope of this report and will be addressed in 
the report on the CIW environmental domain (but have obvious effects on the sustainability of the 
overall economy and society) the prospects for the long-term sustainability of the current level of 
living standards of Canadians are good. Indeed, it is likely that average living standards will continue 
to rise in the future although not all Canadians may benefit if inequality continues to grow.    101 
   
 The high probability of a rosy scenario for living standards is based on a number of features 
of the Canadian economy: 
  a highly educated population, with Canada having the highest proportion of its 
population with a post-secondary education of any OECD country; 
  a rich natural resource base, especially the oil sands, in a world hungry for resources; 
  easy access to the world pool of technological innovations through trade and 
investment flows, and through our proximity to the United States, the world leader in 
technology; 
  low government and international debt; and 
  a rising population largely through immigration adding dynamism to the economy, in 
contrast to stagnant or falling population in many other developed countries.  
 
This scenario faces some significant risks for example. The most prominent risk to a rosy 
scenario of recovery in Canada is a protracted recovery, or even further significant declines in 
economic activity, south of the border. If the United States does not get out of recession rapidly, 
Canada may not be able to weather the storm as efficiently as it would otherwise do. Moreover, in the 
short-term, however, the recession in Canada and the United States will undoubtedly reduce the pace 
of growth of incomes in Canada and significantly increase labour market insecurity.
78 Yet, the 
recession may also translate lead to a decline in house prices which will translate into more affordable 
housing. Nonetheless, it is clear that a recession will translate into a falling composite index for the 
living standards domain. Indeed, in the wake of both the early 1990s and the 2001 slowdowns, the 
composite index of the living standards domain decreased (Chart 49).    
 
The effect of the developing recession on the composite index, however, will not be felt 
before the 2009 reference year. The current crisis only began affecting the labour market in the last 
quarter of 2008, and will likely not have a significant impact on annual estimates for that year. Given 
the significant lag between the reference and release year for some data, particularly income data, we 
should not expect to see the effect of current developments on the composite indicator before 2010 or 
2011 when 2009 data become available. 
 
VII. Living Standards Measurement Issues 
 
In its examination of trends in living standards, this report has encountered many 
technical/definitional and conceptual issues where choices had to be made. Some of these issues are 
highlighted below.  
 
                                                 
78 Some impacts can already be seen in current data. See Arsenault and Sharpe (2009) for more details.   102 
A. Technical and Definitional Issues 
 
  Which is the more appropriate price index for deflating nominal income to obtain real or 
constant price estimates – the Consumer Price Index, which has been used in this report, or the 
Implicit Personal Consumption Expenditure deflator? The CPI grew 0.6 percentage points per 
year more quickly than the PCE over the 2000-2008 period. 
 
  Is the most appropriate unit of analysis for income statistics the person or the household? This 
is a very important issue as the number of households grew 19 percentage points faster than 
the number of persons (51.5 per cent versus 32.7 per cent) over the 1981-2007 period because 
of falling household size. Both have been used in the report, but gives more emphasis to after-
tax data. 
 
  Is the most appropriate unit of analysis for household income statistics the economic family 
(two or more related persons) or the family unit or household, which includes unattached 
individuals? Again both have been used in the report depending on data availability from 
Statistics Canada. Unfortunately, income distribution data are not available for all households. 
 
  Should an equivalence scale be used to adjust economic family income estimates for family 
size and if so what is the most appropriate equivalence scale? As we have used Statistics 
Canada data, there is no inconsistency in the use of an equivalence scale. 
  
  Should the term poverty rate be used to refer to the LICO measure, as is done in this report? 
Since the Government of Canada has provided no official definition of poverty in this country, 
Statistics Canada does not call LICOs poverty rates. On the other hand, many social groups 
refer to the LICOs as poverty rates. The report uses LICO rate in preference to poverty rate, a 
choice reflected in the choice of the headline indicator for poverty. 
 
B. Conceptual Issues 
 
  Would value be added to the analysis of living standards by the construction of a composite 
index of living standards indicators that captures and summarizes overall trends or would such 
a measure be potentially misleading given the need for weights to aggregate the different 
indicators into one index? Do the advantages of aggregation outweigh the disadvantages? A 
brief section in this report has been added on composite indicators and another paper 
addresses in more detail this issue (Michalos et al., 2009). 
 
  Which is the most appropriate income measure for tracking trends in real income – after-tax 
measures, which are closely linked to private consumption and saving possibilities and have 
largely been used in this report, or total (before-tax) income measures which are closely linked 
to public consumption possibilities through taxes as well as private consumption and saving 
possibilities? The report reports both total and after-tax income measures as both have uses. 
 
  Which is the most appropriate low income measure? Is it a purely relative measure such as the 
Low Income Measure (LIM) which is insensitive to income growth that equally affects all   103 
income groups? Or is it an absolute poverty measure such as the Market Basket Measure 
(MBM) or to a somewhat lesser extent the Low Income Cut-off (LICO) where income growth 
that equally affects all income groups can reduce poverty? The report reports results for all 
three measures of low income, but prefers the LICO as it is available for a long period and is 
familiar to Canadians.  
 
  A second issue related to poverty is the relative emphasis that should be given low income or 
poverty rates versus gaps. Both low income rates and gaps are reported, but more attention is 
given to the rate as it is better understood by the public. 
 
  In the analysis of trends in living standards, what is the relative weight that should be attached 
to objective measures of living standards and to subjective measures, particularly in situations 
where the two concepts are out of alignment? The report gives priority to objective measures. 
 
  What is the relative weight that should be given short-term or frictional unemployment, 
compared to long-term or structural unemployment in the assessment of the wellbeing effects 
associated with unemployment? More emphasis is put on long-term unemployment as 
involves greater hardship. 
 
VIII. Headline Indicators for the Living Standard Component of the 
CIW  
      
At the meeting of the CIW National Working Group June 27-28, 2006 in Ottawa, eleven 
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The absolute values of the latest estimates for all headline indicators are provided in Summary 
Table 13. Unfortunately, annual time series data are available for only nine of the eleven indicators. 
There were no consistent time series estimates for the persistence of low income (estimate for 2000 
only) and the prevalence of food insecurity (estimate only for a few selected years). Moreover, data 
on wealth distribution were available only for 1984, 1999 and 2005.  
 
Only six of the eight headline indicators with time series data have estimates for the entire 
1981-2008 period. Estimates for the CIBC employment quality index are only available from 1988 
and for the RBC housing affordability index since 1985. Because of these data limitations, and 
because of data limitations in other domains, headline indicators for the living standards domain are 
reported only starting in 1988. As a result, the key trends discussed in this section differ slightly from 
those observed for the 1981-2008 period highlighted throughout the report.  
 
It is important to know if an increased value for a headline indicator represents an 
improvement or deterioration in living standards. We assume that increases in the values for median 
income, the CSLS economic security index, the employment rate and the CIBC Employment Quality 
Index represent improvements in living standards. Alternatively, increases in the value of the ratio of 
the top to bottom income quintile, the incidence of low income, the incidence of long-term 
unemployment, and the RBC housing affordability index represent a deterioration in living standards.  
 
Of the eight headline indicators, four experienced increases and four deteriorations between 
1988 and 2008 (Executive Summary Table 2). The largest improvement was in the incidence of long 
term unemployment which witnessed a 22.5 per cent decrease (1.9 percentage points). The second 
largest improvement was in the incidence of low income for economic families (down 27.5 per cent 
per cent or 2.2 percentage points). There are also notable increases in after-tax real median family 
income, up 14.4 per cent, and the employment rate which is up 3.2 per cent (1.9 percentage points). 
 
The headline indicator that suffered the largest deterioration over the 1988-2008 period was 
the ratio of the after-tax incomes of the top to bottom quintile (up 16.6 per cent), followed by 
economic security (down 14.7 per cent) and employment quality (down 11.3 per cent). The RBC 
Housing Affordability Index saw the smallest change among the indicators that experienced 




   105 
Summary Table 13: Composite Index of the Canadian Index of Wellbeing, Headline Indicators for 
the Living Standards Domain 










































1988  4.16  54,000  8.0  0.654  8.7  61.7  112.6  41.3 
1989  4.23  54,800  7.5  0.667  8.1  62.2  113.5  44.3 
1990  4.38  52,700  9.1  0.654  7.1  61.7  111.7  49.0 
1991  4.48  50,700  9.9  0.621  8.9  59.7  108.6  42.6 
1992  4.59  51,100  9.9  0.603  13.2  58.3  104.0  40.0 
1993  4.44  49,500  11.0  0.592  16.2  57.9  101.8  38.9 
1994  4.46  50,400  10.8  0.592  17.4  58.4  100.6  42.5 
1995  4.53  49,900  10.9  0.599  16.3  58.7  101.6  39.2 
1996  4.74  49,800  11.7  0.586  16.4  58.4  100.1  36.7 
1997  4.86  50,100  11.6  0.575  15.6  58.9  100.1  35.1 
1998  4.99  52,000  10.1  0.581  13.3  59.7  100.4  34.5 
1999  4.86  53,700  9.5  0.584  11.2  60.6  104.4  35.6 
2000  5.11  54,600  9.0  0.593  10.7  61.3  105.3  36.6 
2001  4.99  56,800  7.9  0.571  9.0  61.1  105.7  34.3 
2002  5.09  56,700  8.6  0.537  9.2  61.7  102.9  35.1 
2003  4.98  56,700  8.5  0.534  9.6  62.4  100.2  35.5 
2004  5.15  57,400  8.0  0.549  9.1  62.7  99.2  36.7 
2005  4.97  58,400  7.4  0.544  9.2  62.7  99.3  37.3 
2006  4.88  59,600  7.0  0.558  8.3  63.0  98.5  41.0 
2007  4.86  61,800  5.8  0.563  7.1  63.5  97.7  44.9 
2008  4.86  61,800  5.8  0.558  6.7  63.6  99.9  45.2 
Change, 1988-2008 
Absolute 
change  0.7  7,800  -2.2  -0.096  -1.9  1.9  -12.7  3.9 
Per cent 
change  16.6  14.4  -27.5  -14.7  -22.5  3.2  -11.3  9.5 
Note: Data were interpolated linearly for missing data point. If data points were missing for 2008, they were assumed to 
be the same as in 2007 
 
A Composite Index for the Living Standards Domain 
 
  This section constructs a composite indicator for the 1988-2008 period based on the indexes 
for the eight headline indicators (see Michalos et al. (2009) for details). Each of the eight raw 
indicator scores of Summary Table 13 is converted into an index of change in Summary Table 14 by 
dividing every raw score in each column by the first score in the column for the base year of 1988, 
e.g., the first score for the ratio ot top to bottom quintile gives 4.16/4.16 = 100.0, 4.23/4.16 = 101.68, 
etc. It should be noticed that the replacement of raw data scores by change scores in the interest of   106 
obtaining comparability across the set of indicators was made at the expense of a loss of important 
information for each indicator, e.g., the final change score for economic families’ after tax median 
incomes across the decade indicates that some progress was made but it fails to indicate anything 
concerning the size or adequacy of those incomes. Clearly, the information contained in Summary 
Table 13 is at least as important as the information in Summary Table 14. 
 
Summary Table 14: Composite Index of the Canadian Index of Wellbeing, Headline Indicators for 
the Living Standards Domain 
















































1988  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1989  98.3  101.5  106.7  102.0  107.4  100.8  100.8  93.2  101.3 
1990  95.0  97.6  87.9  100.0  122.5  100.0  99.2  84.3  98.3 
1991  92.9  93.9  80.8  95.0  97.8  96.8  96.4  96.9  93.8 
1992  90.6  94.6  80.8  92.2  65.9  94.5  92.4  103.3  89.3 
1993  93.7  91.7  72.7  90.5  53.7  93.8  90.4  106.2  86.6 
1994  93.3  93.3  74.1  90.5  50.0  94.7  89.3  97.2  85.3 
1995  91.8  92.4  73.4  91.6  53.4  95.1  90.2  105.4  86.7 
1996  87.8  92.2  68.4  89.6  53.0  94.7  88.9  112.5  85.9 
1997  85.6  92.8  69.0  87.9  55.8  95.5  88.9  117.7  86.6 
1998  83.4  96.3  79.2  88.8  65.4  96.8  89.2  119.7  89.8 
1999  85.6  99.4  84.2  89.3  77.7  98.2  92.7  116.0  92.9 
2000  81.4  101.1  88.9  90.7  81.3  99.4  93.5  112.8  93.6 
2001  83.4  105.2  101.3  87.3  96.7  99.0  93.9  120.4  98.4 
2002  81.7  105.0  93.0  82.1  94.6  100.0  91.4  117.7  95.7 
2003  83.5  105.0  94.1  81.7  90.6  101.1  89.0  116.3  95.2 
2004  80.8  106.3  100.0  83.9  95.6  101.6  88.1  112.5  96.1 
2005  83.7  108.1  108.1  83.2  94.6  101.6  88.2  110.7  97.3 
2006  85.2  110.4  114.3  85.3  104.8  102.1  87.5  100.7  98.8 
2007  85.6  114.4  137.9  86.1  122.5  102.9  86.8  92.0  103.5 
2008  85.6  114.4  137.9  85.3  129.9  103.1  88.7  91.4  104.5 
Change, 1988-2008 
Per cent 
change  -14.4  14.4  37.9  -14.7  29.9  3.1  -11.3  -8.6  4.5 
Note: Data were interpolated linearly for missing data point. If data points were missing for 2008, they were assumed to be the same 
as in 2007 
 
In order to standardize the index values so that increases and decreases in figures uniformly 
represent improvement and deterioration, respectively, in living standards, the values of indicators 
where an increase represented a deterioration in living standards have been transformed by their 
reciprocals e.g., the index values for the RBC housing affordability index become 100.0/100.0 =   107 
100.0, 100.0/107.3 = 93.23, etc. This transformation is non-linear and may distort some trends, but it 
seemed to be the most transparent option.  
   
The aggregation function for the index values of the eight indicators is a simple average, or a 
mean score, with equal weights for all indicators. The simple average of any set of numbers is a 
familiar measure of the central tendency of the set, with familiar problems. Most notably, a mean (or 
average) score can provide a very misleading picture if one or a few figures in the set are wildly 
different from most others.  
 
  The composite index increased 4.5 per cent over the 1988-2008 period (Chart 49). This 
composite indexes suggest that Canadians have seen virtually no increase in their living standards 





This conclusion of course depends on the period selected (as 1988 was a peak year, use of an 
earlier year would likely show greater improvements), and the choice of headline indicators. Had 
averages for income been used instead of median values, living standards improvements would have 
been greater. Increased inequality in income and wealth do not necessarily mean that persons at the 
bottom of the distribution are worse off in any absolute sense, only that they are worse off in relative 
terms. This means that the weights given distribution issues in the assessment of living standards (in 
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Chart 49: Trends in GDP per Capita and Composite Index of Headline Living Standards Indicators for 
Canada, 1988-2008  108 
X. Conclusion 
 
This report has provided a comprehensive examination of a large number of 
indicators of living standards in Canada over the last quarter century and has identified a 
number of these indicators as headline indicators for the new Canadian Index of 
Wellbeing. The bottom line from this report is that Canada is becoming a much richer 
country, but that it has been the top quintile that has received the lion’s share of rising 
income and wealth.  
 
Looking at the nine headline indicators for which time series are available, one 
sees that many dimensions of the living standards of Canadians have not improved 
between 1981 and 2008. Indeed, Canadians experienced a widening of income and 
wealth inequalities. There have been notable poverty reductions over the period. On the 
other hand, wealth inequality have both increased significantly. The unemployment rate 
is near to a record low for the 1981-2008 period, and yet the incidence of long-term 
unemployment was higher in 2008 than in 1981. Economic security has also fallen; 
despite rising security in many dimensions, the decrease in economic security caused by 
additional personal financial costs associated with healthcare represents a major policy 
area that must be addressed. Thus, many dimensions of living standards in Canada have 
not improved since 1981, and that in spite of a 52.6 per cent surge in real gross domestic 
product per capita. Looking forward, the challenges for Canada’s policymakers are 
significant, but need to be tackled if Canada is to become a fairer and richer country. 
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